UNIVERSAL LIBRARY

ORIENTAL TRANSLATION FUND.

NEW SERIES,

VOL. XXIV.

THE

VAISESIKA PHILOSOPHY

ACCORDING TO THE

DASAPADARTHA-SASTRA:

CHINESE TEXT

WITH

INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION, AND NOTES

BY

H. UI

PROFESSOR IN THE SŌTŌSHU COLLEGE, TOKYO,

EDITED BY

F. W. THOMAS

LONDON:

ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY,

22 ALBEMARLE STREET.

1917

STEPHEN AUSTIN AND SONS, LTD.
PRINTERS, HERTFORD.

PREFACE

THE Vaiśeṣika philosophy has not hitherto been much studied, though it seems to deserve a thorough investigation. As regards its scope, it differs considerably in many respects from the metaphysical systems of the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta, and its epistemological basis, natural philosophy, and consequently its mechanical view are more consistently elaborated than might be expected in a school of ancient Indian philosophy. The present little work does not attempt, as will be apparent, to give a systematic and exhaustive exposition of all the theories of the school; but I have tried, in the course of my explanations of the translation, to expound some fundamental and characteristic thoughts, where they might be helpful in the understanding of passages. The work is, however, designed primarily not for scholars, but for beginners, in view of whom the bulk of the Introduction and the Notes has been written.

I am fully aware of many imperfections. In particular, I ought to say that the statements concerning the origin and development of the Nyāya reasoning (pp. 82–4, § 2) are according to my subsequent investigations not correct. It is hoped that the reader will not attach importance to the passage, which fortunately is not essential to the main purpose of the Introduction.

Dr. F. W. Thomas has kindly corrected my English, and his rigorous criticism has detected throughout the work many of my oversights. He has also helped me in all matters connected with the reading of the proofs, the subject, the arrangement, and the form. But no changes have been made without my assent, and I retain a full responsibility for all the features of the work. For a kindness which is too great to particularize or

ERRATA AND ADDENDA

Page 2, note 1, read *Bodhicaryāvatāra-ṭīkā.*

p. 2, n. 1, read *Vijñapti-mātratāyām.*

p. 4, n. 2, read *cetanā.*

p. 11, l. 21. Insert "11. *Kwandō-shōshūjikkugiron*, 1 vol., by Kō-tan

p. 18, l. 8 from bottom, read *is.*

p. 36, ll. 6 8. *Mahā-sattā* is found in the *Mahā-vyutpatti* (cciii, 27).

A LIST OF TEXTS, EDITIONS, ETC., COMPENDIOUSLY CITED IN THIS WORK

Atomic theory	Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ii (*Edinburgh*, 1908 f.).
Bhāṣya	On the *N.S.* by Vātsyāyana. See *N.S.*
,,	On the *V.S.* by Candra-kānta (*Calcutta*, 1887).
Bibl. Bud.	Bibliotheca Buddhica (*St. Petersburg*).
Bibl. Ind.	Bibliotheca Indica (*Calcutta*).
B.S.	*Brahma-Sūtra.*
Caṅ-shwo (or *lun-*) *tāo-li-lun*	正說 (or 論) 道理論.
Chū-sān-tsāṅ-ci-tsi	出三藏記集.
Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō	大日本續藏經.
Dina-karī	See *Siddhānta-muktāvalī.*
D.N.	*Dīgha Nikāya* of the Pāli Sutta-Piṭaka.
JAOS.	The Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JBTS.	The Journal of the Buddhist Text Society.
JPTS.	The Journal of the Pāli Text Society.
JRAS.	The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.
Kir.	*Kiraṇāvalī* with the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, Benares S.S., No. 15 (*Benares*, 1885).
Lakṣaṇāvalī	See *Kiraṇāvalī.*
Majjh.N.	*Majjhima Nikāya* of the Pāli Sutta-Piṭaka.
M.S.	*Mīmāṁsā-Sūtra.*
Nanjio's Nanjio's *Cat.*	*A Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka*, by B. Nanjio (*Oxford*, 1883).
No. 1295, etc.	Nos. in Nanjio's *Cat.*
N.D. *N.S.*	*Nyāya-Sūtra* with the *Bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana, Bibl. Ind. (*Calcutta*, 1865).
Nyāya-bindu	With the *Ṭīkā*, Bibl. Ind. (*Calcutta*, 1889).
Nyāya-kandalī	See *Pr. Bh.*
Nyāya-kośa	Bombay S.S., No. xlix, 2nd edition (*Bombay*, 1893).

Nyāya-vārttika . .	Bibl. Ind. (*Calcutta*, 1887–93).
Prābhākara School .	*The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā*, by Gaṅgā-nāth Jhā (*Allahabad*, 1911).
Pr. Bh.	*Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya* with the *Nyāya-kandalī*, Vizianagram S.S., vol. iv (*Benares*, 1895).
Prakaraṇa-pañcikā .	Paṇḍit, old series, vol. i.
Saṁy.N.	*Saṁyutta Nikāya* of the Pāli Sutta-Piṭaka.
Saptap.	*Sapta-padārthī*, Vizianagram S.S., vol. vi (*Benares*, 1893).
Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha	Bibl. Ind. (*Calcutta*, 1858).
" "	Translated by Cowell and Gough, Trübner's Oriental Series, 2nd ed. (*London*, 1894).
SBE.	The Sacred Books of the East.
Shaṅ-tsuṅ shi-cü-i-lun .	勝宗十句義論.
Shi-cü-i-lun . . .	十句義論.
Siddhānta-muktāvalī .	With the *Dina-karī* (Benares, 1882).
Si-yü-ci	西域記.
S.K.	*Sāṁkhya-Kārikā.*
Sloka-vārttika . .	Translated by Gaṅgā-nāth Jhā, Bibl. Ind. (*Calcutta*, 1900).
S.-t.-kaumudī . .	*Sāṁkhya-tattva-kaumudī.*
Tarka-bhāṣā . . .	*Poona*, 1894.
Tarka-dīpikā . .	See *Tarka-saṁgraha.*
Tarka-kaumudī . .	*Bombay*, 1907.
Tarka-saṁgraha . .	With the *Tarka-dīpikā*, Bombay S.S., No. lv (*Bombay*, 1897).
V. . . . . . } *Vārttika* . . . }	*Nyāya-vārttika.*
V.D. . . . . } *V.S.* . . . . }	*Vaiśeṣika-Sūtra* with the *Upaskāra* and the *Vivṛti*, Bibl. Ind. (*Calcutta*, 1861).
VOZ.	Vienna Oriental Journal.
WZKM. . . .	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes.
ZDMG. . . .	Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft.

INTRODUCTION

I. The Treatise

Among the huge collection of the Buddhist *tripiṭaka* in the Chinese translation we have only two distinct works of other systems than Buddhism. The one is the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā* with a commentary, and the other is a Vaiśeṣika treatise without a commentary. The former has been translated into French by Professor Takakusu, and the latter is represented by the present work.

The title of the treatise is in Chinese *Shaṅ-tsuṅ*[1]*-shi-cü-i-lun*[2] and in Sanskṛt *Vaiśeṣika-(nikāya-)daśapadārtha-śāstra*,[3] i.e. a treatise on the ten categories of the Vaiśeṣika. It was composed by a follower of the Vaiśeṣika, and translated into Chinese by Yuan Chwang (Hhüen-Cwāṅ) in 648 A.D.

A tradition says that Kwhēi-ci,[4] a famous disciple of Yuan Chwang, commented on the treatise; but this is perhaps a mistake. Yuan Chwang translated a great many Sanskṛt works into Chinese; but his main effort appears to have been devoted to the translation of the works of the Sarvāsti-vāda, especially the *Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra*,[5] and of the Vijñāna-vāda, especially the

[1] *Tsuṅ* or *tsung*. The pronunciations of the Chinese characters are taken principally from Nanjio's *Catalogue* and Giles' Dictionary.

[2] In Japanese *Shō-shū-ji-k-ku-gi-ron*, sometimes called *Jikkugiron*. Copies exist in the Bodleian Library (Jap. 65, Y, 10, pp. 72*b*–75*b*) and in the Library of the India Office (case 64*b*, pp. 1*a*-13*b*).

[3] Nanjio, *Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka*, No. 1295. *Nikāya* is probably superfluous.

[4] In Japanese Ki-ki, usually called Ji-on, or Jion-daishi-kiki (632–82 A.D.). He is a great commentator and the first patriarch of the Fā-hsiang-tsung (the Hossō-shū or -jiū), a sect of the followers of the Vijñāna-vāda in China and Japan.

[5] No. 1269.

Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi-śāstra.[1] His disciples were divided principally between the two schools.

II. Kwhei-ci

Kwhēi-ci is the orthodox propagator of the Vijñāna-vāda and the authority on the second work. This is a commentary on Vasu-bandhu's *Vijñapti-mātratā-triṁśat-kārikā*,[2] which is a highly authoritative exposition of the Vijñāna-vāda and had ten commentaries by as many different Indian authors. Yuan Chwang first translated the ten commentaries, but he afterwards amalgamated them with the commentary by Dharma-pāla, the teacher of his teacher, Śīla-bhadra. This second work, the *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi-śāstra*, is ascribed chiefly to Dharma-pāla, and is the fundamental work of the Fā-hsiang-tsung. Kwhēi-ci commented on the work.[3] Dharma-pāla's work adopts an idealistic standpoint in epistemology and metaphysics, and refutes the realistic systems, the Sāṁkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, other minor schools, and the Hīna-yāna Buddhism. The Vaiśeṣika in this work represents the doctrines of the six categories, and seems to have been quoted by Dharma-pāla himself, because his refutations agree with those in another work by him.[4] Kwhēi-ci, commenting on the passage concerning the Vaiśeṣika, quotes and paraphrases the treatise, although the latter exhibits ten categories, under the three headings, the enumeration of the ten categories and the subdivisions,

[1] No. 1197. As for the term *vijñapti-mātratā*, see the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (Professor de la Vallée Poussin, *Bouddhisme*, London, 1898, p. 271, ". . . cittamātre 'pi vijñapti-mātrāyām api . . ."). I owe the Sanskṛt term to Professor de la Vallée Poussin. See *Lokatattva-nirṇaya* ("vijñaptimātraṁ śūnyaṁ ceti śākyasya niścayaḥ") of Hari-bhadra (Giorn. d. Soc. Asiat. ital., 1905, pp. 279, 283–4).

[2] No. 1215.

[3] *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 77, bk. 1 ff. A copy is kept in the British Museum. Kwhēi-ci's quotations and paraphrasing are found on pp. 29*a*–40*a*.

[4] That is, No. 1198, a commentary on Deva's *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya* (No. 1189). Some passages are translated in this Introduction.

the definitions of them, and the relations among them, that is, the first and a portion of the second chapter of the treatise. This was, perhaps, taken for a commentary on the treatise. Kwhēi-ci's quotations are useful for understanding the treatise, so that they are freely used in the following notes, where necessary.

III. The Founder of the System

Kwhēi-ci mentions some traditional accounts concerning the Vaiśeṣika and its founder in the above commentary and in his commentary on Śaṅkara-svāmin's *Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-praveśa-śāstra*.[1] The traditions in the two commentaries are essentially the same, and may be supposed to have their origin in India, because he has probably put down what he had heard from Yuan Chwang.

Before Yuan Chwang, Kumāra-jīva translated Deva's *Śata-śāstra*[2] into Chinese, together with the commentary by the Bodhi-sattva Vasu. The *Śata-śāstra* contains, in many passages, refutations of the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeṣika, etc. The work was also commented upon by a Chinese Buddhist, Ci-tsāṅ (549 623 A.D.).[3] Ci-tsāṅ's commentary relates the following traditions with regard to the Vaiśeṣika and its founder:—

"(The founder's name) Ulūka means an 'owl' . . . The time when he lived was 800 years before the Buddha. By day he composed a work and by night he wandered about for alms. . . . The *sūtra* composed by him is called the *Vaiśeṣika(-sūtra)* and consists of 100,000 ślokas. The main tenets are the doctrines of the six categories, of

[1] No. 1216. Kwhēi-ci's commentary is in the *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 86, bk. 4, pp. 346 ff.

[2] No. 1188. Kumāra-jīva arrived in China (Chāṅ-an) in 401 A.D. and died c. 413, at the age of 74 years. He was the chief translator of the works of the Śūnya-vāda. See Nanjio, *Cat.*, App. ii, 59.

[3] In Japanese Ki-chi-zō, or Kajō-daishi-kichizō. His commentary is in the *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 73, bk. 5, and 87, bk. 2.

the *asat-kārya-vāda*, and that self (*ātman*) is something different from cognition (*buddhi*)." [1]

In another passage he states :—

"According to the *Life* of Hari-varman, 'there lived a follower of Ulūka (at the time of Hari-varman, c. 260 A.D.). He said that the *sūtra* composed by our teacher, Ulūka, is named the *Vaiśeṣika(-sūtra)*, and is subtle or scholastic. Its general tenet is the doctrines of the six categories, and the speciality is that cognition is something different from self. If anyone could defeat me in disputation, I should kill myself for apology.' This is a little similar to the statement of the present text. Ulūka's opinion of self evidently shows that he lived when the Sāṁkhya had been systematized, and that he founded another system, because he had discovered, as is affirmed, the imperfection of the Sāṁkhya.[2] *Vaiśeṣika*, the name of the *sūtra*, means superior, or excellent, and distinguished (or different). The origin of the name is in the fact that the system is distinguished from, and superior to, the Sāṁkhya." [3]

[1] Ibid., bk. 5, p. 282*a*. The source of his traditions is not clearly known. Ci-tsāṅ in his boyhood, when he had not yet become a Buddhist, saw Paramārtha accompanied by his father. Paramārtha arrived in China in 548 A.D. and died in 569 A.D. (499 569). See Nanjio, *Cat.*, App. ii, 104–5. Ci-tsāṅ seems not to have been instructed by Paramārtha even afterwards. Paramārtha was an eminent scholar of the Vijñāna-vāda and of the *Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra*, while Ci-tsāṅ was a distinguished propagator of the Śūnya-vāda in China, and restored the Sān-lun-tsung (the San-ron-shū, or -jiū).

[2] This means the Sāṁkhya doctrine of self (*puruṣa*), that is nothing but cognition (*cit*, *cetana*, or *jñā*).

[3] *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 87, bk. 2, p. 103*a*. The latter part of his account is also found in 73, bk. 5, p. 384*b*. The *Life* of Hari-varman was composed by Yuan Ch'ang (Gen-chō) about 450 A.D., and is preserved in the *Chu-sān-tsāṅ-ci-tsi* (No. 1476), vol. xii, pp. 63*b*-64*a*, which was compiled by Saṅ-yiu (Sō-yū) about 520 A.D.

According to the original text, Hari-varman lived in the 900th year after the Buddha's Nirvāṇa (A.N.). The follower of Ulūka surpassed others in disputation. Having heard that the king of Magadha favoured Buddhists, he went to Pāṭali-putra and asked the king to be

It can hardly be ascertained what authority these traditions have, except the extract from the *Life* of Hari-varman. Nevertheless, the whole material was not invented by the commentator, because his account agrees in some respects with Kwhēi-ci. Kwhēi-ci states:—

"About the end of the time of the creation (*sṛṣṭi*), when the age of creatures was immeasurable, a teacher (*tīrthaka*) came to the world. He was named Ulūka. Ulūka means an 'owl'. In the daytime he meditated in a dense forest, secluding himself from worldly affairs, and at night, when people went to rest, he wandered about for food. This mode of living was very similar to that of an owl, so that he got the name Ulūka. He was also called Kaṇa-bhuj or Kaṇa-bhakṣa. *Kaṇa* means 'a grain (or a piece) of (rice-)corn', and *bhuj* or *bhakṣa* means 'to eat'. The origin of the name was that he was usually wandering about at night, but as young women were frightened by the sight of him he afterwards went in secret into mills, picked up pieces of corn from rice-bran, and ate them. He was, consequently, nicknamed the 'corn-piece-eater'. He was further called (the teacher of) the Vaiśeṣika. Vaiśeṣika means 'superior' or 'excellent' (literally, 'conquering'). He composed a work explaining the six categories. The work was named the *Vaiśeṣika(-śāstra)*, since it excelled other works in all respects, or because it was composed by a man of superior intelligence. As he was the master and the composer of the *Vaiśeṣika(-śāstra)*, he was called the teacher of the *Vaiśeṣika(-śāstra)*." [1]

allowed to enter into disputation with Buddhists. Hari-varman was elected to dispute with him, etc.

According to another tradition, Hari-varman had been a follower of the Sāṅkhya before he became a Buddhist. He introduced some doctrines of the Sāṅkhya into his own work, the *Satya-siddhi-śāstra*.

[1] *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 77, bk. 1, pp. 39*a* 40*a*, and 86, bk. 4, p. 371*b*. Cf. *Nyāya-kośa* (Bombay S.S., No. xlix, 2nd ed.), p. 743.

Kwhēi-ci also calls the founder Kaṇāda; but to the Chinese traditions it is not known that Kaṇāda or Kaṇabhuj means "atom-eater", and the meaning of the term Vaiśeṣika is "superior" or "excellent".

"Atom-eater," as the nickname of the founder, might not be probable, because an atomic theory is not special to the system, and the Vaiśeṣika is not the first pioneer of the theory.[1] "Superior" or "excellent" is a secondary meaning of the term, and the term is not used in this sense in *V.S.*[2] The explanation of the name Vaiśeṣika that it was derived from the fifth category particularity (*viśeṣa*), or the characteristic of the system that an object is precisely analysed and classified, is more probable. And the above explanation of Ulūka is different from that of Indian commentators. Rāja-śekhara, in his *Nyāya-kandalī-ṭīkā*, explains that Kaṇāda was favoured by Īśvara on account of the merit of his ardent ascetic practice. Īśvara appeared to him as *Ulūka-rūpa-dhārī* (bearing the form of an owl). On that occasion he was instructed by Īśvara in the doctrines of the six categories.[3] But Īśvara is not mentioned in *V.S.*, although later commentators strain the meaning of some passages.[4] Praśasta-pāda acknowledged Īśvara for the first time in the history of the Vaiśeṣika. Consequently the tradition must have been originated in a time later than Praśasta-pāda, who lived in the fifth or sixth century A.D. The Chinese traditional explanation of Ulūka seems to have been derived from an etymological meaning of the term, but it represents an older tradition. Even Aśva-ghoṣa

[1] But in later times the atomic theory is considered as a special doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika (*Brahma-sūtra*, ii, 2, 11 ff.), and the system is called the Pailuka. See Dharmottara. *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā*, p. 86 (Bibl. Ind.).

[2] 10, 2, 7.

[3] Handt, *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣika-Philosophie* (Rostock, 1900), pp. 1–2; *Nyāya-kośa*, pp. 2-3 (*dvitīya upodghātaḥ*).

[4] See notes on ch. i, 3, 22–3 (merit and demerit).

alludes to the meaning.[1] The date of Ulūka is only an invention.[2] Ci-tsāṅ's summary of the principal tenets of the system is perfectly correct and well characterized. Kwhēi-ci further says:—

"After having attained the five sorts of *siddhi*[3] (perfection), the *Ṛṣi* (sage) Ulūka desired to enter into Nirvāṇa; but he regretted that he was not able to have a disciple and to hand down the doctrines of the six categories . . . At last (after innumerable years) he found one named Pañca-śikhī (or -in). Pañca-śikhī was born in a family of Brāhmaṇas in Vārāṇasī; his father's name was Māṇavaka. Māṇavaka means a 'boy' or a 'youth'. After a long, long time (9,000 years) Ulūka took Pañca-śikhī into his hermitage and instructed him in the six categories, i.e. substance, attribute, action, existence (*sattā* or *bhāva*), universality-particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*),[4] and inherence."[5]

IV. PANCA-SIKHI

According to another statement of Kwhēi-ci:—

"Pañca-śikhī accepted the doctrines of the categories, substance, attribute, and action, but he did not follow the doctrine of existence. Kaṇāda explained that existence is that which inheres in substances, etc., and has reality apart from substances, attributes, and actions: it is one and eternal. Pañca-śikhī rejoined that the existing of substances, attributes, and actions is nothing but existence; there cannot be such existence as to be something different from the three categories and to make them

[1] See below.

[2] Kwhēi-ci places Kapila in the beginning of the time of *sṛṣṭi* in his commentary on Nos. 1216 and 1197.

[3] *Divya-cakṣus, divya-śrotra, para-citta-jñāna, pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna*, and *ṛddhi-vidhi-jñāna*.

[4] This will be explained later on.

[5] This is an extract from his statement in 77, bk. 1, p. 29*a* f., and 86, bk. 4, p. 388*b*. The exaggeration of numbering is a general peculiarity of Chinese and Indian traditions.

existent. Kaṇāda left the explanation for a while and proceeded to explain the category universality-particularity . . . ,[1] and the category inherence, which is one and eternal. Pañca-śikhī accepted these two categories, except existence. Kaṇāda then framed the following syllogistic proof: 'Existence is neither a substance, nor an attribute, nor an action . . .'[2] Upon this proof Pañca-śikhī accepted the theory of existence. After that Kaṇāda died, and the Vaiśeṣika was promulgated by Pañca-śikhī."[3]

The tradition asserts that Pañca-śikhī was the disciple of Kaṇāda. The first statement of the above two is very similar to the tradition of Āsuri, a follower of the Sāṁkhya.[4] According to the *Mahā-bhārata* and other Sāṁkhya writings Āsuri had a disciple named Pañca-śikha.[5] There must have been many persons whose name was Pañca-śikhī, or Pañca-śikha, and Pañca-śikhī might be a different person from Pañca-śikha, a follower of the Sāṁkhya. Consequently Pañca-śikhī, a follower of the Vaiśeṣika, should not be denied on the simple ground that the name is almost the same. But the tradition was, it is obvious, confused with that of Āsuri. Unless we should get other evidence concerning Pañca-śikhī, we cannot accept it as it is. Besides, such a syllogistic proof was not used at such an early time. Kwhēi-ci further says in the same commentary that the Vaiśeṣika was divided into eighteen schools after Pañca-śikhī, just like the eighteen schools of the Sāṁkhya. The reference to the Sāṁkhya proves that the tradition was confused with, or taken from, that of the Sāṁkhya. Even the eighteen schools

[1] Fully quoted in notes on ch. i, 10.

[2] Quoted in the following introduction.

[3] Loc. cit., p. 388*b*.

[4] See the introductory comment on the *Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, v. 1, in the Chinese translation. Professor Garbe, *Sāṁkhya-Philosophie*, pp. 29-34.

[5] *Mahā-bhārata*, xii, 218, 14–15; *S.k.*, v. 70. According to the commentary on *S.k.*, v. 70 in the Chinese translation, the successors of Kapila are thus: Kapila—Āsuri—Pañca-śikha—Gārgya—Ulūka.

of the Sāṁkhya are not ascertained. It is, however, known that there were, in the course of time, many different opinions in both systems.

V. The Author

According to Kwhēi-ci's statement, a later follower of the Vaiśeṣika, or an eminent teacher among the teachers of the eighteen schools, was Chan-tā-lo. Chan-tā-lo is rendered in Chinese by *Hwui-yueh*, literally "Wisdom-moon". He wrote the *Shi-cü-i-lun* (*Daśa-padārtha-śāstra*).[1]

This is the present author. Chan-tā-lo is the transliteration of Candra in Sanskṛt. Candra, as the original of "Wisdom-moon", seems to show an omission. Later commentators give the full name, "Chan-tā-(lo-)mo-ti (Candra - mati)." but Mati - candra[2] is preferable to Candra-mati.

He has an epithet, Shañ-cö, before his name. Shañ-cö literally means "an excellent teacher" or "a conqueror", and may be the translation of Vaiśeṣika in the sense of a follower or a teacher of the Vaiśeṣika. "An excellent teacher" (or "a conqueror") as an epithet can be applied to any other eminent teacher, and does not especially denote a follower of a definite system. In this case the term "excellent" or "superior", as the translation of Vaiśeṣika, may also not be preferable.

The life of the author is not known from Kwhēi-ci's statement, and the time when he lived is uncertain. But Dharma-pāla's refutation of the Vaiśeṣika is directed against the doctrines of the six categories as stated above. If this fact implies that the author is later than

[1] Loc. cit., pp. 29*b*, 376*b*.

[2] Cf. Rājendralāla Mitra, *Notices of Skt. MSS.* (Calcutta, 1886), vol. viii, pp. 80–1; Bhandarkar, *A Catalogue of the Collections of MSS.* (Bombay, 1888), p. 61; Hara-prasād Śāstrī, *Notices of Skt. MSS.*, vol. x, [illegible]

Dharmapāla, his date is between Dharma-pāla and Yuan Chwang.

According to Yuan Chwang's *Si-yü-ci*[1] Śīla-bhadra was, when he was studying with Dharma-pāla, 30 years old, and he was 106 years old when Yuan Chwang met him.[2] Yuan Chwang started from China in 629 A.D., and arrived at Rāja-gṛha, and saw him in 633 A.D.[3] So Dharma-pāla was still living in 557 A.D.[4] Consequently the *terminus a quo* of Mati-candra is 550 A.D., and the *terminus ad quem* is 640 A.D. This date is also confirmed by that of Praśasta-pāda. Praśasta-pāda is undoubtedly a predecessor[5] of Mati-candra, and lived in the first half of the sixth century or the latter half of the fifth century, as proved later on. Mati-candra cannot be earlier than the first half of the sixth century.

VI. The Treatise and its Commentaries

The most obvious characteristic of the treatise is that it acknowledges ten categories, adding the four potentiality (*śakti*), non-potentiality (*aśakti*), commonness (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*), and non-existence (*abhāva* or *asat*) to the six in *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.* The explanations and the source of the four categories will be found in the following translation and notes. And the treatise has no mention of Īśvara, as in the case of *V.S.*: there is also no description of the way to emancipation (*mokṣa*); even if the second sort of merit (*dharma*, one of the twenty-four attributes) corresponds to it, it is only a definition of it. As a

[1] No. 1503, vol. viii. p. 40*a*. [2] No. 1493, vol. ix. p. 105*b*.

[3] No. 1637, vol. xii. p. 84*a*.

[4] According to Kwhēi-ci's commentary on No. 1197 Dharma-pāla died in the 32nd year of his age, though the tradition is a little different from the Tibetan tradition mentioned in Tāra-nātha's *Geschichte des Buddhismus* (pp. 161-2), which is later and less reliable. And Dharma-pāla is said to have been one year younger than Sīla-bhadra; hence he lived in 539-70 A.D.

[5] This is known from the fact that the treatise bases its explanations upon the *Praśasta-pāda-bhāṣya* (*Pr. Bh.*) in many passages, as shown in the following notes.

consequence, the author does not allude to *yoga*, *yogin*, or anything supernatural. The description in general is throughout concise and has no superfluity or digression.

No commentaries on the treatise were composed by Chinese Buddhists; but later Japanese writers composed the following:—

1. *Shōshūjikkugiron-ki*, 2 vols., by Hō-jū, 1758 A.D.
2. *Kwachū-shōshūjikkugiron*, 1 vol., by Ko-katsu, 1760.
3. *Kwachū-shōshūjikkugiron*, 1 vol., enlarged by Son-kyō.
4. *Shōshūjikkugiron-shaku*, 2 vols., by Ki-ben, 1779.
5. *Shōshūjikkugiron-shiki*, 2 vols., by Gon-zō, c. 1783.
6. *Shōshūjikkugiron-kecchaku*, 5 vols., by Kai-dō, 1796.
7. *Shōshūjikkugiron-sōrin*, 1 vol., by Kai-dō, c. 1796.
8. *Shōshūjikkugiron-shaku-bōkwanroku*, 1 vol., by Kō-gon, undated, refuting No. 4.
9. *Jikkugiron-monki*, 1 vol., by Hō-un, 1844, depending upon No. 6.
10. *Jikkugiron-kōgi*, 1 vol., by Kō-hō, 1898, paraphrasing No. 6.[1]

VII. The *Sutras* of the Six Systems

The dates of the founders and the *sūtras* of the six systems have been discussed by eminent scholars; but for the present study the dates of the founders and those of the *sūtras* must be treated as separate problems because most of the founders are mystical personages and their traditional dates are very vague, while the

[1] These commentaries are rare even in Japan, except Nos. 3, 9, 10. The present writer has been able to consult the last two. No. 6 is said to be the best; but there are many cases of misreading and misunderstanding. All the commentaries depend upon Kwhēi-ci's paraphrasing and other sub-commentaries on Kwhēi-ci's commentary, etc. After Kwhēi-ci the Fā-hsiang-tsung was not much studied; some texts were lost and corrupted. The third patriarch of the sect, C'-ceu (Chi-shū, the seventh–eighth century), misunderstood some passages of the treatise owing to the corruptions of the text. These corruptions and misunderstanding caused the mistaken explanations in the above commentaries.

dates of the *sūtras* cannot possibly be so remote. Jacobi maintains that the *Nyāya-darśana* and the *Brahma-sūtra* were composed between 200 and 500 A.D. The *Vaiśeṣika-darśana* and the *Mīmāṁsā-sūtra* are about as old as, or rather somewhat older than, *N.D.* and *B.S.* The *Yoga-sūtra* is later than 450 A.D. and the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* is a modern composition.[1]

As a matter of fact, the compilation of the *sūtras* fixes the doctrines of the systems: but before the compilation there must have been, to some extent, a systematization of the doctrines. Therefore, even if the above opinion, which is admirably founded, is quite acceptable, it naturally does not mean that there were no rudiments or no earlier stages of the development of the doctrines. In this sense the traditional founders and the real compilers of the *sūtras* cannot be the same persons. For a historical study the question may be divided into two parts. The question of the founders resolves itself into the question of the origins of the systems, and the dates of the *sūtras* relate to the development of the doctrines. Especially if the study is of another work than the *sūtra* of a system, researches into the historical development are necessary. In the course of the following introduction the present writer will try to study the origin, the systematization, and some aspects of the historical development of the Vaiśeṣika. Before entering into the questions some digressions may be permitted.

VIII. The *Vaisesika Sutra* and its Commentaries

The historical development of the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya has been discussed by Bodas in his introduction to Athalye's edition of the *Tarka-saṁgraha*.[2] It contains reliable information, and has been quoted by eminent

[1] JAOS., vol. xxxi, 1911, p. 29. During that period (200-500) lived the old commentators: Vātsyāyana, Upa-varṣa, the Vṛtti-kāra (Bodhāyana?), and probably Śabara-svāmin.

[2] Bombay S.S., No. lv.

scholars (Max Müller, Jacobi, and Suali). The Vaiśeṣika can be treated from the historical point of view, like other systems; but there is, as Bodas pointed out, a gap in the history between the time of Praśasta-pāda (or Uddyota-kara) and that of Śrīdhara (991 A.D.). The treatise was produced during that interval, and has not yet been influenced by theories of the Nyāya. But, having followed *Pr. Bh.*, it differs from *V.S.* in certain opinions and takes the lead of the modern Vaiśeṣika works. The modern Vaiśeṣika has, to speak roughly, two sources. The one is *Pr. Bh.* and the other is *N.S.* and its *Bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana. The latter explained some of the Nyāya theories by the Vaiśeṣika and mixed them up, while the former contended for the special theories and in some measure changed the original theories. Some of these special theories were accepted not only by the treatise, but also by the later commentators on *V.S.*

V.S. had and has at least the following commentaries: *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*;[1] *Vṛtti*;[2] *Upaskāra*;[3] *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya*;[4] *Vivṛti*;[3] and *Bhaṣya*.[5]

Śrīcaraṇa in his *Prakaṭārtha* says that some of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines discussed by Śaṅkarācārya in his

[1] *Pr. Bh.* (Vizianagram S.S., vol. iv), Introd., p. 12: *Kiraṇāvalī* (Benares S.S., No. 15), Introd., p. 12; *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya* (Calcutta, 1887), Introd., p. 1; *Ratna-prabhā*, by Govindānanda, 2, 2, 11.

[2] *Pr. Bh.*, p. 12; *Kir.*, p. 12; *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 4.

[3] By Śaṅkara-miśra and by Jaya-nārāyaṇa, published in *Bibl. Ind.* by the latter.

[4] By Gaṅgādhara-kaviratna-kavirāja (Calcutta, 1869).

[5] By Candra-kānta (Calcutta, 1887).

The authors of the last three commentaries lived in the last century. Besides these commentaries there are Raghu-deva's *Vyākhyāna*, Candra-nanda's *Bhāṣya*, *Bhāṣya-ratna*, and *Ṭīkā* (Aufrecht's *Cat. Cat.*, iii, p. 128, and Hṛṣīkeśa Śāstri's *Cat.*, iii, No. 369). Candrananda's *Bhāṣya* is said by Kielhorn to be complete, while the other three are incomplete. It is not known whether they are good commentaries or not. As to the first and the second in Aufrecht's *Cat. Cat.*, i, p. 615, it cannot be ascertained whether they are really commentaries on the *sūtra*. Cf. Oppert's *Lists*, ii, p. 62, No. 1041. *Pr. Bh.* is not a commentary on *V.S.*, and it is called the *Padārtha-dharma-saṁgraha*.

Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya represent an older school and agree with *Pr. Bh.*, but they are not in harmony with the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*. Consequently Rāvaṇa is seen to have been later than Praśasta-pāda.[1] Nothing more can as yet be found concerning Rāvaṇa.

The *Vṛtti* is quoted by the *Upaskāra* about eight times.[2] It may, according to some writers, be that which is sometimes called the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti* and ascribed to Uddyota-kara, simply because Uddyota-kara is Bhāradvāja.[3] And some writers maintain that the *Vṛtti* or the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti* is the text of the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya*. But when the *Vṛtti* in the *Upaskāra* is compared with the latter, none of the corresponding passages agree. *V.S.* 6, 1, 5[4] and 6, 1, 12 are not found in the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhaṣya*. The *Upaskāra's* reference on *V.S.* 7, 1, 3 to the *Vṛtti-kāra* is entirely at variance with the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya*. According to the *Upaskāra* the *Vṛtti-kāra* explains the *sūtra* 7, 1, 3, *etena nityeṣu nityatvam uktaṁ*, thus: *nityeṣv-anityatvam uktaṁ*; but the corresponding *sūtra* in the *Bhāradvaja-vṛtti-bhāṣya* runs *etena nityeṣu nitya uktāḥ*[5] The conclusion from these comparisons is that neither the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya* nor the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti*,[6] if the former is a *Bhāṣya* on the latter, nor the *sūtras* in them can be the same as the *Vṛtti* or the *sūtras* in it. We cannot know anything further as to the *Vṛtti*.

[1] Bodas' Introd., p. 33.

[2] On 1, 1, 2; 1, 2, 4; 1, 2, 6; 3, 1, 17; 4, 1, 7; 6, 1, 5; 6, 1, 12; 7, 1, 3.

[3] *Nyāya-kośa*, pp. 3 4.

[4] Instead of this *sūtra*, which runs "Ātmāntaraguṇānāṁ ātmāntare 'kāraṇatvāt" in *V.S.*; there is inserted "Mantreṇa-adṛṣṭakāritaṁ" in the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya*, 6, 1, 7. See the *Vivṛti* on 6, 1, 5, which says that this latter *sūtra* is in *M.S.*, and should be supplied to the former *sūtra*.

[5] See notes on chap. ii, 2, 2.

[6] *Pr. Bh.*, Introd., p. 12, "Vārāṇasyām ekasya saṁnyāsino nikate tālapattreṣu maithilākṣarair likhitaṁ jīrṇatvāt samantāc chinnaṁ bhāradvājavṛttipustakam vartate."

The order and the number of the *sūtras* in the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya* are widely different from those in the other commentaries, and sometimes are not correct. About eighteen *sūtras* are added, while about seventy-six are omitted.[1] The *sūtra* 2, 1, 14 has the term *paramaṇu*, which is not used in *V.S.* in the other commentaries, and 1, 2, 13 was evidently derived from *Pr. Bh.*[2] Besides, the explanations are much influenced by the Sāṁkhya and are not reliable.

The *Upaskāra* is an acknowledged commentary: but the explanations generally depend upon *Pr. Bh.* and are sometimes too far-fetched.[3] The author lived about 1650 A.D.

The *Vivṛti* principally bases its explanations upon, and paraphrases, the *Upaskāra*, although the author in some passages expresses disapproval of it.[4]

The *Bhāṣya* of Candra-kānta may claim to be regarded as a better commentary than others, though sometimes too short. But in some passages the *Bhāṣya* depends upon the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya* and is not correct.[5]

The *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*, as opposed to *Pr. Bh.*, may seem to be very close to the original meaning of *V.S.*; but this is not exactly the case, because Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*, a commentary on *Pr. Bh.*, depending upon the *Rāvaṇa-bhāṣya*,[6] differs in some opinions from the author of *V.S.* Also the *Vṛtti* seems to have been affected by *N.S.*, especially in commenting on 1, 2, 6 and 3, 1, 17. Consequently we see that *V.S.* cannot have had a good commentator like Vātsyāyana on *N.S.*, and was explained

[1] Even the corresponding *sūtras* sometimes do not agree with the *sūtras* in the other commentaries.

[2] pp. 14 and 324. Ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ saṁbandha iha-(ihedam iti, in the *Bhārad.*) pratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ.

[3] See notes on chap. i, 3, 22-3 (merit and demerit); ii, 1, 1.

[4] On 1, 1, 4: 1, 1, 25; 2, 1, 1; 2, 2, 5; 9, 1, 8.

[5] Especially pp. 7-8, *Bhārad.* pp. 29-30; and see especially the explanation of *samavāya*.

[6] *Kir.*, Introd., pp. 11-12.

by commentators with different opinions. On the other hand, such different explanations show that the Vaiśeṣika doctrines developed after the *sūtra* had been compiled.

IX. Vaisesika and Nyaya

After the compilation of *V.S.* the author of *N.S.* introduced its doctrines into his own metaphysics. The not doubtful examples are *N.S.* 3, 1, 36[1] (= *V.S.* 4, 1, 8) and 2, 1, 54 (essentially the same as *V.S.* 7, 2, 20). The *Bhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana used many passages from *V.S.* even as examples of reasoning.[2]

The date of *N.S.* seems to be between Nāgārjuna (the second-third century) and Vasu-bandhu (the fourth century).[3]

Vātsyāyana had a predecessor in commenting on *N.S.*[4] and calls the author a *ṛṣi*,[5] which proves that some time elapsed between the author and Vātsyāyana. Vātsyāyana was attacked by Dig-nāga. Dig-nāga's works were, for the first time, translated into Chinese in 557–69 by Paramārtha.[6] Dig-nāga must have lived at the latest in the fifth or sixth century, probably in the middle (or the

[1] This *sūtra* has already been pointed out by Windisch in his *Über das Nyāya-bhāṣya* (Leipzig, 1888). The *sūtra* is not found in Viśva-nātha's *Vṛtti*; but Uddyota-kara's *Nyāya-vārttika* and Vācaspati-miśra's *Nyāya-sūci-nibandha*, upon the latter of which the *Vṛtti* depends, reckon it as a *sūtra* of *N.S.*' Besides, compare *N.S.* 3, 1, 28 with *V.S.* 4, 2, 3; *N.S.* 3, 1, 35 with *V.S.* 4, 1, 6 13: *N.S.* 3, 1, 63 with *V.S.* 8, 2, 4 5; *N.S.* 3, 1, 71 with *V.S.* 8, 2, 5: *N.S.* 3, 2, 63 with *V.S.* 7, 1, 23; and *N.S.* 1, 1, 10 with *V.S.* 3, 2, 4.

[2] According to Jacobi *V.S.* 4, 1, 6 is quoted by the *Bhāṣya* on *N.S.* 3, 1, 33 and 3, 1, 69, and *V.S.* 3, 1, 16 by the *Bhāṣya* on 2, 2, 36. Besides, as the example of the second explanation of *śeṣavat* of *N.S.* 1, 1, 5, *V.S.* 1, 1, 8 (or 2, 2, 22); 2, 2, 23; 2, 2, 31; 2, 1, 27 are freely used, and even in other passages of the *Bhāṣya* there are contained Vaiśeṣika theories. The *Bhāṣya* on 1, 1, 9 asserts that the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika are *prameya*. This assertion is followed by later writers.

[3] V. Smith, *Early History of India*, 3rd ed., pp. 328-44.

[4] On 1, 2, 9. "Eke naiyāyikāḥ" in the *Bhāṣya* on 1, 1, 32 probably alludes to someone of a time earlier than that of the author of the *sūtra*.

[5] On 2, 1, 15.

[6] Nos. 1172, 1255.

latter half) of the fifth century.[1] Hence Vātsyāyana is inferred to have lived in the latter half of the fourth century, or in the first half of the fifth century.

Dig-nāga was attacked by Uddyota-kara,[2] and his logic was followed by Praśasta-pāda.[3] Praśasta-pāda is earlier than, or a contemporary of, Uddyota-kara, because Uddyota-kara alludes to *Pr. Bh.*[4] Uddyota-kara is said to have been answered by Dharma-kīrti, who was referred to by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and Śālika-nātha,[5] a disciple of Prabhā-kara. These teachers were answered by Dharmottara; Dharmottara was criticized by Śrīdhara[6] (991 A.D.).

Dharma-kīrti is not mentioned by Yuan Chwang (travelled through India 629–45), but he is spoken of by I-tsing (671–95).[7] Consequently Dharma-kīrti's palmy days were in 645–71, and he was, according to the Tibetan tradition, a contemporary of Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, who was earlier than Śaṅkarācārya (*c.* the eighth century).[8]

[1] V. Smith, loc. cit., p. 324 (the fifth century). The Tibetan tradition asserts that Dig-nāga was a disciple of Vasu-bandhu (Tāranātha's *Geschichte*, p. 131).

[2] Especially *Nyāya-vārttika*, pp. 14 f., 17 f., 41, 43 f., 52 f., 36 f., 184 f., 111 f., 116 f., 122 f., 127 f., 347 f., 389 f., 435, etc.

[3] Cf. *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 233–52, with *Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-dvāra-śāstra* (No. 1223 = No. 1224), pp. 1*a*–3*a*, 5*a*–7*b*.

[4] Especially *Vārttika*, p. 288—*Pr. Bh.* p. 288; *V.* pp. 319–20—*Pr. Bh.* pp. 11, 311; *V.* p. 320—*Pr. Bh.* pp. 14, 324; *V.* p. 468—*Pr. Bh.* p. 48; *V.* p. 417—*Pr. Bh.* pp. 106–7.

[5] *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* (Paṇḍit, old series, vol. i), p. 44, quotes Dharma-kīrti's theory of *Pratyakṣa* (cf. *Nyāya-bindu*, p. 103).

[6] *Nyāya-kandalī* (Vizianagram S.S., vol. vi), p. 76. The above statement depends upon Max Müller's *Six Systems*, p. 477; Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic* (Calcutta, 1909); *The Influence of Buddhism on the Development of Nyāya Philosophy* (JBTS., 1898); Bodas' Introd. to the *Tarka-saṁgraha*; Jacobi's *Atomic Theory, Indische Logik* (Göttinger Nachrichten, phil.-hist. Kl., 1901, pp. 460–84), and *The Dates of the Philosophical Sūtras* (JAOS., vol. xxxi, pp. 1–29).

[7] No. 1492, vol. iv, p. 88*a*. Professor Takakusu, *I-tsing*, p. lviii.

[8] Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, pp. 35–6; Professor Garbe, *Sāṁkhya-Philosophie*, p. 42 (Anm.).

Uddyota-kara lived earlier than Dharma-kīrti, perhaps in the sixth–seventh century.[1]

Praśasta-pāda, being earlier than Uddyota-kara and later than Dig-nāga, lived in the first half of the sixth century, or rather in the latter half of the fifth century. His date is also proved by the dates of Dharma-pāla (539–70), and of Paramārtha (499–569), because the two Buddhists cannot be earlier than Praśasta-pāda. The Vaiśeṣika doctrines quoted and refuted by both Buddhists came from *Pr. Bh.*, as proved later on.

After *N.S.* and its *Bhāṣya* Praśasta-pāda precisely systematized the Vaiśeṣika doctrines; his *Bhāṣya* seems to be the first of the pure Vaiśeṣika works after *V.S.*, and it is not influenced by the Nyāya so much as is the case with later Vaiśeṣika works.

Uddyota-kara, as a successor of Vātsyāyana, used the Vaiśeṣika doctrines many times in his *Nyāya-vārttika*, and ascribed the highest authority (*paramarṣi*) to Kaṇāda.[2] Jacobi remarks that "the fusion of these two schools began early, and seems to have been complete at the time when the *Nyāya-vārttika* was written".[2] The fusion came for the first time from the Nyāya, and the completeness of the fusion is only on the side of the Nyāya, because *Pr. Bh.*, as well as the treatise, are not much influenced by the Nyāya.

X. Vaisesika Tenets and the Early Sects

The Vaiśeṣika is not a materialism in the strict sense of the term, because the system acknowledges other factors besides the four material atoms, and does not reduce the former to the latter; they are all regarded as having the same validity. But there is no doubt that a materialistic

[1] Cf. Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa, *Uddyota-kara, a contemporary of Dharma-kīrti* (JRAS., 1914, p. 604).

[2] Jacobi, *Atomic Theory* (Hastings' *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. ii, p. 201*b*).

tendency dominates the whole system,[1] and its religious and ethical teaching is to a large extent egoistic and optimistic. This is, perhaps, a consequence of the characteristic of the system so far as it is materialistic.

Such a materialistic and atomistic tendency is not met with in the ancient *Upaniṣads*;[2] consequently the origin of the Vaiśeṣika would not be traceable in the ancient *Upaniṣads* or in any other early literature.

After the time of the ancient *Upaniṣads* a great many schools, or rather various opinions, were originated by different teachers. Among them Buddhism and Jainism are the most prominent and influential systems. The canons of both systems agree in describing other minor teachers.

The Buddhists are wont to designate them the six teachers (*tīrthaka*), Pūraṇa Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesa-kambalī, Pakudha Kaccāyana, Nigaṇṭha Nāta-putta, and Sañjaya Velaṭṭhi-putta,[3] while the Jainas classify them into the four schools, Kriyā-vāda, Akriyā-vāda, Ajñāna-vāda, and Vainayika-vāda.[4] Heterodox and minor as they are, they have yet an important meaning in the history of Indian philosophy. They represent a general and popular thought of the time outside the orthodox speculations, which were usually confined to the secluded Brāhmaṇas. The general tendency of the six teachers is materialistic in metaphysics, and sceptical or a kind of criticism of knowledge in epistemology. We may find the origin of the Vaiśeṣika in the thought of these times.

Now, Ajita Kesa-kambalī contends that "a human

[1] Cf. Handt, loc. cit., p. 28.

[2] Jacobi, *Atomic Theory*, p. 199*a*.

[3] *Sāmaññá-phala-sutta* in *D.N.* In the *Brahma-jāla-sutta* the famous sixty-two sorts of different opinions are mentioned.

[4] SBE., vol. xlv, pp. xxvi-vii. Cf. F. O. Schrader, *Über den Stand der indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mahā-vīras und Buddhas* (Strassburg, 1910).

being is built up of the four elements (*cātur-mahā-bhūtika*). When he dies, the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the windy to the air, and his faculties (*indriyāṇi*, the five senses, and the mind as a sixth) pass into space (*ākāsa*)".[1]

The opinion is a real and radical materialism; there is no soul nor any other mental factors, but only the five sorts of materials.[2] Body is the combination of the five elements, and the soul is nothing but body. Ajita Kesakambalī is probably a Cārvāka.

But Pakudha Kaccāyana holds that "the following seven things (*kāya*) are neither made nor commanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be created, they are barren (so that nothing is produced out of them) . . . the four elements—earth, water, fire, and air—and ease and pain and the soul (*jīva*) as a seventh".[3]

This opinion cannot be designated a materialism, because the soul has an equal position with the other five elements, but it is materialistic. The above two opinions represent the metaphysical aspect of the current opinions of the time; but there is as yet no trace of an atomic theory, because the elements are called *mahā-bhūta* or *kāya*, and the earthy, etc., in a body return to the corresponding elements. That the body is built up of the elements is

[1] SBB., vol. ii, p. 73; *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, ii, 1, 15. This is one of the *Uccheda-vādas* in the *Brahma-jāla-sutta* (46). *Ākāsa* (= *Ākāśa*) is rendered by ether in the following translation of the treatise: "Tatra pṛthivyādīni bhūtāni catvāri tattvāni tebhya eva dehākārapariṇatebhyaḥ kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat caitanyam upajāyate teṣu vinaṣṭeṣu satsu svayaṁ vinaśyati . . . tat caitanyaviśiṣṭadeha evātmā dehātirikta ātmani pramāṇābhāvāt pratyakṣaikapramāṇavāditayā anumānāder anaṅgīkāreṇa prāmāṇyābhāvāt" (*Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, *Cārvāka-darśana*, p. 2).

[2] *Ākāśa* is enumerated as an element. See SBE., vol. xlv, p. xxxiv (1).

[3] SBB., vol. ii, p. 74; *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, ii, 1, 21 f., and i, 1, 1, vv. 15–16. This is the same as the *Sassata-vāda* in the *Brahma-jāla-sutta* (27). Air (*vāyu*) and ease (*sukha*) are rendered by "wind" and "pleasure" in the following translation of the treatise. See Professor Garbe, *Sāṁkhya-Philosophie*, pp. 5–6 (Anm.).

not a production, but a combination or aggregation, because the elements cannot be made nor be created, and they are barren. How or by what sort of force they are combined is not explained.

As a consequence of such a materialistic view, the religious and ethical teaching must be such as "to him who acts, or causes another to act, mutilates or causes another to mutilate, punishes or causes another to punish, causes grief or torment, trembles or causes others to tremble, kills a living creature, takes what is not given, breaks into houses, commits dacoity or robbery or highway robbery, or tells lies, to him thus acting there is no guilt, . . . no increase of guilt would ensue . . . In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit (*puñña*), nor increase of merit";[1] and as "there is neither slayer nor causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or explainer. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby deprives anyone of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances".[2]

The view is held by Pūraṇa Kassapa, Ajita Kesa-kambalī, and Pakudha Kaccāyana. For the materialists merit or any other virtue has no meaning at all; a human being is only a mechanical combination of the five or the eight elements and nothing else. "There is no such thing as alms or sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or next. There is neither father nor mother nor being springing into life without them."[3] But it cannot be denied by anyone that there are some enjoying happy circumstances in this life, while others are living miserable lives. What is the cause of this? The materialist, Ajita Kesa-kambalī, cannot give a satisfactory

[1] SBB., pp. 69–70. This is called the *Akriya(-vāda*, Akriyā-vāda).
[2] Ibid., p. 74.
[3] Ibid., p. 73. This is also called the *Uccheda-vāda.*

answer. Pakudha Kaccāyana maintains that pleasure (or ease, *sukha*) and pain (*dukkha*) are also eternal and are not affected by any other thing. By means of the combination of pleasure and pain with a body and the soul the different circumstances can be produced. The enumeration of the soul, pleasure, and pain shows that the doctrine of Pakudha Kaccāyana is more advanced and speculative than that of Ajita Kesa-kambalī. In this connexion Pakudha Kaccāyana is more similar to the Vaiśeṣika than Ajita Kesa-kambalī.

The opinion concerning pleasure and pain seems to lead to the dogma of transmigration, as in the case of Makkhali Gosāla[1] (the leader of the Ājīvakas), who holds, however, a kind of fatalism. At any rate the dogma of transmigration required the admission of a certain force, which can answer the question how the elements are combined and how the different circumstances are produced. In the Vaiśeṣika the force is called *adṛṣṭa* (unseen force, destiny).

Makkhali Gosāla's opinion that "there is no such thing as power or energy, or human strength or human vigour" seems to have a relation to the opinion of Sañjaya Velaṭṭhi-putta, who maintains—"If you ask me whether there is another world (*atthi paraloko*)—well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I don't say so. And I don't think it is thus or this. And I don't think it is otherwise. And I don't deny it. If you ask me whether there is not another world (*n'atthi paraloko*) . . . whether there is and is not another world (*atthi ca n'atthi ca paraloko*) . . . whether there neither is nor is not another world (*n'ev'atthi na n'atthi paraloko*) . . ."[2]

The opinion is sometimes called an agnosticism;[3] but it

[1] SBB., vol. ii, p. 71. His opinion is called the *Adhicca-samuppannikā* in the *Brahma-jāla-sutta* (41). *Sūtra-kṛtāṅga*, SBE., vol. xlv, pp. 345, 239.

[2] Ibid., p. 75. Cf. the opinion of Ajita Kesa-kambalī, p. 73. Sañjaya Velaṭṭhi-putta's opinion is called the *Amarā-Vikkhepa* (*Brahma-j.*, 37).

[3] SBE., vol. xlv, pp. xxvii–viii.

is a scepticism on the one hand and a primitive stage of criticism of knowledge on the other hand, like the sophists in the Greek philosophy. The opinion is of a great importance, and influenced Jainism and Buddhism.[1] Mahā-vīra and even Buddha were compelled to provide their teachings and assertions against the scepticism of Sañjaya Velaṭṭhi-putta, which is essentially a negation of the four modes of expression (*atthi, n'atthi, atthi ca n'atthi ca, n'ev'atthi na n'atthi*). Negation generally implies a kind of criticism; therefore the consequent development of the above opinion leads to an idealism epistemological and metaphysical, as in the case of the Buddhist view of Nirvāṇa and of the Mādhyamika philosophy of Nāgārjuna.[2] Important as the opinion is, it could not be developed so far in the materialistic and realistic schools; but it survives in the Vaiśeṣika in the method of studying.

The above opinions, the *Sassata-vāda*, the *Uccheda-vāda* (or the *Akriyā-vāda*), and the *Amarā-Vikkhepa*, represent the metaphysics, the ethics, and the theory of knowledge (in a wider sense of the term) of those times.

The *Sassata-vāda* is too naive and not philosophic; but, if it is refined and consequently developed, the resultant must be atomistic. Body and things have the same quality of elements, but they are not the same in appearances. To reconcile the distinct contradiction an

[1] Oldenberg, *Buddha* (6. Aufl.), p. 80 f., *Die Lehre der Up. und die Anfänge des Buddhismus* (Göttingen, 1915), p. 290 f.; SBE., pp. xxviii–ix. Cf. *Samy. N.* iv, No. 44, *Aryākatāni samy.*

[2] Nāgārjuna's epistemology was developed from the theory of Anātman and the *Prajñā-pāramitā-sūtras*. But the influence of the opinion of Sañjaya Velaṭṭhi-putta can be seen throughout the *Mādhyamika-śāstra*. It is very interesting to notice that the Mādhyamika system influenced Śaṅkara's *Māyā-vāda*. See Professor de la Vallée Poussin, *Vedānta and Buddhism*, JRAS., 1910, pp. 129–40; Sukhtankar, *Teachings of Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, WZKM., vol. xxii, p. 136 f.; Jacobi, *On Māyāvāda*, JAOS., 1913, vol. xxxiii, pp. 51–4; Walleser, *Der ältere Vedānta* (Heidelberg, 1910).

atomic theory may suit better than any other, and it also appears to be a natural consequence. The Buddhist view of the four elements (*cattāri mahā-bhūtāni*) in the *Rūpūpādhāna-kkhandha*, which divides them into two sorts, interior (*ajjhattika*) and exterior (*bāhira*),[1] seems to have been an earlier stage of the development to an atomic theory. In those times the Jainas and the Ājīvakas maintained an atomic theory, which is most primitive.

Jacobi remarks: "Matter (in Jainism) is an eternal substance, undetermined with regard to quantity and quality, i.e. it may increase or diminish in volume without addition or loss of particles, and it may assume any forms and develop any kind of qualities. Material substances may coalesce into one substance, and one substance may divide into many. Now, the Jains maintain that everything in this world, except souls and mere space, is produced from matter (*pudgala*), and that all matter consists of atoms (*paramāṇu*). Each atom occupies one point (*pradeśa*) of space.[2] Matter, however, may be either in the gross state (*sthūla*, *bādara*), or in the subtle (*sūkṣma*). When it is in the subtle state, innumerable atoms of it occupy the space of one gross atom. The atoms are eternal as regards their substances; each atom has one kind of taste, smell, and colour, and two kinds of touch. These qualities, however, are not permanent and fixed for the several atoms, but they may be changed and developed in them. Two or more atoms which differ in their degree of smoothness and roughness may combine to form aggregates (*skandha*). The figures formed by the arrangement of the atoms into groups are manifold, and are precisely described in the *Bhagavatī*;[3]

[1] *Mahā-hatthi-padopama-sutta* (Majjh. N., No. 28), p. 184 f.

[2] Cf. *N.S.* 2, 2, 18.

[3] The fifth *Aṅga* (of the Jaina canon), or sometimes called the *Viyāha* (or *Vivāha*)-*paññatti*.

everything is believed to be formed of groups of one kind only.[1] The atom may develop a motion of its own, and this motion may become so swift that by means of it an atom may traverse in one moment the whole universe from one end to the other."[2]

The atomic theory of Jainism is undoubtedly more speculative than the opinion of Pakudha Kaccāyana; but it may be seen to have a close relation to the latter, or rather both represent the current thought of the time in materialistic and atomistic theories. If these theories are logically developed, they are easily converted into the Vaiśeṣika theory. At any rate Pakudha Kaccāyana and the Jainas are probably forerunners of the Vaiśeṣika.

The opinion of Pakudha Kaccāyana is called the *Akriyā-vāda*, while the Vaiśeṣika is called the *Kriyā-vāda*. Consequently the two are contradictory on this point. Pakudha Kaccāyana maintains, as stated above, that pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) are eternal and substances (to use the Vaiśeṣika's term), just as are the soul and other elements. Therefore, the opinion is named the *Akriyā-vāda*; but the Vaiśeṣika classified them among the attributes of self (the soul) and changed the *Akriyā-vāda* into the *Kriyā-vāda*. If the dogma of transmigration is acknowledged, pleasure and pain cannot have a position among substances.

Such modifications are also found with regard to the Jaina theory. The atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika is, as stated in the following notes, more advanced than that of the Jainas; but the essential points are not changed and the attributes of atoms remain still unfixed. In the Vaiśeṣika there are different kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elements, while in Jainism there are not different kinds of atoms. Other modifications in the atomic theory need not be mentioned here. If we

[1] Cf. *V.S.* 4, 2, 1-3; 8, 2, 4; *N.S.* 3, 1, 28.
[2] *Atomic Theory*, pp. 199-200.

consider at what period an atomic theory was introduced into Buddhism, it will be suggestive in this subject.

Now in the Pāli Buddhism there is no trace of an atomic theory, as asserted by Franke.[1] But in the so-called northern Buddhist literature we can find an early trace of the theory.

Dharmottara's *Abhidharma-hṛdaya-śāstra*[2] is of this opinion. His date is said to have been during the Tsin dynasty (221 – 206 B.C.) and the Hān dynasty (201 B.C. – 9 A.D.)[3] of China. Accordingly he lived about the third–second century B.C. He states :—

"Atoms (*aṇu* or *paramāṇu*) in the four sense-organs are of ten kinds; atoms in the body as a sense-organ (i.e. the skin) are of nine kinds, and in the others they are of eight kinds. This number of atoms are restricted to the world possessing smell."[4]

According to the commentaries, the ten kinds of atoms in the eyes are earth, water, fire, wind, colour, smell, taste, touch, the sight-organ (*cakṣur-indriya*), and the body-(= touch-)organ. In the cases of the other three sense-organs the sight-organ as an atom is replaced by the other three sense-organs as the atoms respectively. The nine kinds in the body are the same as the first nine (the sight-organ and the other three sense-organs are excepted).

[1] See Jacobi, *Atomic Theory*, p. 199.

[2] No. 1288, translated in 391 A.D. The text consists of 250 ślokas; it has been translated with a commentary. Whether the commentary is by the author or not is not clearly known; but it is perhaps by the hand of another, because Dharmottara's text is said to have consisted of only 250 ślokas. No. 1294 is another commentary by Upa-śānta, and No. 1287 is also a commentary by Dharma-trāta; but Dharma-trāta enlarged the original text and commented with an advanced theory. Dharma-trāta's atomic theory is quoted and criticized in the *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra* (No. 1263), vol. cxxvii, p. 5*b* f., together with the theory of Buddha-deva, and in the *Vibhāṣā-śāstra* (No. 1279), vol. i, p. 8*a*; vol. vi, p. 6*b* (the text in the Library of the India Office).

[3] Postscript in No. 1287 (*Chu-sān-tsāṅ-ci-tsi*, vol. x, p. 59*b*). Or some hundred years A.N. (preface in No. 1287).

[4] Vol. i, ch. ii, p. 56*a* = No. 1294, p. 82*b* = No. 1287, p. 29*a*–*b*.

"In the others" means things which are not sense-organs. the eight kinds are the four elements and the four qualities, colours, etc., as the atoms. "The world possessing smell" is the Kāma-loka of the three worlds, because there is no smell and taste in the Rūpa-loka, whence atoms in the Rūpa-loka are less than those in the Kāma-loka. The atoms other than smell and taste are the same in both worlds.[1]

In another passage Dharmottara also states that things in the objective world consist of atoms, while the mental (*citta* and *caitasika*) does not consist of atoms. Consequently atoms are material. The meaning of the above quotation may be that there are the eight kinds of atoms in the objective world, and every sense-organ has its own atom; a sense-organ itself is considered as a special atom, because a sense-organ has a special function. The four sense-organs other than the skin partake of the atom of the skin, inasmuch as they occupy a part of the body. Atoms are of thirteen sorts. The view that the atoms of the four elements are different from those of the four qualities is derived from the fact that earth, etc., sometimes have certain qualities owing to mixture with the latter, and sometimes are without them. The commentaries say that atoms are always mixed with one another.[2]

[1] No. 1288, p. 56*a*; No. 1294, p. 82*b*; cf. No. 1287, p. 29*a*–*b*.

[2] An atomic theory is not met with in Kātyāyanī-putra's *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra* (No. 1273 = No. 1275), a fundamental and the authoritative work of the Sarvāsti-vāda and the text of the *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra* (No. 1263 = No. 1264). The author is said to have lived during the years 200–300 A.N. (No. 1273). But in the latter work the atomic theory was adapted to explain the text. Afterwards the Sarvāsti-vāda (= the Vaibhāṣā school) maintains the atomic theory, and the Sautrāntika school also follows an atomic theory. Vasu-bandhu's *Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra* (No. 1269 = No. 1267) holds the theory. In the Mādhyamika school the theory is rejected, while the Yogācāra school uses it to explain the process and the state of emanation of the phenomenal world, although the school is idealistic. See Asaṅga's *Yogācārya-bhūmi-śāstra* (No. 1170), vol. i, p. 48; *Mahāyānābhidharma-saṁgīti-śāstra*

The above theory is not yet refined, and does not make distinction between substances and attributes, so that colour, etc., and even the sense-organs, are enumerated as atoms. In some respects Dharmottara's theory is opposed to the Jaina theory. But in the Vaiśeṣika colour, etc., are distinguished from earth, etc., and classified among attributes, while the sense - organs are explained as consisting each of a particular one among the four atoms. The Vaiśeṣika accepted the atoms of the four elements, and classified the four objects among attributes. Accordingly the above theory appears to represent an earlier stage of the development of the atomic theory, and at the same time to show that an atomistic tendency pervaded the general thought of these times.

According to the *Uttarādhyayana* [1] Jainism maintains that there are three categories—substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and developments (*paryāya*). Substances are the substrata of qualities; qualities are inherent in one substance, and developments have the characteristics that they inhere either in substances or in qualities. Substances are six—merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*), space, time, matter, and souls; [2] they make up the world. The characteristic of merit is motion, that of demerit immobility; that of space,[3] which contains all other substances, is that it makes room for everything; that of time is duration; [4] that of soul is realization of knowledge, faith,

(No. 1199), vol. i, p. 2*a*, its commentary, *Mahāyānābhidharma-saṁyukta-saṁgīti-śāstra*, by Buddha-siṁha (compiled by Sthira-mati), (No. 1178), vol. iii, pp. 31*a*, 39*b*, and *Prakaraṇāryavācā-śāstra* (No. 1177), p. 21a. But Dig-nāga refutes the theory in his *Ālambana-pratyaya-parīkṣā-śāstra* (No. 1173 = No. 1172), and others. Cf. Dharma-pāla's commentary (No. 1174) on No. 1173. Dharma-pāla also refutes the theory in his *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi-śāstra.*

[1] The first *sūtra* of the four *Mūla-sūtras*, translated in SBE., vol. xlv.

[2] *Dharma*, *adharma*, and space are each one substance only, while time, matter, and souls are an infinite number of substances.

[3] *Nabhas*, see notes on ch. ii, 1, 6. *Śrotraṁ punaḥ śravaṇa-vivara-saṁjñako nabho-deśaḥ* (*Pr. Bh.*, p. 59).

[4] *Vartanā.*

happiness, and misery; and the characteristic of Soul is knowledge, faith, conduct, austerities, energy, and realization (of its developments); and that of matter is sound, darkness, lustre (of jewels, etc.), light, shade,[1] sunshine, colour, taste, smell, and touch. The characteristic of developments is singleness (*ekatva*), separateness (*pṛthaktva*), number, form, conjunction, and disjunction.[2]

Usually in Jainism the categories are divided into two—substance (*dravya*) and its developments (or modifications, *paryāya*). The developments include attributes (*guṇa* in the Vaiśeṣika), and leave no room for the latter as an independent category. The most important distinction between the Vaiśeṣika on the one hand and Jainism, together with the other schools of the time, on the other is that the former strictly distinguishes substance itself from its quality and quantity, while the latter confuses them[3] with each other. In these circumstances the Vaiśeṣika cannot be earlier than these schools. The Vaiśeṣika, developing the principle systematically, elicited its notions of substances and attributes out of the above doctrines of Jainism and the like. And probably actions (*karma*), too, were derived from the same doctrines. Almost an outline of the three categories of the Vaiśeṣika is to be found here.

It may be supposed from these considerations that the Vaiśeṣika has its origin in the general thought of those times, that is, the Vaiśeṣika borrowed the materials from the thoughts of those days and systematized them at a somewhat later time. This supposition can be proved not only by two other evidences, but also by the descriptions of Kauṭilya and of the sixth schism in Jainism.

[1] Cf. *V.S.* 5, 2, 19–20, *dravya-guṇa-karma-niṣpatti-vaidharmyād-abhāvas* (or, *bhā'bhāvas*) *tamaḥ* and *tejaso dravyāntareṇāvaraṇāś ca.*

[2] SBE., p. 152 f. See *Eine Jaina-Dogmatik* (*Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra*), ZDMG., 1906, p. 512 f.

[3] Ibid., pp. xxxiii–v; Śaṅkara on the *Brahma-sūtra*. 2, 2, 17.

The Vaiśeṣika, together with the Nyāya, is a representative opponent of the Mīmāṁsā in regard to the dogma of eternity of sound,[1] and denies the absolute authority of the Veda.[2] The Vaiśeṣika contends that human beings have nothing innate in their minds, but every idea or concept results from experiences. Consequently the Vaiśeṣika is an empirism; but such ideas produced by experiences are conveyed to others and handed down to next generations, and become, as it were, innate,[3] so that the system can reconcile the conflict between empirism and the theory of innate ideas. From this standpoint the Veda is regarded as having an origin and being *buddhi-pūrva*.[4] But the system observes, on the one hand, the duty of the four periods of religious life,[5] etc., and esteems the Yoga practice;[6] on the other hand the *sūtra* says, "likewise the making away with those who are contrary," "making away with another has reference to an inferior," "in the case of an equal, suicide, or the destruction of the other,"[7] and "in like manner in the case of the bursting open of one burnt".[8] Such allowances could not be consisted with the strict rules of yogins or other observances.[9] The former observances possibly came from the Veda, the Mīmāṁsā, or other sources in the course of controversy against them; and the latter allowances may be considered and could be understood as remainders of the above-mentioned

[1] *V.S.* 2, 2, 21-37; *N.S.* 2, 2, 13-40. See Muir, *Original Sanskrt Texts*, 1861. pt. iii, pp. 73-113.

[2] *V.S.* 6, 1. 1 ff. The Nyāya defends the authority of the Veda against the Cārvāka (*N.S.* 2, 1, 56-67. Cf. the Cārvāka-section in the *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*).

[3] See notes on ch. i, 3, 12 (cognition).

[4] 6, 1, 1. [5] 6, 2, 2-3. [6] 6, 2, 8; 5, 2, 16, etc.

[7] *Tathā viruddhānāṁ tyāgaḥ* (6, 1, 13), *hīne pare tyāgaḥ* (14), and *same ātmatyāgaḥ paratyāgo vā* (15). See commentaries on the *sūtras* and on 6, 1, 12. In a word the Vaiśeṣika, in some cases, permits to kill others and to take what is not given.

[8] *Tathā dagdhasya visphoṭane* (5, 1, 12).

[9] Cf. 6, 2, 1; 6, 2, 8; 10, 2, 8.

Akriyā-vāda or *Uccheda-vāda*. If the Vaiśeṣika had had its origin in orthodox Brāhmanism, such curious features could not have appeared and could not be explained. It is therefore more probable that the origin of the Vaiśeṣika was in heterodox speculations, and in the course of time the system was on one side[1] adjusted to orthodoxy, just as the later Vaiśeṣika adapted itself to Śaivism and imported Īśvara into the system.[2]

Later Mīmāṁsakas are, in their philosophical theories, very similar to the Vaiśeṣika, as in the case of Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and Prabhā-kara, and *M.S.* contains terms identical with the technical terms of the Vaiśeṣika. The similarities in the philosophical theories and in one aspect of the religious practices may suggest a conclusion the reverse of the above. But this is not the case. Though the Mīmāṁsā originated earlier, as Thibaut and Jacobi[3] assert, the earlier origin cannot in this case prove priority. Before the beginning of the Christian era there is, in the field of Brāhmanical orthodox speculations, no trace of an atomic theory.[4] And the essential problem of the Mīmāṁsā is ritual, while philosophical speculations are rare and quite subordinate. Under such circumstances a systematical theory of philosophy cannot be originated: on the contrary, it is more reasonable to suppose that the philosophical theories have been taken into the system from the outside and are used to make the sacrificial injunctions (*dharma*) or other essential factors of the system transcendent in

[1] Cf. *V.S.* 6, 2, 1-9. The Vaiśeṣika is called the *Ardha-vaināśika* by Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* on 2, 2, 18.

[2] See notes on ch. i, 3, 22 (merit). Cf. Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism* (Bühler's *Grundriss*, iii, 6), p. 117.

[3] Thibaut, Introduction to the *Artha-saṁgraha* (Benares, 1882), p. ii: SBE., vol. xxxiv, pp. x–xiii; Jacobi, *Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie* (*Sitzungsberichte d. k. p. Ak. d. W.*, 1911), pp. 738-9.

[4] See *Brahma-sūtra*, 2, 2, 17. Śaṅkara on the *sūtra* and on 1, 4, 28: Deussen, *The System of the Vedānta*, p. 22 (15). Some Mīmāṁsakas did not acknowledge an atomic theory (*Śloka-vārttika* on 1, 1, 5, sec. 5, śl. 183).

relation to them. For instance, the Mīmāṁsā acknowledges the nine sorts of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*);[1] but the means of knowledge have no such philosophical import in the system as in other systems; they only serve to prove that the sacrificial injunctions are far superior to them,[2] and accordingly they are adopted in as large a number as possible. The philosophical speculations also serve the same purpose, never serve for the foundation of the system. Consequently the philosophical theories are so loose that eminent followers could explain them in their own ways, and this led to different opinions. Those theories in the system which are common to the Vaiśeṣika are due to the receptiveness of the system when continually attacked by the latter.[3] Thus this system cannot be considered as the source of the Vaiśeṣika.

As for the *Amarā-Vikkhepa*, the Vaiśeṣika did not accept it as it was. As a realistic system, the Vaiśeṣika is contrary to the idealistic tendency; nevertheless it was influenced by the *Amarā-Vikkhepa*. A Jaina tradition says, "indem alle diese 36 Unterabteilungen (9 substances, 17 attributes, 5 actions, 3 universalities, particularity and inherence) der sechs Grundprincipien sich unter vier Gesichtpunkte stellen, nämlich 1. den der Position (Beisp. *puḍhavī* = *pṛthivī*); 2. den der Negation der Position (Beisp. *apuḍhavī*); 3. den der Prohibition (Beisp. *nopuḍhavī*); 4. den der Negation der Prohibition (Beisp. *no apuḍhavī*), so ergeben sich

[1] In Śabara-svāmin's *Bhāṣya* on *M.S.* the six sorts are enumerated (pp. 6, 10). The *Gauḍa-pāda-bhāṣya* on *S.K.* v. 4 asserts that *sambhava*, *pratibhā*, and *aitihya* are acknowledged by Jaimini. Cf. *S. T.-Kaumudī* on v. 5; *N.S.* 2, 2, 1–12; *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 213–30.

[2] See the *sūtras* 1, 1, 4–5.

[3] That the system is comprehensive will be seen in Kumārila-bhaṭṭa's *Śloka-vārttika*. Not only the Vaiśeṣika theories, but also the essential parts of Dig-nāga's logic are accepted and taken in by Kumārila as well as by Prabhā-kara. Almost all the varieties of logical theory from Dig-nāga down to Kumārila are contained in the *Śloka-vārttika* on *M.S.* 1, 1, 5, *autpattika-sūtra*, sections 3 and 5.

die 144 (Punkte)."[1] This is perhaps a prior stage of enumeration (*uddeśa*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*), and explanation (*parīkṣā*)[2]; but the relation to the *Amarā-Vikkhepa* cannot be denied,[3] because the above four points of view are almost the same as the four modes of expression (*atthi*, *n'atthi*, *atthi ca n'atthi ca*, and *n'ev'atthi na n'atthi*). Further, this strict method of investigation seems to have helped the development of the Vaiśeṣika principle, distinguishing substance itself from attributes and actions, and of the theories concerning the relation between concepts and their objects, and of logic[4] in the system.

XI. Date of Systematization: the Categories

Generally a philosophical system may be described from the three points of view, epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics. In ancient times metaphysics is usually predominant, and epistemology appears at a later time and in advanced philosophical speculations. Consequently, though epistemology is really the foundation of metaphysics, the former is much neglected as compared with the latter in the ancient history of philosophy. The epistemological factor of the general thought of the time of Mahā-vīra and Buddha is not much developed in the Vaiśeṣika; but the essential parts of the three points of view are well combined in the system. The facts are therefore in favour of the conclusion that the origin of the Vaiśeṣika was in the time of Mahā-vīra and Buddha (the sixth–fifth century B.C.).[5]

[1] Leumann, *Indische Studien*, Bd. xviii, p. 121 f.

[2] *Nyāya-kandalī*, pp. 26–7; *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, p. 9; *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 29.

[3] See *Brahma-jāla-sutta*, pp. 37–40.

[4] See notes on ch. i, 3, 12 (cognition).

[5] Another evidence that the origin of the Vaiśeṣika is as old as Jainism is found in the fact that the terms *hetu* and *pramāṇa* have the same meaning in both systems. See Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, pp. 4–5; *V.S.* 9, 2, 4 (*hetur apadeśo, liṅgaṁ pramāṇaṁ karaṇam ity-anarthāntaraṁ*).

But the systematization of the Vaiśeṣika cannot be earlier than about 300 B.C. Kauṭilya (Cāṇakya) in his *Artha-śāstra* states that philosophy is only the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, and the Lokāyata (Cārvāka) (Sāṁkhyaṁ Yogo Lokāyataṁ ca ity-ānvīkṣikī). Oldenberg remarks, "dagegen ist dies kaum zweifelhaft, dass die Nichtnennung der beiden eng untereinander verbindenen Systeme, denen zu begegnen man hier noch erwarten könnte, des Nyāya und Vaiśeṣika, in der Tat auf deren damaliger Nichtexistenz beruht. Den Anspruch *ānvīkṣikī* (die auf Prüfung beruhende (Wissenschaft)) zu sein erhob seiner Zeit der Nyāya ebenso entscheiden wie berechtigt."[1] Consequently the systematization of the Vaiśeṣika is later than 300 B.C., probably in the first century B.C., because the information concerning the sixth schism (18 A.D.) of Jainism reveals that the Vaiśeṣika had already been systematized before the beginning of the Christian era. This does not, however, directly refer to the date of the compilation of *V.S.* *V.S.* seems to have been composed earlier than the other *sūtras*; but it presupposes not only the Mīmāṁsā and the Sāṁkhya, but also the Vedānta and others.[2] On the other hand, the Vaiśeṣika doctrines in *V.S.* represent the earlier, perhaps the genuine, doctrines of the system—at least the doctrines prevailing before the time of the sixth schism in Jainism, and the orthodox of the system.

A distinct characteristic of the Vaiśeṣika is a sharp and strict analysis of an object. The six categories are only the six modes of observation and of the explanation of an object. The distinction between substance and its

[1] *Die indische Philosophie* (*Kultur der Gegenwart, allg. Gesch. d. Phil.*), pp. 32–4; Jacobi, *Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie*, pp. 736, 738, 743.

[2] Especially see 2, 1, 20 (relying on the commentaries); 3, 1, 1–2; 5, 2, 19–20; 7, 2, 3-8; 7, 2, 13; 9, 2, 3.

attributes and actions[1] is one of the fundamental principles. It leads to the theory of the *Asat-kārya-vāda* and self (*ātman*) distinguished from cognition (*buddhi*). But the relation between the fourth and the fifth category, universality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*), is not in accordance with the above-noted characteristic, because an object is, on the one hand, classified under universality, and, on the other hand, under particularity, so that it cannot be fixed in a definite category. This is a natural consequence of the conceptual relations, as in the case of the classification of concepts in formal logic: but from the principle of the system it is not so strict as the other categories. Various opinions on this point arose even before the Christian era. Roha-gutta, the chief teacher in the sixth schism of Jainism (*Trairāśika-matam*, 544 A.V. = 18 A.D.)[2] imported the Vaiśeṣika doctrines into Jainism. Its first three categories and the last (sixth) are just the same as enumerated in *V.S.*; but the fourth, universality, and the fifth, particularity, are different from those of the *sūtra*. The original runs:—

"sāmannaṁ tivihaṁ: 1. mahā-sāmannaṁ, 2. sattā-sāmannaṁ, 3. sāmanna-visesa-sāmannaṁ.

tatra mahāsāmānyaṁ ṣaṭsv api padārtheṣu padārthatva-buddhi-kāri — sattāsāmānyaṁ bhū-padārtha-sad-buddhi-vidhāyi—sāmānya-viśeṣa-sāmānyaṁ 3 dravyatvādi 3 (I). anye tu vyācakṣate: (mahāsāmānyaṁ) bhū-padārtha-sat-kāri; sattāsāmānyaṁ dravyatvādi: sāmānya-viśeṣaḥ pṛthivītvādiḥ (II).

viseso egaviho; evaṁ . . . aṇṇe bhaṇanti: sāmannaṁ duvihaṁ: paraṁ aparaṁ ca (III); viseso duviho: anta-viseso aṇanta-viseso ya."

The Sanskṛt equivalent of universality has been rendered

[1] Cf. SBE., vol. xlv, p. xxxiii f. and notes on ch. i, 1, 1, and ch. ii, 2, 11.
[2] *Indische Studien*, xviii, pp. 121 f., and SBE., p. xxxvii f. (*Āvaśyaka*, the second of the four *Mūla-sūtras*, vv. 77-83).

into Chinese by various terms: "generality," "universality, " existence," "great universality," and "great existence The first two are translations of *sāmānya*, the third is that of *sattā* or *bhāva*, while the fourth is evidently that of *mahā-sāmānya*. The fifth might be a translation of *mahā-sattā*, but the term is not met with in any work. It is perhaps a translation of *sattā* modified by the analogy of the fourth. These Chinese equivalents may show that there were also different opinions concerning the fourth category, even in later times, and that the term *mahā-sāmānya* was still used. That the term *sāmānya-viśeṣa* ("universality-particularity") occurs in the Chinese translations has already been pointed out in the preceding passage; it was not classed under the fourth category, but the fifth category itself was called *sāmānya-viśeṣa*.[2]

The three subdivisions of *sāmānya* in the above quotation from the Jaina record are not known to *V.S.*, *Pr. Bh.*, the present treatise, or to any other works, and the three different opinions (I, II, III, in the above quotation) concerning the subdivisions came from different points of view.

In the first opinion (I), i.e. the opinion of Rohagutta, the *mahā-sāmānya* corresponds to *abhidheyatva* ("capability of being designated") and *jñeyatva* ("knowableness"), as common properties (*sādharmya*) of the six categories in *Pr. Bh.*, and to "knowable" in our treatise.[3] This view was probably suggested by *V.S.* 1, 1, 8.[4] As it is applied only to the categories, the

[1] The first is used in the translations of the *Śata-śāstra* and the *Satya-siddhi-śāstra* (both by Kumāra-jīva), and of the *Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra* (by Kekaya), the second and the fourth in the translation of our treatise (by Yuan Chwang), and the second to the fifth in Kwhēi-ci's commentaries on Nos. 1197 and 1216.

[2] See notes on ch. i, 10 (commonness).

[3] *Pr. Bh.*, p. 16, and notes on ch. ii, 11.

[4] 1, 1, 8 runs, sad anityatvaṁ dravyavat kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānya-viśeṣavad iti dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām aviśeṣaḥ. The other three categories relate to the same object, in which the first three categories reside.

mahā-sāmānya does not relate to the contents of the categories; but the *sāmānya*, lower than the *mahā-sāmānya*, includes the contents of the categories and relates to the *viśeṣa*, so that the lower *sāmānya* is called *sāmānya-viśeṣa*. The *sattā-sāmānya* corresponds exactly to *sattā* or *bhāva* in *V.S.*[1] The division of *mahā-sāmānya* and *sāmānya-viśeṣa* springs from the same point of view (*padārthatva*, "category-ness," and *dravyatva*, "substance-ness," etc.,as the objective entities corresponding to the subjective concepts of category and substance, etc.), while the *sattā-sāmānya* comes from the notion with regard to the *bhū-padārtha*[1] that that is existent. Both *sattā-sāmānya* and *sāmānya-viśeṣa* have the same scope, and *sāmānya-viśeṣa* naturally implies existence. Even *mahā-sāmānya* must imply existence. *Pr. Bh.* ascribes existence (*astitva*) to the six categories as a common quality (*sādharmya*). Accordingly, *padārthatva* in *padārthatva-buddhi-kāri* implies existence (*sad*, in *bhū-padārtha-sad-buddhi-kāri*). *Sattā-sāmānya*, therefore, turns out to be superfluous, and the three subdivisions are reduced to two. If *bhū-padārtha* should mean the six categories, the *mahā-sāmānya* and the *sattā-sāmānya* would, after all, become one. The third opinion (III, *param aparaṁ ca*) probably accepted such a consequence. This third opinion was adopted by *Pr. Bh.*, which maintains that the *para-sāmānya* ("the highest universality") is *sattā*, while the *apara-sāmānya* ("the lower universality") includes *sāmānya-viśeṣa-sāmānya* in the first opinion, and *aṇanta-viseso* (*anantya-viśeṣa*), the second sort of *viseso* (*viśeṣa*). Consequently, the *viśeṣa* ("particularity") contains *anta-viseso* (*antya-viśeṣa*, "the final species or the ultimate particulars") alone. The second opinion (II) is too artificial.

The fifth category, *viśeṣa*, is not usually subdivided.

[1] *Bhū-padārtha* includes the first three categories. See *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 17, 19.

Even *Pr. Bh.* does not know the two sorts of *viśeṣa*, but a similar subdivision is met with in Kwhēi-ci's commentary.[1]

These different opinions show that the intention was to classify things either under universality or under particularity, and to fix them in the definite classes. At the same time they prove that the systematization of the Vaiśeṣika theories contained in *V.S.* took place in a time distant from 18 A.D. Besides, that the Jainas themselves maintain that the Vaiśeṣika system was established by Roha-gutta is a good reason for holding that the systematization was not very near to the sixth schism, because, had the systematization been very recent, they could not have claimed to be the founders.[2] On the other hand, it may be supposed that the systematization did not take place at a time very remote from the schism: otherwise the Jainas could not have connected Roha-gutta with its origination, because the founder would have been conceived as a legendary personage. The probabilities are in favour of even the middle of the first century B.C. as the date of the systematization.

XII. THE *SUTRA*: EVIDENCE FOR DATING: 1. THE *VIBHASA*, ETC.

We have now established the date of the supposed origin and systematization of the Vaiśeṣika, and learned a little in outline of the doctrinal development. We shall next proceed to obtain some materials concerning the date of *V.S.* and the development of the doctrines from Chinese translations.

1. To begin with, we shall first refer to the *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra*,[3] which was composed by Vasu-mitra

[1] See notes on ch. i, 10 (commonness).

[2] SBE., vol. xlv, pp. xxxvii–viii.

[3] See *supra*. Vol. cxiii, p. 53*b*.

and others under the patronage of Kaniṣka (the first century A.D.).[1] The work consists of 200 volumes, and is not easy to read. Only one passage has been found. "The Vaiśeṣika maintains that there are five sorts of actions, namely, throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contracting, expanding, and going as a fifth."

The *Vibhāṣā-śāstra*,[2] which seems to be a short extract from the above work,[3] also refers to the Vaiśeṣika. "A certain teacher maintains that there are five sense-organs, the organ of smell, of taste, of seeing, of touch, and of hearing. This opinion is the same as held by the Vaiśeṣika."[4] Next mentioned is the Sāṁkhya, which holds that there are the five intellectual organs (*buddhi-indriya*), the five organs of action (*karma-indriya*), and a mind (*manas*).

The references are too slight to supply detailed ideas of the Vaiśeṣika; but there is ground for concluding that the Vaiśeṣika had been acknowledged by the Buddhists in these days as a system having the special doctrines.

According to Jacobi the oldest reference to the Vaiśeṣika is found in the *Caraka-saṁhitā*.[5] Caraka seems to have lived in the time of Kaniṣka.[6] Subsequently the Vaiśeṣika is known to have been referred to by various writers.

[1] The date of Kaniṣka has lately been discussed by English eminent scholars in JRAS., 1912, pp. 665, 981; 1913, pp. 55, 627, 911 f. Cf. Oldenberg, *On the Era of Kaniṣka*, JPTS., 1912, pp. 1-18.

[2] No. 1279, translated in 383 A.D.

[3] See Tāo-an's (Dō-an, died in 385 A.D.) preface to the work (*Chu-sān-tsāṅ-ci-tsi*, pp. 58–9); cf. Dr. Watanabe, *The Oldest Record of the Rāmāyaṇa in a Chinese Buddhist Writing*, JRAS., 1907, p. 99 f. Allusions to the *Mahā-bhārata* and the *Rāmāyaṇa* also occur in this work, pp. 4*b*, 8*b*; see Professor Takakusu, *On the Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāsti-vāda*, JPTS., 1904-5, pp. 68–146.

[4] Vol. iv, p. 23*a*. The original text explains that the organ of smell is the nose and so on.

[5] *Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie*, p. 732 (2). (*Caraka-saṁhitā*, i, 1. 43 f., 63 f.)

[6] Jolly, *Medicin* (Bühler's *Grundriss*, iii, 10), p. 11.

2. Aśva-ghoṣa in his *Sūtrālaṅkāra*[1] states: "Once there lived a Brāhmaṇa, Kauśika by name, who had thoroughly mastered the *Sāṁkhya-śāstra*, the *Vaiśeṣika-śāstra*, and the *śāstra* of Jñāti-putra[2] . . . Kauṣika said to his friend, '. . . Why do you look down upon the teachings of our Buddha so much? The *Vaiśeṣika-śāstra* is so defective that it is by no means to be compared with the teachings of Buddha. The *śāstra* cannot properly explain what an object is, and misunderstands causality . . .' The friend asked him, 'For what reason can you assert that the *Vaiśeṣika-śāstra* does not properly explain causality? The *śāstra* explains that broken potsherds are the cause of a pot. How can it be said that the *śāstra* cannot properly explain causality?' Kauśika answered, 'If the *Vaiśeṣika-śāstra* really assert it, the assertion is nonsense. Threads having become warp and woof are, as everyone knows, the cause of a cloth. Just so in the case of a pot and a jar. When a pot has existed, there can be potsherds; but it is never the case that there are potsherds without a pot having existed. Before a pot has been broken into potsherds, the pot is of use. Broken potsherds are, therefore, by no means the cause of a pot. A potter makes, it is certain, a pot from clay, but never from potsherds . . . Before Buddha, who has *daśabala*

[1] No. 1182, translated by Kumāra-jīva in 405 A.D. The work has been translated into French by Édouard Huber (*Aśvaghoṣa, Sūtrālaṅkāra*, Paris, 1908).

[2] *Śāstra* in such cases does not denote a special work, but simply means "doctrine". In another passage Kumāra-jīva used the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* and the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. *Sūtra* also means "doctrine".

Jñāti-putra is *Zho-thi-swei-mo* (or *Jo-t'i-souei-mo*) in Chinese. *Zho-thi* (*Jo-t'i*) is evidently the transliteration of Ñā-ti (= Jñāti), while *Swei-mo* (*souei-mo*) is doubtful. In Buddhist works the Sāṅkhya, the Vaiśeṣika, the Nirgranthas, and the Jñāti-putras are connected with one another in respect to their opinions; accordingly I have ventured to replace *Zho-thi-swei-mo* by *Jñāti-putra*. In such cases the Jñāti-putras are called Ājīvakas, while the Nirgranthas are called naked medicants (Dig-ambara). SBE, vol. xlv, pp. xxix–xxx.

("ten sorts of power"),[1] came to the world, all creatures were so uncultivated and blind to truth that they looked upon the *Vaiśeṣika-śāstra* as the best. But after our Buddha, the sun, appeared and shone, wisdom (of creatures) became clear, so that the *Vaiśeṣika-śāstra* was known not to contain any reasonable explanation and to be good for nothing, like an owl that is flying and energetic at night and conceals itself and is not energetic in the daytime . . .'"[2]

"Broken potsherds are the cause of a pot" is not met with in *V.S.*, but "threads are the cause of a cloth" is a hackneyed metaphor in the Vaiśeṣika.[3] Potsherds as broken pieces cannot, as it stands, be the cause of other pots; but this example probably means that potsherds are in essence the same as clay, and the difference between them comes from the difference of the state, that is, clay is called so before it has become a pot, and potsherds exist after a pot has been broken.[4] Perhaps an imperfect illustration of the *Asat-kārya-vāda*. The example of an owl possibly came from the meaning of Ulūka and does not appear to be an accidental coincidence. Ci-tsāṅ and Kwhēi-ci may have followed Aśva-ghoṣa in the explanation. Aśva-ghoṣa placed the origin of the Vaiśeṣika in a time before Buddha; but, as stated above, there was before Buddha as yet no theory similar to the Vaiśeṣika. We therefore understand that Kaṇāda was, even at the time of Aśva-ghoṣa, known to have been an ancient Ṛṣi, and that the followers of the Vaiśeṣika had traced their doctrine back to this ancient Ṛṣi, who was, nevertheless, not the real founder, if he indeed lived in a time prior to Buddha.

[1] *Mahā-vyutpatti*, vii.

[2] Vol. i, pp. 72*a*, 73*b*.

[3] *Upaskāra*, on 2, 1, 22; 5, 2, 24; 10, 2, 3; 10, 2, 5.

[4] This may be compared with *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, on 4, 1, 16, and *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 458. [In the later Vaiśeṣika works the two *kapālas*, "sherds," often occur as the material cause of "pot".—F. W. T.]

3. Before proceeding further we have to study the dates of Nāgārjuna, Deva (Ārya-deva), Hari-varman, and others.

Saṅ-cāo (Sō-jō), a famous disciple of Kumāra-jīva,[1] states that Deva lived 800–900 A.N.[2] According to Yuan Chwang's *Si-yü-ci* Deva seems to have seen Nāgārjuna when Nāgārjuna was passing his days on the Śrī-parvata near the River Kistna. Nāgārjuna lived about 750–850 A.N.

Saṅ-jwei (Sō-yei), another disciple of Kumāra-jīva, says that Aśva-ghoṣa came to the world after the time of the Caṅ-fā (shō-bō), and Nāgārjuna came at the end of the time of the Hsiang-fā (zō-bō).[3] He quotes an Indian tradition which says, "if Aśva-ghoṣa and Nāgārjuna had not come into the world at times following respectively that of the Caṅ-fā and that of the Hsiang-fā, the teachings of our Buddha would have seriously declined and would have ceased to exist."[3] Now the time of the Caṅ-fā is the duration of 500 years A.N., and that of the Hsiang-fā is another 500 years after the Caṅ-fā according to Nāgārjuna and Hwui-jwei[4] (E-yei), another disciple of Kumāra-jīva. Consequently Aśva-ghoṣa may be placed in 650 A.N. and Nāgārjuna in 800 A.N.

Hari-varman is said to have lived in the 900th year A.N.,

[1] Kumāra-jīva is the first translator of works of the three great Buddhists.

[2] In his preface to the translation of the *Śata-śāstra* (*Chu-sān-tsāṅ-ci-tsi*, p. 62*a*): "800–900 A.N." is literally "800 and some years".

[3] In his preface to the translation of the *Prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra* (No. 1169) of Nāgārjuna, translated by Kumāra-jīva (*Chu-sān-tsāṅ-ci-tsi*, p. 60*a*–*b*).

[4] *Chu-sān-tsāṅ-ci-tsi*, p. 30*b*; *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra*, vol. ii, p. 16*a*; vol. lxvii, p. 36*b*. Some Buddhists explain that the Caṅ-fā is the duration of 1000 years A.N.; but this opinion does not matter in the present case, because the authorities of the above discussion are the disciples of Kumāra-jīva and Nāgārjuna himself. Caṅ-fā literally means "the true law (*sad-dharma*)"; the true law of Buddha remains for 500 years A.N. as it was, while during the time of the Hsiang-fā the true law declines.

i.e. 800–900, according to Yuan-Ch'ang,[1] and in 890 A.N. according to Sañ-jwei.[2] Hari-varman was a disciple of Kumāra-labdha of the Sarvāsti-vāda.[3]

The date of the Nirvāṇa held by Kumāra-jīva and his disciples is 637 B.C.[4] Hence we conclude the following dates: Aśva-ghoṣa lived about 13 A.D., Nāgārjuna about 113–213 A.D., Deva about 163–263 A.D., and Hari-varman about 260 or 270 A.D.

There are more than fifty different traditions of the date of the Nirvāṇa in Chinese Buddhist works. The date 637 B.C. is one of them. The present writer does not mean that 637 B.C. is the only possible date of the Nirvāṇa; but he holds that the dates stated above must be calculated from the date of the Nirvāṇa held by Kumāra-jīva and his disciples.

Yuan Chwang remarks, "in his (Kumāra-labdha's) time Aśva-ghoṣa in the east, Deva in the south, Nāgārjuna in the west, and Kumāra-labdha in the north were called the Four Shining Suns."[5] Aśva-ghoṣa was, according to the traditions, a disciple of Pārśva[6] and a copyist or a writer in the fourth Buddhist Council under Kaniṣka.[7] According to another tradition the successive order of Buddhist Patriarch is "Pārśva — Puṇya-yaśas — Aśva-ghoṣa — Kapi-mala — Nāgārjuna — Deva".[8] Nāgārjuna

[1] In his *Life of Hari-varman*, see before.

[2] In his preface to the *Satya-siddhi-śāstra* (No. 1274, translated by Kumāra-jīva) of Hari-varman.

[3] A verse by Kumāra-labdha is quoted by Vasu-bandhu in his *Abhidharma-kośa-śāstra*. According to Yuan Chwang Kumāra-labdha was a follower of the Sautrāntika (*Si-yu-ci*, vol. xii, p. 63*a*). The Sautrāntika is an advanced branch of the Sarvāsti-vāda.

[4] Bukkyo-Dainempyō (*The Chronology of Buddhism*, Tokyo, 1909), Introd., p. 12.

[5] *Si-yu-ci*, vol. xii, p. 63*a*. Watters, ii, p. 286.

[6] *Life of the Bodhi-sattva Aśva-ghoṣa* (No. 1460), p. 111*b*.

[7] *Life of Vasu-bandhu* (No. 1463), p. 116*b*: Professor Takakusu, *A Study of Paramārtha's Life of Vasu-bandhu*, JRAS. 1905, p. 39.

[8] No. 1340 (Record on the *Nidāna* of transmitting the *Dharma-piṭaka*), p. 399.

mentions Pārśva in his *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra*,[1] and the substance of what he states agrees, to some extent, with No. 1340. He also states in the same work, "Kaccāyana (= Katyāyanī-putra) composed the (*Abhidharma-*)*jñāna-prasthāna-sūtra* in eight *granthas* (Aṣṭa-grantha)[2] . . . afterwards followers of his composed the *Vibhāṣā* (or *Vaibhāṣā*), because Buddhists in later times (later than the author) could not (or will not) thoroughly understand the eight *granthas*."[3] This

[1] Vol. xcix, p. 99*a*.

[2] This is No. 1273 = No. 1275. *Sūtra* is sometimes confused with *śāstra* by Kumāra-jīva.

[3] Vol. ii, p. 18*a*; cf. vol. iv, p. 34*b*; vol. xxxviii, p. 102*a*.

The date of Aśva-ghoṣa is one of the most difficult questions among Chinese and Japanese Buddhists, because the *Mahā-yāna-śraddhotpāda-śāstra* (No. 1250 = No. 1249), one of the fundamental and the most systematic works of the Mahā-yāna Buddhism, is ascribed to him, and the question of his date is, accordingly, connected with the origin of the Mahā-yāna, while his *Life* does not suggest that he was a Mahāyānist and the author of the work. Besides, the fact that the doctrines contained in the work are contrary in some points to the doctrines of the Fā-hsiang-tsung (both have similar doctrines) adds to the difficulty of the question. Though it is clear from No. 1340 that he knew the *Prajñā-pāramitā*-doctrine, the question is still undecided. Some writers believe that there were two persons named Aśva-ghoṣa, relying upon a tradition held among the Sarvāstivādins (mentioned by Saṅ-yiu in his *Chu-sān-tsāṅ-ci-tsi*, p. 72*a–b*). But this is only a mention of the name without any account of him, and is only by hearsay. Nevertheless, the present writer contents himself, at the present time, with the above date, relying upon the oldest and native tradition, and regards the question of A.'s date as different from that of the author of the work, which is not always ascribed to him by old traditions, and from that of the origin of the Mahā-yāna.

Nāgārjuna's date has also many different traditions. Generally the date is believed to be 700 A.N. Its source is in the *Mahā-māyā-sūtra* (No. 382, translated in 479–502 A.D.), where the Buddha prophesies that Nāgārjuna will be born 700 A.N. But the date of the Nirvāṇa held by the author of the *Sūtra* is not known, and the *Sūtra* is not reliable; it consists of a collection, so to speak, of materials from the *Mahā-parinibbāna-sutta* and other *sūtras*, or from unknown sources. Nāgārjuna's date is, at the earliest, undoubtedly later than 500 years A.N., because in his *Prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra*, vol. ii, p. 16*a*; vol. xxx, p. 52*b*; vol. xxxv, p. 84*a*; vol. lxiii, p. 14*a*; vol. lxvii, p. 36*b*, he states that Buddhist schools were originated after 500 years A.N.

passage clearly shows that Nāgārjuna knew about the compilation of the *Abhidharma-mahā-vibhāṣā-śāstra* in the fourth Council. Consequently, Aśva-ghoṣa, as a disciple of Pārśva, seems to be a little earlier than Nāgārjuna, just as Hari-varman, a disciple of Kumāra-labdha, is a little later than Nāgārjuna. Kumāra-jīva's tradition is one of the oldest.

Hari-varman's *Satya-siddhi-śāstra* has no commentary; but Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-śāstra*[1] and Deva's *Śata-śāstra* have commentaries by Indian authors. The commentary on the former is by Piṅgala,[2] and that on the latter is by the Bodhi-sattva Vasu. Some scholars believe that Piṅgala (or Piṅgala-netra or Nīla-netra) is another name of Deva.[3] But Kumāra-jīva and his disciples never suggest that the commentator was Deva. Nor do they assert that the Bodhi-sattva Vasu is the same person as the famous Bodhi-sattva Vasu-bandhu; but Ci-tsāṅ, the commentator on the translation of the work, asserts that Vasu is Vasu-bandhu,[4] and Peri[5] is of the same opinion. Be that as it may, the *Mādhyamika-śāstra* and the *Śata-śāstra* were translated in 409 and 404 A.D. Kumāra-jīva (*c.* 340–413 A.D.), according to his *Life*, had been instructed in these works about 353 A.D. by Sūrya-soma in Shā-chü

[1] No. 1179. The work has been translated by Walleser from Chinese into German (Heidelberg, 1912).

[2] p. 23*a*.—Saṅ-jwei says in his preface to the work that there were many commentaries on it in India; the commentary was by a Brahmacārin, or a Brāhmaṇa, Piṅgala, the Blue-eyed in Chinese, who devoted himself to the doctrine; but his commentary was not perfect, so that the translator, Kumāra-jīva, filled up and omitted some passages.

[3] Nanjio's, App. i, 4. Walleser identifies Piṅgala-akṣa with Vimalākṣa (Introd., pp. x–xiii). Nāgārjuna is said to have quoted a verse of Deva in his *Akutobhaya*, a commentary on the *Mādhyamika-śāstra* (Walleser; *Die mittlere Lehre*, Heidelberg, 1911, p. 175). In the Chinese translation (p. 57*a*) the verse also occurs as a verse of the *Catuḥ-śata-parīkṣā* (cf. Tāra-nātha's *Geschichte*, p. 83); but in Bhāva-viveka's *Prajñā-dīpa-śāstra* (No. 1185), another commentary, the verse is omitted (p. 138*b*).

[4] In his sub-commentary *Dainihon-zokuzōkyō*, 73, bk. 5, p. 372*a*.

[5] V. Smith, loc. cit., p. 329 (N. Peri, *A propos de la date de Vasubandhu*, Bull. de l'École fr. d'Extrême-Orient, t. xi, 1911, pp. 339–90).

(Yarkand,[1] a province in Chinese Turkestan). Accordingly Piṅgala and Vasu lived during 150–300 A.D. The special doctrines or opinions in the commentaries may be considered as having prevailed during that period.

4. Nāgārjuna mentions the Sāṁkhya (Kapila), the Yoga, and the Vaiśeṣika (Ulūka) in his *Daśa-bhūmi-vibhāṣā-śāstra*[2]; but the most important passages are found in his great work, the *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra*. Here, having stated the theory which says that time (*kāla*) is the cause of everything in the world, and having quoted two verses,[3] he says: "Another maintains that all things in the world, e.g. heaven and earth, agreeable and disagreeable things, are not considered as products of time. But time is unchangeable and has the real existence relating to a cause (*V.S.* 2, 2. 7-9: 5, 2, 26: 7, 1, 25). The substance time, being subtle, cannot be seen, nor known (by the sense-organs). It is, however, inferred from the effects like (the opening of) flowers and (the ripening of) fruits. That is to say, by the marks—the past year and the present year, posteriority and priority, slowness and quickness—time is known as existent, however invisible (2, 2, 6). This reasoning is that from effect to cause."[4]

As for space (*dik*), he does not accept it as a substance, but he acknowledges it from the standpoint of common sense (*vyāvahārika*), because, in his idealistic philosophy, its reality is not ascertained.

[1] Professor Shiratori, *A Study on "Ta-yuan-kuo" in Han Dynasty* (The Tōyō-gakuhō, Reports of the investigations of the Oriental Society, vol. vi. No. 1, pp. 5, 49).

[2] No. 1180, vol. iii, p. 11*a*; *Eka-śloka-śāstra* (No. 1212), p. 5*b*.

[3] The first half of the verses agrees with the verse in the commentary on *S.K.* in the Chinese translation (No. 1296), p. 89*b*, and in the *Gauḍa-pāda-bhāṣya*, v. 61.

[4] Vol. ii, p. 14*b*. Almost the same statement is found in Piṅgala's commentary, p. 44*b* f., and Vasu's commentary, p. 47*a*. Cf. *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya*, by Deva (No. 1189), pp. 49*b*–50*a*. *V.S.* 2, 2, 6, runs, *aparasminn aparaṁ yugapat ciraṁ kṣipram iti kālaliṅgāni*. 5, 2, 26, *kāraṇena kālaḥ*, and 7, 1, 25, *kāraṇe kālaḥ*. As to this sort of reasoning see notes on ch. i, 2, 1-4, 5-7, ch. i, 3, 12.

"Someone will ask me, 'Why do you maintain that there is no such real thing as space? Although the four divisions (= *Catvāry ārya-satyāni*) in your system do not contain it, our six categories contain it: space is not enumerated among the five *skandhas*, the twelve *āyatanas*, and the eighteen *dhātus*[1] of your system; but it is enumerated under our category substance' (*V.S.* 2, 2, 11). The substance space has the characteristics of eternity and of real existence, that is, space is eternal and really existent (2, 2, 11-2). The *sūtra* says, 'Where the sun rises is the east, where it sets is the west, where the sun moves is the south, and whither it does not go is the north. The conjunction of the sun (with space) takes place in the three divisions of its course, prior (or past), present and posterior (or future). The divisions of the course presuppose space. Where the conjunction (of the sun in its course) first takes place is the east. In like manner the south and the west are explained (2, 2, 13-5). Whither the sun does not go there is no division of the course.' '(That is) far, (this is) near, that (is there), and this (is here),' are the marks of space. Without space there are no (such notions as) that and this. 'That' and 'this' are the marks of space; they are not space itself (2, 2, 10)."[2]

Concerning self (*ātman*) Nāgārjuna naturally denies its existence: "There is no self asserted, because the mark of its existence cannot be found out. Of everything existence is inferred when marks are known; e.g. the existence of fire is known from seeing smoke and feeling hot . . . Someone will object 'that there is breathing out and in (*prāṇa* and *apāna*) in a body is a mark of the existence of self. Seeing and winking (or the opening

[1] See *Dharma-saṁgraha*, 22, 24–5, or *Mahā-vyutpatti*, 100, 106-7

[2] Vol. x, p. 67*b*. The passage in Vasu's commentary, p. 47*a*, is more similar to *V.S.* *V.S.* 2, 2, 10, runs, *ita idam iti yatas tad-diśyaṁ liṅgam*; 2, 2, 14, *āditya-saṁyogād bhūtapūrvād bhaviṣyato bhūtāc ca prācī*; 2, 2, 15. *tathā dakṣiṇā pratīcī udīcī ca.*

and closing of the eyes), life, (the motions of) mind, pain, pleasure, desire, aversion, and effort, etc., are the marks of self (*V.S.* 3, 2, 4). To whom do they belong, if there is no self? . . . As self is too subtle to be perceived by the five sense-organs, its existence is inferred from the marks (8, 1, 2)' . . ."[1]

In other passages, refuting the eternity of self, he says that, "if self be eternal, there is no sin in killing others, because self cannot be killed even when the body is killed . . . (cf. *N.S.* 3, 1, 5)."[2]

He also states the different opinions which assert that there are two kinds of self, eternal and non-eternal, or subtle and eternal (i.e. inactive) and active, and that self is neither eternal nor non-eternal.[3] Then follow the distinctions of various opinions with regard to self and the world, which are similar to the distinctions in the *Brahma-jāla-sutta*.[4] First, the Sāṁkhya is fully stated, after which we read: "Next, another says, the world is, at the beginning, produced from atoms.[5] Atoms are eternal, indestructible, and unconsumable, because they are subtle (*V.S.* 4, 1, 1; 7, 1, 10). Such atoms are caused to aggregate with one another by the force of merit and demerit (*dharma* and *adharma*, i.e. *adṛṣṭa* in *V.S.* 6, 2, 13) and form bodies (cf. 5, 2, 17-8). Heaven

[1] Vol. xxiii, p. 13*b*. The same proof of self is found in Piṅgala's commentary, p. 33*b*; Vasu's commentary, p. 39*b*; Bhāva-viveka's *Prajñā-dīpa-śāstra*, p. 110*b*; *Mahāyāna-tāla-ratna-śāstra* (No. 1237), p. 65*a*; *Lakṣaṇānusāra-śāstra* (No. 1280, see below), pp. 79*b*–80*a*. Cf. Dharma-pāla's *Vaipulya-śata-śāstra-vyākhyā* (No. 1198), p. 79*a*. *Buddhi* is enumerated as an attribute of self in the first and the last two works. See notes on ch. i, 2, 8. *V.S.* 3, 2, 4, runs, *prāṇa-apāna-nimeṣa-unmeṣa-jīvana-manogati-indriyāntaravikārāḥ sukha-duḥkha-icchā-dveṣa-prayatnāś ca-ātmano liṅgāni.*

[2] Vol. xii, p. 80*a*.

[3] Vol. lxx, p. 48*a*.

[4] The divisions occasionally occur in his and Deva's works. The sixty-two sorts of *dṛṣṭi* are always used in Buddhist works. Cf. *Daśa-bhūmi-vibhāṣā-śāstra*, vol. viii, p. 35*b*; Piṅgala's commentary, pp. 38*b*, 55*a*.

[5] Cf. vol. xcxi, p. 62*b*; Piṅgala's commentary, p. 23*a*; Walleser, p. 1.

and hell, etc., having been produced, not by father and mother (i.e. the world is not produced by other causes, but it is an aggregation of atoms), are dissevered after the force of merit and demerit has been exhausted." [1]

Nāgārjuna, in many passages of his works,[2] refutes the *Asat-kārya-vāda*, but his refutation of the theory is not restricted to the Vaiśeṣika, because there were some Buddhists who advocated this theory. Even in *V.S.* the theory is not so fully discussed as is the *Sat-kārya-vada* in *S.K.* (v. 9).

As regards ether (*ākāśa*), Nāgārjuna's *Mādhyamika-śāstra* [3] denies its reality. But in the text ether is one of the six elements [4] (*dhātu*), which are not known to the Vaiśeṣika. Piṅgala explains that ether is the universal vacuum, where the four elements are contained. This concept of ether is the same as in *V.S.*[5] In another passage Nāgārjuna states: "Some, both heretics and Buddhists, acknowledge eternal things. Some of the eternal things are common to both, but others are not common. The former are ether and Nirvāṇa, etc., while the latter are self, time, space, atoms, and *prakṛti*." [6] It will be seen that this passage refers to the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṁkhya.

Nāgārjuna did not refute the Vaiśeṣika theory of attributes so thoroughly as in the case of substances. Only one passage has been found in the *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra*, where he refutes the reality of number

[1] Cf. vol. xii, p. 79*a*; vol. xxxvi, p. 89*b*; vol. lxxxix, p. 53*a*–*b*. These passages sometimes refer to the atomic theory of the Sarvāsti-vāda, and not always to the Vaiśeṣika.

[2] e.g. *Mādhyamika-śāstra*, pp. 27*b*, 45*a* f.; *Dvādaśa-dvāra-śāstra* (No. 1186), p. 68*a* and others.

[3] pp. 28*a*–*b*.

[4] *Pṛthivī*, *ap*, *tejas*, *vāyu*, *ākāśa*, and *vijñāna*. The six elements are an important factor in the Shin-gon-shū (the Mantra sect).

[5] See notes on ch. i, 2, 5–7, and Jacobi's mention of the atomic theory of the Jainas quoted above.

[6] *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra*, vol. xv, p. 98*a* = Piṅgala's commentary, p. 27*a*, and Vasu's commentary, p. 46*b*.

and individuality (*saṁkhyā* and *pṛthaktva*).[1] If the passage is compared with the parallel passage in Deva's work and Vasu's commentary, the refutation is seen to have been directed against the Vaiśeṣika.[2]

The above quotations might possibly seem to favour the supposition that *V.S.* had been composed before the time of Nāgārjuna, that is to say, was composed about 50–150 A.D., though some of his references (e.g. to space) are not correctly stated. But, in fact, this incorrectness or the deviation from the original is, in this case, of such a kind as to show that the author had once had the original *sūtra* in his hands or known about it. That the quotations are not sufficient in number is perhaps no objection, because they contain the proofs of self, space, time, atoms, etc., which are peculiar to *V.S.* We shall next consult the works of Deva and Hari-varman with a view to supporting the supposition.

5. Deva, relying upon the last quoted statement of Nāgārjuna, refutes the reality of ether, time, space, and atoms, and quotes the assertions of the other system. "The other says, 'there really exists a substance ether, which is eternal, all-pervading, and does not consist of parts (*V.S.* 2, 1, 28–31), because everyone believes its existence in every place and in every time' (*sūtra*)."[3] And, "the other says, 'ether must exist; it is all-pervading and eternal, because actions (*karma*) are

[1] Vol. i, p. 14*a*.

[2] *Śata-śāstra*, c. 3, 4. In the *Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra* (No. 1257, translated in 472 A. D.), it is stated that the Vaiśeṣika is the system of the six categories, substance, etc. (pp. 8*b*-9*a*), and the six categories are regarded as a kind of principle or method of reasoning. The work refers to Buddhism, Fire-worshippers, Grammarians or Mīmāṁsakas, the school of medicine, Vaiśeṣikas, Sāṁkhyas, Yogas, Nirgranthas, teachers who maintain that everything is one in essence, and teachers who maintain that everything is different from one another. The work is ascribed to Nāgārjuna, but this is very doubtful.

[3] *Śata-śāstra*, ch. 9, p. 49*b*. *Sūtra* means the text of the work by Deva himself. At the time of Kumāra jīva *sūtra* and *śāstra* are not strictly distinguished from each other.

possible by presupposing it' (i.e. without ether the actions throwing upwards, throwing downwards, going and coming can never happen) (*sūtra*)[1] (cf. *V.S.* 2, 1, 20)." The references are only two, but they contain the essential points.

As for the other substances Deva states: "The other says, 'there exists the substance time, because it has the marks of being eternal (*sūtra*), (*V.S.* 2, 2, 6 8).' 'Through dependence on a past time (the future or present) time exists (*sūtra*).' 'Time exists really, because there are distinctions of characteristics or effects among (past, present, and future) times (*sūtra*).' 'Past and future time have their own special characteristic or effect distinct from each other (*sūtra*).'" The last three propositions can be understood by referring to *V.S.* 2, 2, 9,[2] "the term time is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it exists not in eternal and exists in not eternal things."

"The other says, 'space is really existent, because it has the marks of being eternal (*sūtra*; 2, 2, 10–12).' The other says, 'no, (the difference of) the effects of space presupposes a whole universe (*sūtra*).'" The last part has the same meaning as "its (space's) diversity is (caused to, be conceived) by the difference of its effects."[3]

"The other says, 'there exist atoms, which are, though not all-pervading and eternal as well, yet non-pervading and eternal, because they have the effects (aggregates) as the marks of their existence (*sūtra*: 4, 1, 1–4).'[4] We

[1] p. 46*b*. The explanation is found in Vasu's commentary.

[2] Gough's translation. The original runs, *nityeṣvabhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt kāraṇe kālākhyā-iti*. Cf. 5, 2, 26; 7, 1, 26; and *N.S.* 2, 1, 39–43.

[3] *Kārya-viśeṣeṇa nānātvaṁ* (*V.S.* 2, 2, 13). "No" in the latter part is against Deva's refutation from the Vaiśeṣika. Vasu's commentary on the above three passages (ether, time, space) agrees to great extent with *V.S.*

[4] Vasu explains that everything in the world is subtle in the state of cause, or near to cause, but gross according as it is far from the first cause. The aggregate of two atoms is the first effect, and one

(= Deva) object that 'two atoms do not conjoin with each other on all the sides,[1] because the effects (aggregates) are not spherical (*parimaṇḍala*) (*sūtra*; 7, 1, 20)'. We object that 'atoms must be non-eternal, because they are divided throughout by ether (*sūtra*; 7, 1, 9–10; 7, 1, 20; *N.S.* 4, 2, 18)'. Further ('atoms must be non-eternal') because they are distinguished by colour, etc. (*sūtra*; 7, 1, 18–9)."[2]

The last quotations suggest to us that ether, time, and space are all-pervading and eternal as well, differing from atoms, which agree with the three substances in the quality of eternity, but do not agree with them in being all-pervading. Atoms are imperceptible, but they are spherical and have no normal extension; this is a characteristic of the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika. And atoms are inferred from their effects, but they are not proved by the method of analysis (*anavasthā*); this is also a characteristic of *V.S.* The aggregate of two atoms corresponds to the "binary atomic compound (*dvyaṇuka*)" in later Vaiśeṣika theories, but there is no suggestion of the theory of the "ternary atomic compound (*tryaṇuka*)".[3]

All the above quotations from the *Śata-śāstra*, depending on the statement of Nāgārjuna, appear to be a complement

atom is the cause. From the aggregates atoms are inferred to exist; atoms are spherical and eternal, because they have no cause. The explanation agrees with *V.S.*; and the proof of the existence of atoms is not a kind of analytical method (*anavasthā*). See notes on ch. i, 1, 1-4.

[1] Vasu explains that if two atoms conjoin with each other on all the sides, the effects must be spherical, but the effects of two atoms are not spherical as seen. If atoms can conjoin with each other, there cannot be two atoms conjunct. If two atoms are accumulated, the effects have height. Consequently, atoms must have extension. If so, they are not eternal. A similar refutation is found in Saṅkara's *Bhāṣya* on *B.S.* 2, 2, 11 f. According to Vasu the effect of two atoms is perceptible, while one atom is imperceptible. See notes on ch. ii, 2, 1.

[2] pp. 47*a*–*b*. Cf. *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya*, ch. i, p. 49*a*; ch. iii, pp. 49*b*–50*a*.

[3] See notes on ch. i, 2, 1–4 (earth to wind).

to Nāgārjuna.[1] The supposed date of *V.S.* may be supported by these quotations.

In the refutation of self Deva quotes the assertions of the other system and criticizes them. We extract his own statement of these also without commentary.

"Self really exists, because it has the inferential marks (*N.S.* 1, 1, 10; 2, 1, 23; *V.S.* 3, 1, 19; 3, 2, 4)." "Self exists surely, because pain and pleasure are felt (ibid.)."[2] "Self exists, because colour, etc., are perceived (cf. *N.S.* 3, 1, 2)." "Self exists, because the other sense-organs are excited by the operation of one sense-organ (*N.S.* 3, 1, 12)." "And because the same thing is perceived by both sight and touch (*N.S.* 3, 1, 1)." "There exists a self, because the memory of existence in a previous life is continuous, so that grief and joy arise even in a new-born baby (*N.S.* 3, 1, 19)." "Self must exist, because what is seen by the left eye is recognized by the right (*N.S.* 3, 1, 7)."[3]

According to the commentary of Vasu the other systems refuted in the work are the Sāṁkhya, the Vaiśesika, and the Jaina.[4] Deva never mentions the name Nyāya or

[1] The quotations are taken from ch. ix of the *Śata-śāstra*. This chapter is called *Refutation of Eternal Things*, which are ether, space, time, atoms, and Nirvaṇa (of other systems than the Buddhist). Self is discussed especially in ch. 2, *Refutation of Self*, which contains the refutation of the Sāṁkhya and the Vaiśeṣika.

[2] Next come: "No, because self has no touch, like ether," and "Like the owner of a house, self suffers from pain". The first is the answer to Deva's refutation, which says that, if self feels pain when the body is killed, self also must be killed. The second means that, as, when a house is on fire, the owner suffers from loss, in like manner self suffers when the body is killed, but self itself cannot be killed like the owner. These opinions may be compared with *N.S.* 3, 1, 4.

[3] Ch. ii, pp. 40*b*–41*b*. A very similar statement is found in Piṅgala's commentary, pp. 56*b*–57*a*. Cf. *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya*, p. 49*a*–*b*. *N.S.* 3, 1, 12, runs: "indriyāntara-vikārāt"; 3, 1, 1, "darśana-sparśanābhyām ekārtha-grahaṇāt"; 3, 1, 19, "pūrvābhyasta-smṛty-anubandhāj jātasya harṣa-bhaya-śoka-sampratipatteḥ"; and 3, 1, 7, "savyadṛṣṭasya-itareṇa pratyabhijñānāt."

[4] Vasu says, "the followers of Kapila recite *S.S.*, the followers of Ulūka recite *V.S.*, and the followers of Ṛṣabha recite the *Nirgrantha-sūtra*" (p. 37*b*).

Naiyāyika in any works of his; but the above quotations cannot be found in the *V.S.*; they exactly agree with the *N.S.* It is curious enough to notice that Deva himself used the Nyāya theories instead of the Vaiśeṣika in regard to so important a doctrine as the existence of self, while Vasu. commenting on the same work, used the Vaiśeṣika theories, which were also handled by Nāgārjuna. It is therefore clear that Deva considered the Nyāya theories as being also Vaiśeṣika. In other passages also Deva confused the Nyāya theories with the Vaiśeṣika, e.g. the theory that the eyes have a kind of light which goes out to objects, when we perceive them, and makes them perceptible,[1] and the theory of the relation between a whole and its parts.[2] Consequently, the Nyāya system was not regarded as distinct from the Vaiśeṣika, if indeed the former had been systematized or *N.S.* had been composed.[3]

[1] *N.S.* 3, 1, 32-4. *Śata-śāstra*, p. 44*a*; *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya*, p. 50*b*.

[2] *N.S.* 2, 1, 31-4; 4, 2, 4-17; *Śata-śāstra*, p. 42*a*.

[3] Nos. 1254, 1259, and 1260 (all were translated in 508-35 A.D.) are ascribed to Deva, but it is doubtful whether they are really Deva's works. No. 1259 refutes the four systems, which maintain that self and cognition are one and the same thing (the Sāṁkhya), that they are something different from each other (the Vaiśeṣika), that they are either the same or different (the Nirgrantha), and that they are neither the same nor different (the Jñātiputra). This classification of the four systems is followed by Sāra-mati's *Mahā-yāna-praveśa-śāstra* (No. 1243, p. 65*a*), by Dharma-pāla's *Vaipulya-śata-śāstra-vyākhyā* (a commentary on No. 1189, p. 116*a*, a little different), and *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi-śāstra*, p. 3*b*. The first and the second of the four systems are also set forth in the *Śata-śāstra*, chs. 3, 4. No. 1254 has the first two of the four systems in a part of the commentary by an unknown writer. Deva's text consists of one hundred syllables (the work is called the *Śatākṣara-śāstra*), and contains a description of the first two of the four systems. No. 1260 states the twenty different opinions concerning Nirvāṇa. The seventh is the opinion of the Vaiśeṣika. It runs, "The Vaiśeṣika maintains that atoms and so on (here the text is corrupted) are eternal and produce all things in the world, intelligent and unintelligent, by combination. The first process of combination is the combination of two atoms and so on. Without atoms and so on there is no combination of them. If there is no combination, they exist dispersed. The dispersed existence of atoms and so on is Nirvāṇa. Consequently the Vaiśeṣika says that (the knowledge of) atoms and their qualities leads to Nirvāṇa."

Deva also refutes the *Asat-kārya-vāda*,[1] attributes, universality, and particularity,[2] but the refutation is not of great importance. Universality and particularity in Deva's work will be referred to later on.

6. Hari-varman, in his *Satya-siddhi-śāstra*, says: "An opponent urges, 'Some teachers maintain that everything exists, while others contend that everything does not exist. What are really existing and what are not existing?' The author answers, 'Those things which really exist are contained in the twelve *āyatanas* named by the Buddha. The substances, such as earth, etc.; the attributes, such as number, etc.; the actions, such as throwing upwards and throwing downwards, etc.; universality, particularity, and inherence—these objects and *prakṛti* are, like the horn of a hare, the hair of a tortoise, the feet of a snake, the smell of salt, and the colour of wind, called non-existent. In a certain *sūtra* the Buddha said, "There is no trace left (by birds) in sky, no *Śramaṇa* among *Tīrthakas*, and people like to discuss in vain whether the Tathāgata exists or not (after death)." (These are examples of things non-existent.) But, according as people adhere to different systems, they differently acknowledge things as existent or real. The six categories, such as substance, etc., are real in Ulūka('s system); the twenty-five principles are real in the Sāṁkhya: and the sixteen topics (*artha*) are real in the Nyāya . . .'"[3]

[1] *Śata-śāstra*, p. 45*b* f.; *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya*, p. 51*b*.

[2] pp. 41*b*–43*a*; p. 51*a*.

[3] Ch. xxiii, p. 17*a*. *Nyāya* is originally *na-ya-hsiu-mo* in Chinese. *Na-ya* is the transliteration of *Nā-ya* (=*Nyāya*). *Hsiu-mo* is the same as *Swei-mo* in *Zha-thi-swei-mo*. Prajñā-ruci in his translation of the *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra* (No. 1246, translated in 543 A.D.) uses the transliteration *Zho-ya-su-mo*. *Zho-ya* is the transliteration of *Ñā-ya* (= *Nyāya*). *Su-mo* is the same as *Hsiu-mo* and *Swei-mo*. Both *Nāya* and *Ñāya* are the same as *Nyāya* (Jacobi, *Ausgewählte Erzählungen in Māhārāṣṭrī*, p. 119; Andersen, *Pāli Reader*, p. 105); but *Nāya* is also identified with *Jñāta* in Jñātaputra (Jñātiputra, Weber. *Ind. Stud.*. xvi.

We have here, for the first time, a mention of the six categories.[1] Though Nāgārjuna and Deva knew the six categories, they did not name them side by side. Importance attaches to the reference to the sixteen topics of the Nyāya. The sixteen topics are not explained in the work, nor does the name Nyāya occur again throughout the work. But it is evident that the Nyāya had been systematized before Hari-varman. Hari-varman also confused the Nyāya theories with the Vaiśeṣika, and did not regard the Nyāya as a system independent of the Vaiśeṣika.

Hari-varman further says, "Some teachers (the Sāṁkhya) maintain that colour, etc., are nothing but elements (*mahā-bhūta*), while other teachers (the Vaiśeṣika) contend that elements are something different from colour, etc."[2] The statement corresponds to the characteristic of the Vaiśeṣika that substances are distinguished from attributes and actions.[3] "According to the Vaiśeṣika the four elements are sometimes

p. 308). The substitution of *Nyāya* for *Na-ya-hsiu-mo* depends upon the fact that the sixteen topics seem to be those of the Nyāya, and the *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra* mentions the name in the passage where logical theories are discussed, and ascribes the name to followers of a system of logic. Ci-tsāṅ in his commentary on the *Śata-śāstra* says that the Maheśvara(-deva) school has the sixteen topics of logical theory. His enumeration of the sixteen topics exactly agrees with *N.S.* But he identifies *Naya-hsiumo* with the Nirgranthas. He also enumerates the sixteen principles of the Nirgranthas, which do not at all agree with *N.S.* (*Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 73, bk. 5, p. 385*b*). The *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra* also asserts that the Maheśvara-school is connected with logic. *N.S.* acknowledges Īśvara (4, 1, 19-21) and followers of the Nyāya have a relation to Śaivism, so that the Nyāya and Śaivism were sometimes confused with each other. See Bhandarkar, *Vaiṣṇavism and Śaivism*, p. 117; *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 466 (cf. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 1, 9; *Brahma-sūtra*, 2, 1, 33).

[1] The mention of the six categories occurs once more on p. 68*a*.

[2] Ch. xxxviii, p. 21*b*. The *Asat-kārya-vāda* is discussed in ch. cli, pp. 78*b*–79*a*.

[3] This characteristic is refuted by the author in ch. cxliv, pp. 76–77*a*. The author's standpoint is not a realistic, but a kind of idealistic one.

imperceptible,"[1] and "when things are destroyed, they pass into atoms".[2] From these passages it is plain that the term element means atom, and that the author did not distinguish the one from the other; this arises from the fact that the author did not, in his system, acknowledge an atomic theory. In his quotations the atoms are of four sorts.

"The followers of Ulūka maintain that the touch of earth is neither cold nor hot, and the soft (touch) of wind is explained as in the case of earth; but the touch of water is cold and that of fire is hot (*V.S.* 2, 2, 4–5). . . . Earth alone has the quality of being changed by baking,[3] and this is not the case with water, etc. (7, 1, 6)."[4] *V.S.* does not mention that the touch of earth is neither cold nor hot; but it is stated in *Pr. Bh.*[5] The opinion that cold and hot are included in touch is not known to *V.S.*[6] The reference to the theory of *pākaja* is noticeable.

As for earth, it is said: "Question, 'The followers of Ulūka contend that smell is an attribute belonging to earth alone (*V.S.* 2, 2, 2). Is the opinion acceptable or not?' Answer, 'There is, in reality, no substance like earth; this has been explained above. The opinion is, therefore, not correct. Besides, the Vaiśeṣika maintains that white copper, lead, tin, gold, silver, and copper, etc., are included in fire and possess smell in themselves. Consequently, smell is not confined to earth alone . . .'"[7] This is an interesting reference. *V.S.* says that the fluidity, through conjunction with fire, of tin, lead, iron,

[1] Ch. xxxix, p. 22*a*.

[2] p. 67*b*.

[3] Literally "Ripening-change". "Ripening" has, at the same time, the same meaning as "baking", like *pāka* in Sanskṛt. "Ripening-change" is *pāka-ja*.

[4] p. 32*a*.

[5] p. 27.

[6] See notes on ch. i, 2, 1–4 (earth to wind).

[7] p. 31*b*.

silver, and gold, is common to them with water.[1] Fluidity is a natural attribute of water and the cause of flowing;[2] consequently fluidity in tin, etc., is accidental. In *V.S.* tin, etc., are not classified as fire. *Pr. Bh.* divided fluidity, for the first time, into two sorts, intrinsic (*sāṁsiddhika*) and occasional (*naimittika*). The former is the fluidity of water and the latter is that of earth and water.[3] But gold, etc., are not included under fire.[4] According to later followers of the Vaiśeṣika gold is so classified.[5] The origin of their opinion belongs to a time earlier than Hari-varman. "This has been explained above" refers to ch. xxxviii,[6] where it is argued that elements (*mahā-bhūta*) are not real, but are only names, that is, there are no elements independent of colour, etc.: elements are nothing but colour, etc.[7]; and it also relates to the following:—

"Question. 'Some teachers hold that one sense-organ has one nature (i.e. *prakṛti*, material cause), (e.g. the olfactory organ consists of earth, because) the cognition of smell is produced by reason of the predominance of the attribute (smell in the organ) and of possession of smell. (Similarly water, fire, and wind are the material causes of the organs of taste, sight, and touch respectively, because) the cognitions of taste, colour, and touch are produced (in the organs, in which) water, fire, and wind are predominant.[8] Is the opinion correct or not?'

[1] The original runs, "trapu-sīsa-loha-rajata-suvarṇānām agni-saṁyogād dravatvam adbhiḥ sāmānyaṁ (2, 1, 7)."

[2] 2, 1, 2 and 5, 2, 4.

[3] p. 264.

[4] See pp. 28, 39.

[5] *Nyāya-kośa*, pp. 946–7; *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* (Benares, 1882), p. 25; *Upaskāra* on 2, 1, 7.

[6] p. 21*b* f.

[7] The view of the author is the same as that of the Sāṁkhya. The author is said to have been a follower of the Sāṁkhya before he became a Buddhist, as stated above.

[8] The passage in the Chinese translation cannot be understood literally. But it must be understood by reference to *V.S.* 8, 2, 5–6, "bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandhajñāne prakṛtiḥ; tathā-āpas tejo vāyuś ca rasa-rūpa-sparśa-aviśeṣāt."

Answer, 'It has been answered before that the opinion is not acceptable. Earth possesses not merely smell, but also other attributes, so that earth is not the material cause (of the olfactory organ). And, as earth originates in an aggregation of many elements (i.e. atoms, according to the other's theory), there is no pure earth apart from water, etc. If the cognition of smell is produced (in the olfactory organ) by reason of possessing smell, the cognitions of colour, etc., must be produced at the same time, because earth possesses the four attributes (i.e. colour, taste, smell, and touch).' Question, 'Smell is possessed by earth alone, and the olfactory organ is terrene, so that the olfactory organ only can perceive smell.' Answer, 'The attributes of earth are nothing but earth; the olfactory organ must perceive all the attributes of earth. Also water alone possesses cold touch, and fire alone possesses hot touch; and cold and heat must be perceived by the tongue and the eyes. But this is not the case. Besides, there are in reality no substances. Consequently the sense-organs cannot be established. And the function of them, i.e. the production of cognitions, comes from contact with substances; but, if there are no substances, there is no contact, nor function of the sense-organs. It is, therefore, impossible that the sense-organs should have definite material causes.'"[1]

[1] p. 26*a*. p. 25*b*: "Some teachers maintain that (1) in the eyes fire-elements are predominant, because the eyes come from *karma's*, which possesses a quality similar to the eyes, that is, the eyes are obtained by presenting light to others (in the previous life). (2) The eyes perceive objects by the help of light, and cannot perceive anything without light. Therefore the eyes must have predominance of the fire-element. (3) Fire in general illuminates objects in a distant place; in like manner the eyes perceive coloured objects at a distance, because there is fire in the eyes. (4) After a man has died, the eyes return to the sun, consequently the eyes are known to have the sun as their essence. (5) The eyes perceive colour only; and, as colour is possessed by fire, the eyes perceive, after all, their essence. In this way ether, earth, water, and wind are known to be predominant in the other organs. When a man has died, the organ of hearing returns to ether, because the organ perceives sound, which is

The quotation tells us that the Vaiśeṣika is of opinion that earth possesses the four attributes, water three, fire two, and wind one; but such earth, etc., are not atoms, because the passage treats them as aggregates. This agrees with *V.S.*[1] But the special attribute of earth is smell, that of water is cold, and that of fire is hot. This also agrees with *V.S.*,[2] except that cold and heat are touch. Not only is the relation between the sense-organs and the objects explained as in *V.S.*, but also the opinion that cognition comes from contact is quite correct. In another passage Hari-varman quotes: "Cognition is produced by the contact of self with mind. Self is eternal, like sound."[3] The passage, together with the above long quotation, asserts that self is something different from cognition, and that mind is an indispensable factor in the psychic process. The theory that sound is eternal, like self, is a well-known dogma of the Mīmāṁsā. The statement is sometimes confused even with the Mīmāṁsā.

As for the perceptibility of the categories, Hari-varman says: "a certain teacher maintains that number, extension, single individuality,[4] conjunction, disjunction, agreeableness, disagreeableness,[5] actions, universality, particularity,

possessed by ether. The other organs are similarly explained. The conclusion is that each element is predominant in the corresponding organ." See *N.S.* 3, 1, 63; 1, 1, 13: 3, 1, 70-3, and notes on ch. ii, 1, 6.

[1] 2, 1, 1-4.

[2] 2, 2, 2-5.

[3] p. 42*a*, pp. 63*b*, 67*b*.

[4] Single individuality is literally "one (or sameness) and difference (or separateness)". This is certainly a translation of *eka-pṛthaktva*.

[5] Agreeableness and disagreeableness are perhaps corruptions of *paratva* and *aparatva*, and may be replaced by priority and posteriority. Ci-tsāṅ, evidently depending upon this passage, states that unity, difference, conjunction, disjunction, number, extension, agreeableness, disagreeableness—these eight attributes reside in the nine substances. But the first two (unity and difference) cannot be independent of number and extension, or priority and posteriority, so that eight must be seven. He further says that pain, pleasure, aversion, desire, foolishness, cognition, effort, and negligence—these eight reside in self and mind. But foolishness and cognition (lit.

and (some) substances, although not coloured things, are visible (*V.S.* 4, 1, 11; 8, 1, 5)."[1] "Number, extension, single individuality,[2] conjunction, disjunction, agreeableness, and disagreeableness[3]—these things each have reality. The *sūtra* of the other system mentions that a pot is something different from pot-ness (*ghaṭatva*, cf. *V.S.* 1, 2, 11–16), and that the cognition of a pot presupposes potness (8, 1, 6)."[4] "Colour residing in substances which are large and more than one is visible (4, 1, 6). Wind is invisible (2, 1, 10)."[5]

When the above passage is compared with the statements that "the four elements are sometimes imperceptible", and "when things are destroyed, they pass into atoms", it is seen that all atoms are imperceptible, while substances as aggregates are perceptible upon condition of being large (*mahat*) and more than one (*aneka-dravya*); but wind is an exception. These and other points are in agreement with *V.S.*

Perceptibility of sound is discussed in chapter 1, *On the Perception of Sound.* The qualities of sound affirmed by the other system can be summarized as follows: "Sound is an attribute (*guṇa*) of ether (*V.S.* 2, 1, 27). It reaches to the organ of hearing and causes the cognition (cf. 2, 2, 21). Though sound is an attribute, its transiency is common to action (*karma*), (2, 2, 25); but sound has, like other attributes, no action, because it is an attribute (7, 1, 15; 7, 2, 12; 7, 2, 25). Sound is produced by conjunction, disjunction, or

cleverness in Chinese), being complementary to each other, are a translation of *buddhi*, and effort (lit. diligence) and negligence are also a translation of *prayatna*, so that eight must be six. The number of attributes in Ci-tsān's commentary is seventeen (*Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 73, bk. 5, pp. 384*b*, 385*a*).

[1] p. 30*b*.

[2] See n. 4 on the last page.

[3] See n. 5 on the last page.

[4] p. 44*b*.

[5] p. 77*a*.

another sound (2, 2, 31). Sound is momentary (*kṣaṇika*), as actions are, and continuous (*santāna*)."[1] These qualities almost agree with *V.S.* But the qualities of being momentary, like actions, and continuous, are not mentioned in *V.S.* This is a natural consequence of the qualities of sound stated in *V.S.*; and these two qualities were accepted for the first time by *Pr. Bh.*[2] Continuity is also accepted by *N.S.* (2, 2, 17): but momentariness is rejected (3, 2, 11 f.). If we compare the passage with "Others say. 'You contend that the cognition of colour is produced without contact of the eyes with coloured objects. This is impossible, because the eyes have light, and the light goes out to contact with the colour (of the objects), and then the cognition is produced,'"[3] the passages are seen to contain Nyāya theories. The latter is evidently the Nyāya theory.[4] Other theories similar to the Nyāya are found also in chapter cxxix, *On Doubt*, which may be compared with *N.S.* 1, 1, 23; its *Bhāṣya*, and 2, 1, 37.

The most important reference is the following: "In substances which have no (distinct) attributes the attribute is produced by conjunction with fire, that is, the original black colour is destroyed and the red colour is produced."[5]

This refers to the theory of *pākaja*. The Vaiśeṣika theory of *pākaja* is different from the Nyāya theory. The former is called the *Pīlu-pāka-vāda*, while the latter is named the *Piṭhara-pāka-vāda*.[6] As stated above, Hari-varman knew the Vaiśeṣika theory of *pākaja*; but this reference is more similar to the Nyāya

[1] p. 28*a* f., and chs. xlix, lvi.

[2] pp. 287-8.

[3] p. 28*b*.

[4] *N.S.* 3, 1, 30-50.

[5] p. 28*b*.

[6] *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 106 7. See notes on ch. ii, 2, 2; *Upaskāra* on 7, 1, 6; *Vivṛti* (*Śāstrārtha-saṁgraha*, App. in Bibl. Ind.), p. 466; *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 455 f.; Cowell, *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*. pp. 154-5.

than to the Vaiśeṣika. At least such a process is not explained in *V.S.* But *N.S.* says, "Or as the blackness of an atom is not eternal."[1] Thus the Nyāya is always confused with the Vaiśeṣika, or the former is regarded as a complement to the latter.

Hari-varman also states that the Brāhmaṇa has six sorts of duty, the Kṣattriya four sorts, the Vaiśya three sorts, and the Śūdra one, according to a *Dharma-sūtra*,[2] and that it is not sin, but a cause of good rewards, for the Kṣattriya to kill others in order to protect another from danger. The author denies not merely the last permission, but also the injunction of the *Veda*, which permits to kill animals for sacrifice.[3] "Question, 'There is no guilt on the part of a man who commits robbery for the support of his parents, as a *Dharma-sūtra* allows: a man may steal food from a Śūdra when he has been without food for seven days; stealing in such cases is, for him, not guilty. When his life is in danger, stealing food from a Brāhmaṇa tends not to sin, even though he is not really righteous, because he is in a crisis. Like ether, which cannot be defiled by anything, he is not stained (cf. *Upaskāra* on 6, 1, 12).' Answer, 'A certain *sūtra* of the Brāhmaṇas says, "when a Brāhmaṇa is about to commit robbery, if the possessor of things comes to prevent it, he must deliberate on both himself and the possessor. If the possessor be inferior to himself, he may put the possessor to death (*V.S.* 6, 1, 14), because

[1] *N.S.* 4, 1, 67, "aṇu-śyāmatā'nityatvavad vā"; 3, 2, 77, "aṇu-śyāmatā-nityatvavad etat syāt" (this, an opponent will say, may be just like the eternity of the blackness of an atom), is rejected by the author of *N.S.*

[2] *Vasiṣṭha-dharma-sūtra* (*SBE.*), 2, 13 f.; *Manu*, x, 75 f. Cf. *Āpastamba*, 2, 5, 10, 4 f.; *Gautama*, 10, 1, f.; *Baudhāyana*, 1, 10, 18, 2 f.; *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 272–3.

[3] p. 47*a*. Also the passage says that one who dies on the battle-field goes to heaven, as a verse asserts that one who dies in a campaign (goes to heaven) and is selected by angels as their companion. This may be compared with the *Bhagavad-gītā* or other works.

he, being superior to the possessor, can atone for his deed by confession or some other means. In the case of an equal suicide and killing the other have the same degree of sinfulness (6, 1, 15), because the sin is so grave that it is difficult to dispel it. In the case of a superior suicide is to be committed (6, 1, 16), because the sin, if one kills the possessor, cannot be atoned for. In like manner plunder and murder must be discriminated . . ."[1]

These permissions are one of the characteristics of the Vaiśeṣika, which seems to be a survival of the *Akriyā-vāda*, as stated above. That Hari-varman calls the *sūtra* a *sūtra* of the Brāhmaṇas, or a Brāhmanical *sūtra*, may show that the Vaiśeṣika had been acknowledged as a Brāhmanical system.

7. The preceding long extracts from the works of Nāgārjuna, Deva, and Hari-varman agree with *V.S.* so well that the date of the *sūtra* can be assigned to a time little earlier than the three great Buddhists. We are perhaps quite safe in concluding that *V.S.* had been composed before Hari-varman; otherwise the fact of so many passages agreeing with *V.S.* can hardly be understood. Besides, Hari-varman's work shows that there were many different opinions prevailing among followers of the Vaiśeṣika before his time, to say nothing of the follower of the system, who disputed with him, as stated in his *Life*. On the other hand, Nāgārjuna's and Deva's works do not offer evidences with respect to the variant opinions of the Vaiśeṣika; they seem to represent the doctrines contained in *V.S.* Deva's mention of the fourth and the fifth category exactly agrees with *V.S.*, as proved later on. The fact is explained, if we suppose that Nāgārjuna and Deva knew the *sūtra* and did not pay attention to the different opinions, because according to the Jaina record

[1] pp. 47*a*, *b*.

there existed different opinions among the followers of the Vaiśeṣika.

Jacobi's researches into the dates of the *sūtras* of the six systems fix the date of *V.S.* at about 200–500 A.D., and Suali, following Jacobi's proof, places the date in 250–300 A.D.[1] Jacobi bases his proof mainly upon the relation of the *sūtras* to the Buddhist schools, the Śūnya-vāda and the Vijñāna-vāda. *V.S.* does not directly relate to the Buddhist schools. Consequently he deduces the date from the date of *N.S.*[2] But, as stated above, *V.S.* is quoted by the author of *N.S.*, and such quotations are found in the work of Nāgārjuna; and Deva makes a complement to Nāgārjuna's quotations. Therefore, *V.S.* would appear to have been composed before Nāgārjuna. But the date of *V.S.* cannot be earlier than Roha-gutta and Aśva-ghoṣa. The conclusion is that *V.S.* was composed about 50–150 A.D. If Nāgārjuna is not so early as 113–213, the date of *V.S.* will be placed at a time later than 50–150 A.D. At any rate the date is earlier than Nāgārjuna, and the contents of *V.S.* do not contradict this supposition.[3]

[1] JRAS. 1914, p. 1091. Suali, *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia indiana* (Pavia, 1913, p. 14).

[2] JAOS. 1911, pp. 6–7. He says, "The *V.D.* is probably as old as the *N.D.*; for *V.D.* iv, 1, 6, is twice quoted by Vātsyāyana, namely, in his comment on *N.D.* iii, 1, 33 and 69: and *V.D.* iii, 1, 16, is quoted by him in his comment on *N.D.* ii, 2, 36; and Uddyota-kara quotes the *V.D.* several times simply as the *sūtra* or the *śāstra*, and once calls its author *Paramarṣi*, a title accorded only to ancient writers of the highest authority."

[3] The Sāṁkhya had already been systematized before 300 B.C., although the works of the Sāṁkhya are not so early. The allusion in *V.S.* to the Sāṁkhya is intelligible from this fact. *S.K.* is said to have been composed at the time of Vasu-bandhu, because the author, Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, is traditioned to have been a contemporary of Vasu-bandhu. Vasu's commentary has a noticeable passage: "The *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* says that sacrifice is avoidable, because it is connected with impurity, decay, and excess" (p. 39*b*). *S.K.* v. 2, "dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhi-kṣayātiśayayuktaḥ." The Sāṁkhya had a work before the *S.K.* (v. 72); see Schrader, *Das Ṣaṣṭi-tantram* (ZDMG., vol. lxviii, pp. 101 f., 1913);

XIII. Vaisesika Doctrines: 1. General

We have now finished our researches into the date of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*. The next task is to study the historical development of the Vaiśeṣika doctrines and historically to connect the doctrines contained in the present treatise with those generally set forth. For the former *N.S.* and its *Bhāṣya* must be carefully examined, because they share an important part in the history of the Vaiśeṣika. The later Vaiśeṣika was affected by the Nyāya in its logical theories, but the influence upon its other philosophical theories is not so great. On the other hand, the Nyāya introduced the Vaiśeṣika doctrines into its system. Consequently it is not necessary for the present task to trace the development in this connexion. Our present purpose is to connect our treatise with the Vaiśeṣika doctrines. Its relation to *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.* will be studied in the following notes. Here we shall try to collect from Chinese translations some materials concerning the fourth and the fifth category.

2. The different opinions stated in Hari-varman's work are partly preserved in *Pr. Bh.* and partly accepted by the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas. These different opinions are scarcely contained in our treatise. The most obvious divergence from *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.* is undoubtedly the ten categories. Among these ten the fourth (universality) and the fifth (particularity) are interesting from the historical point of view.

In Deva's *Śata-śāstra* and Vasu's commentary on it the categories are six in number. In the work itself the sixth category (inherence) is not clearly described. But

Professor Garbe, *Sāṁkhya-Philosophie* (pp. 57–60, 32–4); Pañcaśikha, *Festgruss an R. von Roth* (p. 75). The well-known eight causes of imperceptibility (*S.K.* v. 7) are found in Nāgārjuna's *Dvādaśa-dvāra-śāstra* (ch. ii, p. 67*b*), *Satya-siddhi-śāstra* (ch. xlvii, p. 27*b*, more than eight).

Bhāva-viveka, an eminent follower of his,[1] states that Deva had disproved that category.

The explanation of universality and particularity in the *Śata-śāstra* agrees with *V.S.* Universality includes existence (*sattā*) on the one hand and pot-ness (*ghaṭatva*) on the other hand. Existence is eternal and has reality apart from the things in which it resides. In another respect also pot-ness is included in particularity. Consequently, universality and particularity are relative, like father and son, the latter also being father of his own son. Universality is possible by dependence on particularity; without particularity universality cannot be established.[2] From the explanation of pot-ness we gather that substance-ness (*dravyatva*), attribute-ness (*guṇatva*), and action-ness (*karmatva*), are similarly explained, and are either universality or particularity. The ultimate particulars (*antya-viśeṣa*) are not alluded to; but, if we compare the explanation of pot-ness with that of atoms, the latter would appear to have been so named.[3] There are no such subdivisions of universality and particularity as stated in the Jaina record and in *Pr. Bh.*

Even in Hari-varman's work there is no trace of different opinions concerning universality and particularity. The works of Asaṅga and his brother Vasu-bandhu supply no material on this point. Dig-nāga's *Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-dvāra-śāstra*[4] states as follows: "The perceptions of (substances), pot, etc., (attributes), number, etc., (actions), throwing upwards, etc., (universality), existence, and (particularity), pot, etc., are false perceptions (*pratyakṣābhāsa*)," because these perceptions are altogether conceptual and mediate perceptions (*savikalpaka*-

[1] *Prajñā-dīpa-śāstra*, p. 119*a*.

[2] *Śata-śāstra*, ch. iii, pp. 41*b*-42*a*; ch. iv, pp. 42*b*-43*a*; *Śata-śāstra-vaipulya*, ch. vi, p. 51*a*.

[3] The ultimate particulars are the nine substances as causes—the four atoms, ether, time, space, self, and mind.

[4] No. 1223 = No. 1224, p. 3*a* = p. 8*a*.

pratyakṣa),[1] and are not immediate (*nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa*).[1] The sixth category, inherence, is not enumerated in the passage, because inherence is imperceptible; accordingly, the passage shows that the categories are six. If universality is confined to existence and excludes pot-ness, particularity must include pot-ness as well as other sorts of the lower universality (*apara-sāmānya*, in *Pr. Bh.*). But in the passage pot is enumerated among substances and as particularity, so that universality must contain both existence and other sorts of the lower universality. Universality and particularity also agree in Dig-nāga's work with *V.S.*

Śaṅkara-svāmin, a disciple of Dig-nāga, offers an important testimony in the course of illustrating, in his *Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-praveśa-śāstra*,[2] contradictory reasons

[1] As for these terms see notes on ch. i, 3, 12 (cognition).

[2] pp. 10–11*a* (No. 1216). Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa, in his *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic* (p. 89), ascribes the *Nyāya-praveśa* to Dig-nāga, and identifies it with the *Nyāya-dvāra-śāstra* (No. 1223 = No. 1224), relying upon a Tibetan tradition. But in Chinese the two works are quite different. No. 1216 is called, according to Kwhēi-ci's transliteration, *Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-praveśa-śāstra*, the Tibetan title being *Tshad-ma-rigs-par-hjug-pahi-sgo* (*Pramāṇa-nyāya-praveśa-dvāra*), while No. 1223 = No. 1224 is *Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-dvāra-śāstra*. The contents of the *Nyāya-praveśa* as given in Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa's work exactly agree with this No. 1216, but not with No. 1223 = 1224. Kwhēi-ci and other disciples of Yuan Chwang, the translator of the works, assert that Śaṅkara-svāmin was a disciple of Dig-nāga, and No. 1216 was "composed by the Bodhi-sattva Śaṅkara-svāmin", as the Chinese translation asserts. No. 1223 = 1224, and the *Pramāṇa-śāstra-praveśa* in Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa's work (p. 100, sec. 60), would appear to be the same, because he remarks that "it was translated into Chinese by the Chinese interpreter Thasan-tsan (Hhüen-Thsang = Yuan Chwang), and the Chinese version was translated into Tibetan". The Tibetan title is stated to be *Tshad-mahi-bstan-bcos-rig-pa-la-hjug-pa* (*Pramāṇa-śāstra-nyāya-praveśa*); but according to Cordier's *Catalogue du Fonds Tibétain* (p. 435) the Tibetan titles have been interchanged by Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa, and the *Nyāya-praveśa* must be the same work as No. 1216, since Cordier attaches the Chinese title of the latter. Hence the contents of the *Nyāya-praveśa* must be those of No. 1216. There seems to be confusion in Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa's treatment of the works. The ascription of the *Nyāya-praveśa*

regarding existence on the part of the Vaiśeṣika. It runs —

"Existence is neither a substance, nor an attribute, nor
an action;
Because of possessing one substance and attributes and
actions,
Like universality-particularity." [1]

In this case existence is only universality, and particularity is called universality-particularity (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*). Universality - particularity can never be two categories, otherwise the reasoning is a kind of *petitio principii.*

Dharma-pāla, in his *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi-śāstra* [2] and *Vaipulya-śata-śāstra-vyākhyā*,[3] mentions the fourth and the fifth category. The Vaiśeṣika in these works holds the doctrines of the six categories, "you advocate the six categories." [4] And the six categories are substance, attribute, action, existence (universality), universality-particularity, and inherence.[5] In many passages [6] he refutes the reality of the six categories. His accounts of the fourth and the fifth category are summarized as follows:—

to Dig-nāga is not correct. Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa translates the passage thus: "*Sāmānya* (generality) is neither substance, quality, nor action. Because it depends upon one substance and possesses quality and action (p. 95)". According to the Chinese translation there is the example "like *sāmānya-viśeṣa*". Without the example the illustration can hardly be intelligible.

[1] *V.S.* 1, 2, 8, "dravya-guṇa-karmabhyo 'rthāntaraṁ sattā"; 2, 2, 23, "ekadravyavattvān na dravyaṁ"; 1, 2, 9, "guṇa-karmasu ca bhāvān na karma na guṇaḥ"; (1, 2, 7, "sad iti yato dravya-guṇa-karmasu sā sattā").

[2] No. 1197. Bhāva-viveka, a contemporary of Dharma-pāla (Yuan Chwang, *Si-yü-ci*, p. 53*b*. Cf. Walleser, *Der ältere Vedānta*, p. 19), also calls the fifth category *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (No. 1237, p. 65*b*).

[3] No. 1198. [4] No. 1198, p. 113*a*. [5] No. 1197, p. 2*b*.

[6] No. 1198, pp. 76*a*, 86*a*, 105*b*, 113*a*; No. 1197, pp. 3*a*–*b*, 4*a*; No. 1198, pp. 100*a*–*b*, 106*a*–*b*, 109*a*, 111*b*, 112*a*, 114*a*–*b*, 116*a*, 117*b*, 118*a*; No. 1197, pp. 2*b*, 3*a*.

Universality is confined to existence. Existence is common to all things, so that it is called universality.[1] Existence is something different from substances, attributes, and so on.[2] It has reality and is perceptible, depending upon its substratum.[1] Consequently, existence is one, and the cause of the cognitions with regard to all things that they are existent.

Universality-particularity as the fifth category includes substance-ness, attribute-ness, action-ness, and earth-ness,[2] colour-ness, pot-ness, cow-ness (*go-tva*),[3] etc. It is also something different from the substrata. Things are common to one another in one respect, but they are particular in the other respect.[4] Universality-particularity is manifold[5] and pervades the substrata. It is real, eternal, and perceptible. Like existence, universality-particularity is the cause of its cognition. Whether the category includes the ultimate particulars is not clearly stated; but it is inferred from the explanation of atoms and of the process of their combination that it does include them.

In Roha-gutta's opinion universality was divided into three: *mahā-sāmānya*, *sattā-sāmānya*, and *sāmānya-viśeṣa-sāmānya*. These three subdivisions resolve themselves, as a logical consequence, into two subdivisions, the highest universality (*para-sāmānya*), and the lower universality (*apara-sāmānya*), which were accepted by *Pr. Bh.* According to *Pr. Bh.* the highest universality is nothing but existence, and the lower universality includes all sorts of universality with the exception of existence and the ultimate particulars, the latter of which are particularity.[6] And Praśasta-pāda remarks that

[1] No. 1198, pp. 100*a*, 112*a*.
[2] No. 1197, p. 2*b*.
[3] No. 1198, p. 100*a*.
[4] p. 112*a*.
[5] p. 81*a*.
[6] *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 11-13, 311-22.

existence is the only proper universality, and the lower universality is also called particularity, but the ultimate particulars are not called universality. Dharma-pāla's account of universality (existence) exactly corresponds to the higher universality in *Pr. Bh.*, while universality-particularity includes the lower universality and particularity. If the highest universality is the only proper universality there can hardly be reason for classifying the lower universality under the fifth category universality. In consequence of this the category universality-particularity was established. As the lower universality was classified under the fifth, the name of the fifth category was changed from particularity into universality-particularity.

Śaṅkara-svāmin, as a disciple of Dig-nāga, must have lived in the fifth–sixth century, and he was almost a contemporary of Praśasta-pāda. Consequently, the change of particularity into universality-particularity took place about the time of Praśasta-pāda.[1]

But our treatise differs from these in regard to this point, because it enumerates existence or universality, universality-particularity, and particularity as three distinct categories.

Praśasta-pāda and the other authority adduced by Śaṅkara-svāmin and Dharma-pāla have the common opinion that universality can be limited to existence only. And the former maintains that the ultimate particulars are only particularity. Therefore, the lower universality is a medium between universality proper and particularity proper. The ultimate particulars can, as the name itself proves, never be universality. If so, the ultimate particulars cannot logically be classified under universality-particularity, because they are only particularity. The logical consequence has been followed by the author of

[1] Cf. *Sapta-padārthī* of Śivāditya (Vizianagram Skt. S., vol. vi): "sāmānyam param aparam parāparaṁ ca-iti trividhaṁ" (p. 12).

our treatise, and universality-particularity is established as a category distinct from particularity.

The later Vaiśeṣika, subsequent to Śivāditya and Udayana, acknowledged non-existence as a seventh category. Non-existence is affirmed in *V.S.*, but it is not a category. If this establishment of a seventh category can be justified, the establishment of the three distinct categories, universality, universality-particularity, and particularity in the treatise, may also claim to be justified.

As for the other categories (potentiality, non-potentiality, and non-existence), they are not historical developments, but are directly derived from the *sūtra*. Consequently, they will be treated in the following notes.

3. Our main task is almost finished; but we shall proceed to collect some miscellaneous accounts of the Vaiśeṣika.

(*a*) Asaṅga wrote many voluminous works, but he did not refer to the Vaiśeṣika as his predecessors did. He distributed the doctrines of other systems than Buddhism into sixteen classes.[1] Even in those classes the Vaiśeṣika is not clearly indicated.

(*b*) Vasu-bandhu is also a great writer; but distinct references by him to the Vaiśeṣika are exiguous. We shall extract two passages from his works. In the *Karma-siddha-prakaraṇa-śāstra*[2] he states that, "Kaṇāda[3] maintains that atoms conjoin with one another and produce effects (aggregates). The cognition of length is produced by seeing the long side (of an object), that of shortness is by seeing the short side. The cognition of

[1] *Yogācārya-bhūmi-śāstra* (No. 1170), ch. iii, p. 3 f.; *Prakaraṇārya-vācā-śāstra-kārikā* (No. 1202), p. 89*a*; *Prakaraṇārya-vācā-śāstra* (No. 1177), ch. ix, pp. 35*a*–*b*. The first is ascribed to the Bodhi-sattva Maitreya, but it is naturally by Asaṅga.

[2] No. 1221 = No. 1222; p. 90*b* = 95*a*. The former was translated in 651 A.D. and the latter in 541.

[3] In one of the two translations Kaṇāda is rendered ("the system of) corn-piece-eater". This is also found in No. 1198, p. 92*b*.

square comes from the equal length of the four sides, and that of sphericity from things globular in all the sides. The cognition of height is produced from the convex form, and that of lowness from the concave form. The cognition of flatness comes from the even surface of things, and that of unevenness comes from the jagged surface. When things possessing various colours are rotating, the cognition of variegated colour is produced." *V.S.*, *Pr. Bh.*, and our treatise mention small (*aṇu*), large (*mahat*), short (*hrasva*), long (*dīrgha*), and spherical (*pārimaṇḍalya*); but this passage explains them in detail. Among followers of the Vaiśeṣika these explanations were probably adopted, because they appear to be quite natural.

In the *Buddha-gotra-śāstra*[1] Vasu-bandhu refutes the realism of the Vaiśeṣika in respect to sound. He says that "the Vaiśeṣika maintains that sound is of three sorts—sound destroyed by the effect, sound destroyed by the cause, and sound destroyed by both". These qualities of sound correspond to the theory of momentariness of sound in the *Satya-siddhi-śāstra* and *Pr. Bh.* But they are, for the first time, distinctly mentioned in our treatise. Vasu-bandhu also mentions that sound as an attribute cannot, according to the Vaiśeṣika, possess any attribute. This is a very important doctrine of the Vaiśeṣika. Vasu, commenting on the *Śata-śāstra*, says that "sound can, according to the Vaiśeṣika,[2] neither be called great nor be called low (small)". The meaning is that "great (large)" and "small", being attributes, cannot qualify sound at all.

The above passages do not supply important materials: but they prove that some doctrines, which are not found in *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.* and are met with in our treatise, are not originated by the author of the treatise and existed before his time.

As to emancipation (*mokṣa*, *apavarga*, *niḥśreyasa*), *V.S.*

[1] No. 1220, pp. 76*a*–*b*.
[2] *Śata-śāstra*, p. 48*b*.

does not clearly mention it,[1] while *Pr. Bh.* fully describes it.[2] In this matter Chinese translations supply some materials.

Deva states in his *Śata-śāstra*[3]: "The other says, 'there is emancipation, which is eternal and has no distress (*kleśa*). Emancipation is the mental state free from distress (*Sūtra*).'" The Vaiśeṣika's concept of emancipation seems to be negative, as in the case of other systems, although the system is not at all pessimistic.[4]

Vasu remarks in another passage that disciples of Ulūka recite the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, which, in a passage relating to the category "attribute", says that, when a man washes his body (in the River Gaṅgā) thrice a day and offers something to fire, etc., twice a day, a kind of good is produced in, and resides in, himself.[5] Ci-tsāṅ explains the passage in his commentary: "Washing one's body is preparatory to the production of good, because washing purifies, while offering fire, etc., produce good. But such a kind of good is not the final good and only leads to heaven."[6] This is called an exaltation (*abhyudaya*),[7] and is different from the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*) in *V.S.*

(*c*) Paramārtha (499–569 A.D.) describes the Vaiśeṣika doctrines in the *Lakṣaṇānusāra-śāstra*[8]: "According to the Vaiśeṣika self (*ātman*) has fourteen sorts of mark, i.e. the five external and the nine internal (*V.S.* 3, 2, 4). The former are breathing out, breathing in, closing

[1] See notes on ch. i, 3, 23, 24 (merit and demerit).

[2] pp. 272–82.

[3] ch. ix, p. 47*b*.

[4] Cf. *V.S.* 5, 2, 15–18; 6, 2, 10–16; Handt, loc. cit., p. 13 f.

[5] Ch. i, p. 37*b*.

[6] *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 73, bk. 5, p. 385*b*.

[7] *V.S.* 6, 2, 1; 6, 2, 8–9; 10, 2, 8; 1, 1, 2–3.

[8] No. 1280, pp. 79*b*–80*a*. The work is ascribed to Guṇa-mati, a disciple of Vasu-bandhu, but the extant work is not Guṇa-mati's original, because the contents evidently confute the authorship of Guṇa-mati. Paramārtha translated the original work and commented on it (No. 1504, p. 65*b*). The extant work is one part of his own commentary.

(lit. winking), opening (lit. seeing) of the eyes, and life. The latter are the following: The system maintains that self is eternal, and mind (*manas*) is as regards extension atomic (*aṇu*) (3, 2, 5; 7, 1, 23), but is also eternal (3, 2, 2). There are merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) apart from these.[1] Merit is good and demerit is evil. They lead to contact of self with mind. Nine things are produced from the contact. From self and mind comes cognition (*buddhi*), which recognizes everything. From cognition come pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*). Pleasure and pain produce desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*), i.e. desire is caused by pleasure and aversion is by pain. Desire and aversion produce effort (*prayatna*). By effort pain is avoided and pleasure is sought. Effort produces merit and demerit.[1] Eternalists (*Śāśvata-vādin*) believing in existence in a future life practise asceticism in the present life; this is merit:[2] while Exterminationalists (*Uccheda-vādin*), rejecting the future life, do not control their minds and commit evil; this is demerit. From merit and demerit comes impression (*saṁskāra* = *bhāvanā*). Impression is the cause which reminds us of past events (9, 2, 6–8). Merit and demerit, i.e. *adṛṣṭa*,[2] remain after the present merit and demerit have gone away, and afterwards combine with self and produce a new merit and demerit, as stated above. Merit and demerit, i.e. *adṛṣṭa*, cause the following five activities: the upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing of wind (5, 2, 13), the falling down and sinking of earth and water (5, 1, 7; 5, 1, 18; 5, 2, 3), the conjunction (and disjunction) of atoms with (and from) one another (5, 2, 13), and the contact of self with mind (5, 2, 13; 5, 2, 17; 9, 2, 6) . . .

"The *tīrthaka* maintains that there are two kinds of dissolution of the world (*saṁvarta*), the *antara-saṁvarta*

[1] 3, 1, 18; 3, 1, 19; 3, 2, 1; 3, 2, 3; 3, 2, 19; 5, 2, 13; 5, 2, 15; 1, 2, 17; 6, 2, 2; 6, 2, 12; 6, 2, 3; 6, 2, 14; 1, 1, 4.

[2] See *Pr. Bh.*, p. 10, and notes on ch. i, 3, 22–3 (merit and demerit).

and the *tejaḥ-saṁvarta.* The former has the duration of 300,000 *koṭīs* (*koṭī* = ten millions), that is, three *kalpas* of 100,000 *kōṭīs.* The first *kalpa* of 100,000 *koṭīs* is the period of a fire-world, the second of a water-world, and the third of a wind-world. During the first *kalpa* the world is created and dissolved, and so in the second and the third. At the time of dissolution every gross thing is dissolved into its component atoms, which exist without conjunction with one another throughout the period. At the time of creation, merit and demerit, i.e. *adṛṣṭa,* cause the combination of atoms. The combination of atoms through, or with, merit brings about *sugati,* while the combination through, or with, demerit brings about *durgati.* By combination atoms grow bigger and bigger and produce the whole world. Self and mind conjoin with, and are disjoined from, each other, when atoms do the same. After the three *kalpas* the *antara-saṁvarta* is over, and there comes the *tejaḥ-saṁvarta.* When three *kalpas* of the *tejaḥ-saṁvarta* have elapsed, all atoms exist without conjunction with one another, and self and mind also exist without conjunction. At that time self is in temporary emancipation. Afterwards merit and demerit, i.e. *adṛṣṭa,* cause the conjunction of self with mind . . . One who seeks eternal emancipation ought to devote himself to morality (*śīla*), liberality (*dāna*), asceticism (*tapas*), and *yoga.*[1] From these four sorts of practice is produced the supreme merit which leads to the attainment of emancipation or heaven. The supreme merit brings about exaltation (*abhyudaya*) and knowledge of truth (*tattva-jñāna*). Exaltation is enjoyment of pleasure in heaven. Knowledge of truth leads to eternal emancipation (i.e. *niḥśreyasa*), when merit and demerit, i.e. *adṛṣṭa,* have been completely destroyed, and self and mind never come into conjunction with each other, that is, when the nine

[1] *V.S.* 6, 1, 5–6, 2, 9; 5, 2, 15–18; 6, 2, 14–16.

things are no more produced. The whole doctrine set forth depends upon the concepts of self and atoms."

This statement agrees generally with *V.S.*, but it is not exactly the same. The nine things, as the attributes of self, are not clearly stated in *V.S.* *Pr. Bh.*[1] tries, for the first time, to prove the nine things to be attributes of self. The proof evidently shows that *Pr. Bh.* is the first work to enumerate the nine attributes of self.[2] And the theory of the *antara-saṁvarta* and the *tejaḥ-saṁvarta* is also not found in *V.S.*, although the dogma of transmigration suggests the introduction of the theory of creation and dissolution into the system. *V.S.* does not undertake to explain the process of creation, etc., but it tries to explain the construction or the state of the world. *Pr. Bh.* explains the process of creation (*sṛṣṭi*) and dissolution (*saṁhāra*).[3] As for the way to and the means of the attainment of emancipation, *Pr. Bh.*[4] agrees with the above statement more exactly than does *V.S.* These three points prove that Paramārtha's statement came from *Pr. Bh.*, and that Paramārtha is later than Praśasta-pāda.

(*d*) Lastly, Dharma-pāla is important. He says: "The Vaiśeṣika maintains that, if the causes of pleasure and pain have been completely destroyed, and attachment to things has been rooted out, self becomes entirely alone (*kevala*), free from disturbances, and is in accordance with its real nature. Self in this state is not active any more, but absolutely happy and eternal. This is emancipation."[5]

[1] pp. 67–70.

[2] p. 10, "guṇāḥ rūpa - rasa - gandha - sparśa - saṁkhyā - parimāṇa - pṛthaktva - saṁyoga - vibhāga - paratva - aparatva - buddhi - sukha - duḥkha - icchā - dveṣa - prayatnāś ca - iti kaṇṭha - uktāḥ saptadaśa; ca - śabda - samuccitāś ca gurutva - dravatva - sneha - saṁskāra - adṛṣṭa (i.e. dharma - adharma)-śabdāś ca sapta - eva - ity - evaṁ caturviṁśati - guṇāḥ." The passage proves that *Pr. Bh.* enumerates the twenty-four attributes for the first time after the *sūtra* was composed.

[3] pp. 48–9.

[4] pp. 272–82.

[5] No. 1198, p. 79*a*.

When we compare the passage with *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 281–2, we find them both in agreement.

Dharma-pāla, from his own standpoint,[1] refutes the Vaiśeṣika's concept of self, which is something different from cognition, and he enumerates the nine attributes of self, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, impression, and cognition. These attributes pervade the substratum self.[2]

Mind is, according to his statement, corporeal, and its extension is the same as that of atoms[2] (*paramāṇu*), i.e. spherical (*pārimaṇḍalya*). *V.S.* ascribes the extension of atoms (*aṇu*) to mind; but the *sūtra* does not use the term *paramāṇu*, which is found in *Pr. Bh.* In the latter work the term *aṇu* is not the designation of atoms, but one of the five sorts of extension (*parimāṇa*). If mind is called *aṇu* in the sense of *Pr. Bh.*'s terminology, the extension of mind must be the same as that of binary atomic compounds (*dvyaṇuka*) and non-eternal.[3] The passage, therefore, suggests that Dharma-pāla knew the distinction between *paramāṇu* and *aṇu*. Consequently, we may conclude that the passage depends upon *Pr. Bh.*

He further states that "followers of Ulūka say that the sense-organs, the eyes, etc., consist of fire-, ether-, earth-, water-, and wind-substance in order. The eyes perceive three substances: fire, earth, and water, and especially colour. The skin perceives four substances out of the five, excepting ether, and especially touch. The ear perceives sound, the nose perceives smell, and the tongue taste" *V.S.* does not assert that ether is the material cause of the ear. Otherwise ether must be an element (*bhūta*). But in *V.S.* ether is the cosmical vacuum. *Pr. Bh.* reckons ether as one of the five elements,[5] and as the material

[1] No. 1198, p. 84*b*.
[2] p. 81*a*.
[3] See notes on ch. i, 3, 6 (extension).
[4] No. 1198, p. 109*a*.
[5] p. 24.

cause of the organ (*indriya-prakṛti*). The passage is proved to have come from *Pr. Bh.*

"The Vaiśeṣika maintains that the sixth category (inherence) is one in its reality and pervades its substrata. Inherence is supersensuous (*atīndriya*) and imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*)."[1] These qualities of inherence are not exactly stated in *V.S.*,[2] but they are clearly mentioned in *Pr. Bh.*[3] Also the classification of substances into eternal and non-eternal, corporeal and incorporeal, and the classification of attributes into those pervading the substrata and those not pervading, etc., agree with *Pr. Bh.* Moreover, the explanations of the categories, except the fourth and the fifth,[4] exactly agree with *Pr. Bh.*

The classifications of substances and attributes are also mentioned in our treatise. Besides, the two sorts of causes, eternal and non-eternal, and the contradictory and non-contradictory relations between causes and effects, e.g. between conjunction and actions, and between two actions, etc.,[5] which are mentioned in the treatise, are found in Dharma-pāla's works.

Dharma-pāla quotes some interesting opinions:—

Some of the Vaiśeṣikas are of opinion that "colour, etc., are the real objects and possess universality-particularity. The objects are perceived by the eyes, etc., in consequence of the impression (*saṁskāra*)[6] of colour, etc." Another contends that "substances are perceptible in consequence of containing more than one substance, and in consequence of colour. Without these two conditions they are imperceptible, like wind and atoms". Another holds that "substances are perceptible in consequence of colour,

[1] No. 1198, p. 100*b*; No. 1187, p. 2*b*.
[2] Cf. 7, 2, 13; 7, 2, 26–8.
[3] p. 329.
[4] Dharma-pāla knows the theory of *pāka-ja* (No. 1198, p. 114*b*).
[5] No. 1198, pp. 114*b*, 117*b*.
[6] See *V.S.* 4, 1, 5-6.

etc. But in hot water water hides the colour of fire, so that fire, though existent in water, cannot be perceived". In a certain work (*śāstra*) of the Vaiśeṣika some teachers refute this opinion and say that "when a white cloth has been dyed with blue or other colour, white cloth is not perceived any more, but it cannot be contended that the cloth also is not perceived. When the blue colour is perceived, the essence[1] of the blue colour is also perceived. The essence of the blue colour is inherent in the cloth, consequently the cloth is perceived at the same time when the blue colour is perceived. In like manner, though the colour of fire is not perceived, fire can be perceived, when water is perceived in consequence of colour, because fire is conjunct with water".[2]

The first two opinions are found in *V.S.* as well as in *Pr. Bh.*; but the latter two can be traced neither in the two works nor in our treatise. From these passages we may conclude that there were many different opinions among the Vaiśeṣikas before Dharma-pāla. Kwhēi-ci's mention of the eighteen schools of the system, though it cannot be accepted as it stands, is to some extent true. And it is confirmed by the record of the Jaina schism, by the *Satya-siddhi-śāstra*, and by the commentaries on *V.S.* The author of the treatise may not be considered as the representative of his time; but contemporary works, if any, are either non-existent or not yet discovered, and the treatise has a close relation to *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.*, so that the author plays a significant part in the history of the Vaiśeṣika.

XIV. The Nyāya: 1. known to Deva, etc.

1. A few remarks on the Nyāya may be added. The Nyāya was not known to Kauṭilya (300 B.C.), but the system had been constituted before Hari-varman

[1] "Blue-colour-ness (*nīla-rūpa-tva*)."
[2] No. 1198, p. 106*a*.

(*c.* 260 A.D.). Not only Hari-varman, but also Deva referred to the Nyāya theories. And even Aśva-ghoṣa knew the five-membered (*pañca-avayava*) reasoning, as shown in what follows.

In the *Sūtrālaṅkāra* he states: "Kauśika said to his friend: 'The *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* (i.e. the theories of the Sāṁkhya) may essentially be summarized in the five-membered reasoning: 1, thesis (*pratijñā*); 2, reason (*hetu*); 3, example (*udāharaṇa* or *dṛṣṭānta*); 4, application (*upanaya*); and 5, conclusion (*nigamana*).[1] But the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* cannot supply any example, . . . because . . . the *Sāṁkhya-sūtra* explains that *pradhāna* (= *prakṛti*) is not produced by any other thing; it has an eternal nature, and produces all things; it is universally pervading (*vibhu*), and (at the same time) penetrates everywhere[2] (*sarva-gata*). The explanation contains a contradiction, because there is in the world nothing such as to produce other things and never to be produced by anything else. Also, a thing which is universally pervading and penetrates everywhere is proved to have been wrongly conceived. An universally pervading thing cannot move anywhere, and a thing which moves cannot be universally pervading; the concepts are inconsistent with each other . . .'"[3]

Jacobi remarks on Kauṭilya's saying (*Sāṁkhyaṁ Yogo Lokāyataṁ ca-ity ānvīkṣikī*) that "Wir haben jetzt die Gewissheit, dass Sāṁkhya und Yoga schon 300 v. Chr. bestanden, und zwar als philosophische Systeme, die sich auf logische Beweissführung stützten (*ānvīkṣikī*), und nicht etwa nur in der Form intuitiver Spekulation, wie das sogenannte 'epische Sāṁkhya', das nur eine

[1] Huber, in his translation, identifies these with *śabda*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, l'égalité and la certitude absolue (or with *pratyakṣa* or *śabda*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, and *anupalabdhi*), pp. 15–16. But *Lun-i* (reasoning) in Chinese does not mean *pramāṇa* as he understands it.

[2] This is a literal rendering in the Chinese translation.

[3] Vol. i, pp. 72*a*–73*b*.

popularisierende Entartung des eigentlichen Sāṁkhya ist".[1] If the Sāṁkhya was employing logical demonstration in 300 B.C., the Sāṁkhya of the time of Aśva-ghoṣa may possibly have introduced the five-membered reasoning into the system.[2]

2. The essential and characteristic feature of the Nyāya is the five-membered reasoning. Accordingly, the systematization of the Nyāya mode of reasoning is earlier than the Christian era. As for the origin of the Nyāya, we can trace it at the time of Mahā-vīra and Buddha. The Jaina canons hold that there are four sorts of *hetu*[3] (= *pramāṇa*, means of knowledge), which are exactly the same as those in the Nyāya, and employ a primitive form of reasoning.[4] The *Brahma-jāla-sutta* tells us that there were many teachers addicted to logic (*takkin*) and reasoning (*mīmāṁsin*).[5]

But argumentation naturally prevailed among philo-

[1] *Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie*, p. 738.

[2] The Sāṁkhya system is very logical, as seen in *S.K.* *S.K.*, v. 5, defines *anumāna* "tal-liṅga-liṅgi-pūrvakam". The definition may be taken to mean the abstract and universally valid relation between the middle (*liṅga*) and the major term (*liṅgin*), i.e. *vyāpti*. If this is really the case, the definition favours the supposition that *S.K.* adopts the three-membered reasoning, which is more advanced than the five-membered; and some verses in *S.K.* really propound the three-membered reasoning (vv. 9, 15–18). But according to the *Gauḍa-pāda-bhāṣya* on that verse the definition does not always represent the universally valid relation; and, also, according to Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika* (*Anumāna-pariccheda*, v. 143), the Vindhya-vāsins (Īśvara-kṛṣṇa, the author of *S.K.*, etc.) did not know the universal *vyāpti*, but only the *vyāpti* which is valid in special cases. And the verses in *S.K.* are necessarily short because they are in the Āryā metre. Besides, the commentary on *S.K.* in the Chinese translation and the *Gauḍa-pāda bhāṣya* always use the five-membered reasoning. Consequently the Sāṁkhya is proved to have used the five-membered reasoning even at the time of Īśvara-kṛṣṇa and his followers. Such is the case with *N.S.* as well as *V.S.* The three-membered reasoning was elaborated by Dig-nāga for the first time in the history of Indian logic (No. 1223 = No. 1224, p. 2*b* = p. 7*b*).

[3] As for the term *hetu* in this sense, see before. According to Colebrooke the four sorts of *pramāṇa* are acknowledged by the Nyāya only.

[4] Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa, *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic*, pp. 4–5.

[5] Ibid., p. 60.

sophers even in early times. A remarkable example is found in the *Bṛhad-āraṇyaka-upaniṣad* (the third *adhyāya*), and the *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (7, 1, 2) reckons *Vākovākya* (Dialogue)[1] as one of the sciences at that time. But these cannot be regarded as the direct origin of the Nyāya reasoning.

The establishment of a kind of syllogistic form seems to have been necessitated by Sañjaya Velaṭṭhī-putta and other sophists. Mahā-vīra was forced to establish the *Syād-vāda* (*Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya*) and the *Nayas*. Buddha had a special mode of answering questions.[2] A Jaina sage, Bhadra-bāhu (died 293 B.C.),[3] elaborated a syllogistic form with ten members (*daśa-avayava-vākya*).[4] This form appears to forestall the five-membered form of the Nyāya; but another syllogistic form with ten members, which is set forth by Vātsyāyana,[5] may have preceded the five-membered form. The first five of the ten members are, as Vātsyāyana asserts, superfluous as members of a syllogistic form.

In the times previous to the author of *N.S.* there were a great many sophists, as seen from the fifth chapter of *N.S.*, where the twenty-four kinds of futility (*jāti*), and the twenty-two kinds of "unfitness to be argued with" (*nigraha-sthāna*) are mentioned. Futility is also mentioned

[1] Logic, according to Śaṁkara and to Max Muller's translation.

[2] This is called the *catvāri vyākaraṇāni*, viz. *ekāṁśa-vyākaraṇa*, *vibhajya-vyākaraṇa*, *paripṛcchā - vyākaraṇa*, and *sthāpanīya - vyākarana*. See *Vibhāṣā-śāstra* (No. 1279), ch. 7, pp. 23*a*-*b* (the text of the Library of the India Office). Also the *Mahā-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra* often refers to it (vol. xxxv, p. 85*b*, etc.).

[3] Jacobi, *Kalpa-sūtra*, p. 11; SBE., vol. xxii, p. xlii.

[4] Vidyā-bhūṣaṇa, loc. cit., pp. 6–7; Leumann, ZDMG., xlvi, p. 649. The ten members are *pratijñā*, *pratijñā-vibhakti*, *hetu*, *hetu-vibhakti*, *vipakṣa*, *vipakṣa-pratiṣedha*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *āśaṅkā*, *āśaṅkā-pratiṣedha*, and *nigamana*.

[5] On *N.S.* 1, 1, 32. They are *jijñāsā*, *saṁśaya*, *śakya-prāpti*, *prayojana*, *saṁśaya-vyudāsa*, *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *udāharaṇa*, *upanaya*, and *nigamana*. This is also referred to by Dig-nāga, who says "*jijñāsā*, etc., and *upanaya* and *nigamana* are excluded from the syllogistic form" (No. 1223 = No. 1224, p. 2*b* = p. 7*b*).

in the *Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra*[1] (20 kinds), the *Tarka-śāstra*[2] (22 or 27 kinds), and Dig-nāga's *Hetu-vidyā-nyāya-dvāra-śāstra*[3] (22 kinds). "Unfitness to be argued with" is also mentioned in these three works, and the *Tarka-śāstra*[4] perfectly agrees with *N.S.* in this point, though the explanations sometimes agree with, sometimes differ from, those of Vātsyāyana. The agreement evidently shows that the "unfitness to be argued with" in this work was derived from *N.S.*

3. The date of *N.S.* has been discussed by Jacobi and Suali, as stated above. The former places the date in 200–500 A.D., while the latter places it in 300–350. The basis which Jacobi took for his argument is the fact that *N.S.* attacks the theory of Śūnya-vāda, but the Vijñāna-vāda is not alluded to.

Nāgārjuna, discussing *pramāṇa* in his *Vigraha-*

[1] No. 1257, translated by Kekaya in 472 A.D.

[2] No. 1252, translated by Paramārtha in 550 A.D.

[3] No. 1223 = No. 1224, translated by Yuan Chwang and by I-tsing.

[4] Ch. iii, *Nigraha-sthāna*, p. 72*a*. Dharma-gupta, a Buddhist of Southern India, came to China in 590 A.D. and died in 619 A.D. (Nanjio's App. II, 131). According to his *Life* (No. 1493, p. 92*b*, No. 1485, p. 66*b*) he read the work in Shā-lö (a province of Chinese Turkestan), when on the way to China. What he read consisted of 2,000 ślokas. But the extant work consists of about 330 ślokas. Some of the oldest Catalogues, Nos. 1604, 1609, mention that the book is in 2 vols., but the extant one is in 1 vol. And the beginning of the work clearly shows that it is only a concluding part of the original. It has only three sections in a chapter, apparently the last, called *Paripṛcchā*, (1) "wrong refutation", (2) "true refutation (of *jāti*)", and (3) *nigraha-sthāna*. The work is sometimes ascribed to Vasu-bandhu, but this is doubtful. Paramārtha commented on it, but the commentary (3 vols.) has been lost (No. 1504, pp. 56*b*, 92*a*, No. 1609, p. 111*a*, No. 1483, p. 77*b*). He also translated the *Nigraha-sthāna-śāstra* (1 vol.), the *Paripṛcchā-śāstra* (1 vol.), and the *Caṅ-shwo-* (or *lun-*) *tāo-li-lun* (1 vol.); and he wrote a commentary (5 vols.) on the last, called the *Explanation of the Caṅ-lun*. All have been lost. *Caṅ-shwo-* (or *lun-*) *tāo-li* literally means "correctly (truly) explaining reason (or reasoning)", which may have been the translation of *Nyāya*. Yuan Chwang translates *Nyāya* by "true reason (or reasoning)" (*Caṅ-li*). If so, the *Caṅ-shwo-* (or *lun-*) *tāo-li-lun* may have been a translation of *N.S.* That the commentary consisted of 5 vols. suggests the five adhyāyas of *N.S.*

vyāvartanī,[1] says: "If a *pramāṇa* can establish objects, the *pramāṇa* needs also to be established by another *pramāṇa*. What sort of *pramāṇa* can establish the *pramāṇa*? If (you say that) the *pramāṇa* is established without another, your argument is incoherent and defective, so that another reason should be offered.[2] If (you say that) the *pramāṇa* is compared to the light of a lamp, which illuminates both itself[3] and other things—so that the *pramāṇa* can establish itself and other objects, your argument is a mistake, because the light does not illuminate itself like a pot[4] in the dark, and illuminating itself is inconsistent with illuminating other things."

N.S. says, *pramāṇataḥ siddheḥ pramāṇānāṁ pramāṇa-antara-siddhi-prasaṅgaḥ*,[5] *tad-vinivṛtter vā pramāṇa-siddhi-vat tat-siddhiḥ*,[6] *na pradīpa-prakāśa-siddhi-vat tat-siddheḥ*,[7] and *kvacit tu nivṛtti-darśanād anivṛtti-darśanāc ca kvacid anekāntaḥ*[8] (2, 2, 17–19). If we

[1] No. 1251, pp. 13*b*, 18*a-b*. See *Mādhyamaka-vṛtti* (*Prasanna-padā*, Bibl. Bud., No. 4), pp. 16, 30, 56 (n.), 69 (n.).

[2] See note 6.

[3] According to the commentary "itself" means "light itself".

[4] According to the commentary, if the light of a lamp can illuminate itself, the light must exist as being dark before it has been illuminated. A pot is dark in a dark room, before it has been illuminated. Just so in the case of illuminating itself. But the light is not dark; consequently it cannot illuminate itself.

[5] Ballantyne: "Since it is by Proofs (*pramāṇa*) that the existence of Proofs is established, the existence of *other* Proofs presents itself (for demonstration)."

[6] Ballantyne: "Or in the absence thereof (—i.e. of Proof,—since Proof may, in virtue of itself, *be* Proof), then, just as Proof is established (independently), so may this (viz. right knowledge, independently of any cause of it) be established." The translator of the *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* may have understood *-vā pramāṇa-siddhi-vat* as *-vā-a-pramāṇa-siddhi-vat*.

[7] Ballantyne: "It is not so (—that an endless series of Proofs of Proofs are required—), because it (viz. Proof) really is, just as the light of a lump is."

[8] This last *sūtra* is not reckoned as a *sūtra* by the editor of the *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (Bibl. Ind.) or by the *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti* of Viśva-nātha; but Vācaspati-miśra enumerates it as a *sūtra* in his *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* (App. in the *Nyāya-vārttika*, Bibl. Ind.).

compare the latter with the former, we can hardly deny the relationship between the two passages. The *Vigraha-vyāvartanī* is principally engaged in refuting the realistic explanation of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* (objects of *pramāṇa*) and establishing the author's idealistic system. *Pramāṇa's* are enumerated as four: perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*), and trustworthy instruction[1] (*śabda*). The refutation in this work of the relation between *pramāṇa* and *prameya*, and the answer and the attack by *N.S.* on the Śūnya-vāda, may lead to the supposition that the *sūtra* was composed about the same time as Nāgārjuna and Deva, in order to protect the realistic standpoint against their attack. If such be the case, the date of *N.S.* may be placed in 150–250 A.D.

4. As stated above, *N.S.* was commented upon by an unknown author before Vātsyāyana. The next extract from Piṅgala's commentary on the *Mādhyamika-śāstra* seems to represent an explanation of inference earlier than Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*. But it cannot be ascertained whether Piṅgala quoted from the commentary by the unknown author or not.

"If you argue that the existence of self is established by *pramāṇa*, this is not possible, because the four sorts of *pramāṇa* cannot support it. The four sorts are, namely, 1, perception (*pratyakṣa*); 2, inference (*anumāna*), e.g. we infer the existence of fire from smoke; 3, analogy (*upamāna*), e.g. for people who have not as yet seen brass, brass is compared to gold; and 4, trustworthy instruction (*āpta-vacana* = *śabda*), e.g. in assertions like 'there exist hell (*naraka*), heaven (*svarga*), and the *Uttara-kurus* (a kind of paradise)', which are altogether unascertainable

[1] The *Upāya-kauśalya-hṛdaya-śāstra* also enumerates four, Asaṅga enumerates three, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, and *śabda* (No. 1170, pp. 65*a*–68*b*), while Dig-nāga admits only two, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. Dig-nāga says, "*śabda* and *upamāna* are contained in *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*" (No. 1223 = No. 1224, p. 3*a* = p. 8*a*). After Dig-nāga all Buddhists admit only two.

by perception, but are believed upon the authority of trustworthy instruction.[1] The existence of self can never be proved by any sort of *pramāṇa*; that is to say, existence is not proved by perception or by inference. Inference is reasoning concerning an object which has not yet been experienced from an object which has been seen, e.g. if a man has ever seen that, where smoke is, there is fire,[2] he can afterwards infer the existence of fire from seeing smoke. This is not applicable to the proof of self. If you argue, 'we can prove the existence of self from seeing the five *skandhas*, because we have seen that self conjoins with the five *skandhas*. This is also supported by the following sorts of reasoning. There are three sorts of inference, *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*. The *pūrvavat* is the reasoning in which a man has formerly known that where smoke is there is fire, and afterwards infers the existence of fire, as in the former cases (*pūrvavat*), from seeing smoke.[3] The *śeṣavat* is the reasoning in which a man, having known that one grain of rice has been cooked, can infer from that that all other grains in the cooking kettle have also been cooked.[4] The *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* is the reasoning in which a man, having seen that another person has started from one place and arrived at another, and having hence known that he is locomotive, can infer from that that the sun has

[1] Cf. *Gauḍa-pāda-bhāṣya* on *S.K.*, v. 4.

[2] Literally, "if a man has once seen that fire has smoke, afterwards he can infer the existence of fire from seeing smoke." The first part is not strictly logical, but it may be justified if the author means the first experience, which is followed by the knowledge of the concomitant relation between fire and smoke, when the experience is repeated.

[3] This is the second explanation of the *pūrvavat* in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*. The *Bhāṣya* says, "pūrvavad iti yatra yathā pūrvam pratyakṣabhūtayor anyataradarśanena-anyatarasya-apratyakṣasya-anumānam, yathā dhūmena-agnir iti" (p. 13).

[4] This example is not found in the *Bhāṣya*. A similar example is used in the *Gauḍa-pāda-bhāṣya* on *S.K.*, v. 5, "śeṣavad yathā samudrād ekaṁ jalapalaṁ lavaṇam āsādya śeṣasya-apy asti lavaṇabhāva iti." This has the same meaning as the above. See notes on ch. i. 3. 12 (cognition).

motion, though not seen, because the sun moves from the east to the west.[1] In like manner pain, pleasure, aversion, desire, and cognition, etc., are known to have a substratum, just as a people has the king as supporter'[2]—this is not possible. The reason is that in the procedure of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* we infer that the sun has motion, because we have observed its change of place; but in the case of self its existence cannot possibly be inferred from the five *skandhas*, because the conjunction of self with the *skandhas* has not been observed. In the same way existence is not proved by trustworthy instruction, because trustworthy instruction has its origin in perception. Consequently, self cannot be concluded to be something existent." [3]

Vātsyāyana explains the three sorts of inference in two ways. According to the first of these the *pūrvavat* is reasoning from cause to effect, i.e. from the present to the future, and the *śeṣavat* is reasoning from effect to cause, i.e. from the present to the past, while the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* occurs only in the present.[4] This explanation was followed by the unknown commentator on *S.K.* in the Chinese translation. The second explanation is more logical, and almost agrees with Piṅgala's, as stated above. The *pūrvavat* in the second explanation is after all the same as the *śeṣavat* in the first, as Vātsyāyana suggests,[5] including the *pūrvavat* in the first explanation. The *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* in both the first and the second explanation is the same reasoning as Piṅgala

[1] This is the first explanation of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* in the *Bhāṣya*. The same explanation is found in the *Gauḍa-pāda-bhāṣya* and Śabara-svāmin's *Bhāṣya* on *M.S.* (p. 10).

[2] The *Bhāṣya* by Vātsyāyana, ". . . yathā-icchā-ādibhir ātmā icchā-ādayo guṇāḥ guṇāś ca dravya-saṁsthānāḥ tad yad eṣāṁ sthānaṁ sa ātmā-iti" (p. 14).

[3] No. 1197, ch. xviii, p. 43*b*.

[4] Vātsyāyana says, " trikāla-yuktā arthā anumānena gṛhyante (p. 14).

[5] See n. 3, p. 87.

explains it. Then there is no logical reason for the *śeṣavat* in the first explanation; hence, the *śeṣavat* has to be explained after Piṅgala's manner and Vātsyāyana's second explanation[1]; they are complementary to each other. It appears that Vātsyāyana intended in his *Bhāṣya* to comprise and unite different explanations.

5. It has been stated that Deva and Hari-varman did not distinguish the Nyāya school from the Vaiśeṣika, or rather they did not regard the Nyāya as a system distinct from the Vaiśeṣika. Piṅgala and Vasu may have been of the same opinion, because, commenting on the works of Nāgārjuna and Deva, they did not make a distinction between the two systems and confused the Nyāya theories with the Vaiśeṣika.

Such a tendency is also found even among followers of the Nyāya; since the author of the *sūtra* uses the Vaiśeṣika theories, Vātsyāyana and Uddyota-kara use the Vaiśeṣika theories many times, and Uddyota-kara calls Kaṇāda *Paramarṣi*, and the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* the *śāstra* or the *sūtra*. Followers of the two systems, at least the Naiyāyikas, did not disapprove of this attitude. Handt holds the opinion that the name Vaiśeṣika in early times must have included followers of Kaṇāda and Gotama. Brāhmaṇas and Buddhists usually reckon them as followers of one system. Even Śaṅkara, naming the Vaiśeṣika system the school of Kaṇa-bhuj, criticizes the Nyāya theories in the course of his refutation of the former. In Mādhava's *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha* the term *Nyāya* is only applied to the theory of logic.[2]

[1] Śeṣavan nāma pariśeṣaḥ sa ca prasakta-pratiṣedhe 'nyatara-aprasaṅgāc chiṣyamāne saṁpratyayaḥ. Cf. *S.-tattva-kaumudī* on *S.K.*, v. 5, and A. Burk, *Die Theorie der Schlussfolgerung (anumāna) nach der S.-t.-kaumudī des Vācaspati-miśra*, VOJ., vol. xv, pp. 251-64, 1901. The division between *vīta* and *avīta* in *anumāna* is, as the writer asserts, dependent upon the *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 728 (n.), not for the first time established by Vācaspati-miśra. It has been used by Uddyota-kara in his *Nyāya-vārttika*, p. 126.

[2] *Die atomistische Grundlage der Vaiśeṣika-Philosophie*, p. 26.

According to Hall's *Bibliography*[1] Vācaspati-miśra wrote works or commentaries on the five systems other than the Vaiśeṣika. In his case the Vaiśeṣika is probably considered as included in the Nyāya; he wrote the *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*.[2] Udayana[3] wrote on the one hand a commentary on *Pr. Bh.*, named *Kiraṇāvalī*, and a pure Vaiśeṣika work called the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*[4]; and on the other the *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-pariśuddhi* and the *Kusumāñjali*.[5] The *Kusumāñjali* is a Nyāya work, because Udayana enumerates the four sorts of *pramāṇa*.[6] He himself is an eminent Naiyāyika. In this work Udayana proves the existence of Paramātman, i.e. Īśvara, and states the fourteen different opinions relating thereto.[7] The Naiyāyika is one of them, but the Vaiśeṣika is not enumerated. In the *Kiraṇāvalī* he also states the different opinions of the Sāṁkhya, the Yoga, the Vedānta, and the Tautātita[8] concerning emancipation (*apavarga*). If Udayana had considered the Nyāya a distinct system from the Vaiśeṣika, he would have referred to the Nyāya in the *Kiraṇāvalī* (a Vaiśeṣika work). If his not having done so is due to being a Naiyāyika,

[1] p. 87. Cf. Woods, *Yoga-system of Patañjali*, p. xxi.

[2] Published in Vizianagram Skt. S., vol. xiii. Vācaspati-miśra also wrote the *Nyāya-tattvāloka* (*Cat. of Skt. MSS. of the India Office*, No. 1868).

[3] As for the dates of Vācaspati-miśra and Udayana, see Cowell's Introduction to his *Kusumāñjali*; Bodas' Introd. to the *Tarka-saṁgraha*, Introd. to the *Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā*; Candra-kānta's Introd. to the *Kusumāñjali*; Professor Garbe, Berichte d. k. s. G. d. W. Philol.-hist. Kl., 1888; and Keith, JRAS., 1898, pp. 522 f. Vācaspati-miśra lived in the ninth century and Udayana in the tenth.

[4] Published as an appendix of the *Kiraṇāvalī* (Benares S.S.), and in the Paṇḍit, xxi, 625 ff., with the *Nyāya-muktāvalī*.

[5] Published and translated by Cowell with a commentary, Calcutta, 1864; and also published by Candra-kānta with Udayana's *Prakaraṇa*, a commentary and a gloss, Calcutta, 1891 (Bibl. Ind.).

[6] Ch. 5.

[7] Ch. 1.

[8] pp. 6–8. "Tautātita" is the followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, who are usually called the Bhāṭṭa. See *Upaskāra* on 7, 2, 20, *Vivṛti*, p. 461. Here the Tautātita is the representative of the Mīmāṁsakas.

he would have cited the Vaiśeṣika instead of the Nyāya in the *Kusumāñjali* (a Nyāya work). We face a dilemma in this point. If we suppose that he considered the two systems as one school, the dilemma can easily be solved. Vācaspati-miśra also, being his predecessor and following Vātsyāyana and Uddyota-kara, will not have made a distinction between the two schools. It may therefore be concluded that there were some teachers, even in the Nyāya, who did not regard the Nyāya as a distinct school. The facts that the term Nyāya as the name of a school is hardly found in the Chinese translation of the *Tripiṭaka*, except in the *Satya-siddhi-śāstra* and the *Madhyāntānugama-śāstra*, and that Buddhist writers often confuse the Nyāya with the Vaiśeṣika, are probably due to this tendency. Udayana's enumeration of the four systems, which includes the Vaiśeṣika and the Nyāya, as the representative schools, shows that in those days there was a growing tendency to reckon the so-called six systems as one group, since in earlier times the six systems (*ṣaḍ-darśana*) seem not to have been regarded as a group.

DASAPADARTHI

A TREATISE ON THE TEN CATEGORIES OF THE VAISESIKA

CHAPTER I

INDIVIDUAL PROPERTIES OF THE TEN CATEGORIES

Section 1.—*Ten categories*

There are ten categories: 1, substance; 2, attribute; 3, action; 4, universality; 5, particularity; 6, inherence; 7, potentiality; 8, non-potentiality; 9, commonness; and 10, non-existence.

Section 2.—*Substance*

What is the category substance? Nine substances are called the category substance.

What are the nine substances? 1, earth; 2, water; 3, fire; 4, wind; 5, ether; 6, time; 7, space; 8, self; and 9, mind—these are the nine substances.

What is earth? That which has colour, taste, smell, and touch (as its attributes) is called earth.

What is water? That which has colour, taste, touch, fluidity, and viscidity (as its attributes) is water.

What is fire? That which has colour and touch (as its attributes) is fire.

What is wind? That which has touch only (as its attribute) is wind.

What is ether? That which has sound only (as its attribute) is ether.

What is time? That which is the cause of the notions of simultaneity, non-simultaneity, slowness, and quickness with respect to that and this (thing) is time.

What is space? That which is the cause of the notions of the east, the south, the west, and the north, etc., is space.

What is self? That of which the recognition of an inherent cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression, merit, and demerit, etc., is the mark (of its existence) is self.

What is mind? That of which the recognition of a non-inherent cause (for the production) of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, and impression is the mark (of its existence) is mind.

Section 3.—*Attribute*

What is the category attribute? Twenty-four attributes are called the category attribute.

What are the twenty-four attributes? 1, colour; 2, taste; 3, smell; 4, touch; 5, number; 6, extension; 7, individuality; 8, conjunction; 9, disjunction; 10, priority; 11, posteriority; 12, cognition; 13, pleasure; 14, pain; 15, desire; 16, aversion; 17, effort; 18, gravity; 19, fluidity; 20, viscidity; 21, impression; 22, merit; 23, demerit; and 24, sound—these are the twenty-four attributes.

What is colour? Colour is the quality which has one (substance) as its substratum and is perceived by the eyes.

What is taste? Taste is the quality which has one (substance) as its substratum and is perceived by the tongue.

What is smell? Smell is the quality which has one (substance) as its substratum and is perceived by the nose.

What is touch? Touch is the quality which has one (substance) as its substratum and is perceived by the skin.

What is number? Number is the qualities, unity, and so forth, which are inherent in every substance and the cause of the notions with respect to one substance and more than one, etc., that that is one and they are more than one, etc.

What is extension? Smallness, largeness, shortness, length, and sphericity, etc., are called extension.

Smallness is the quality which has a binary atomic compound as its inherent cause and the cause of the notion with respect to one substance, which is produced by two (atoms), that that is small.

Largeness is the quality which is caused by plurality, is inherent in a ternary atomic compound, etc., which arise from a kind of aggregation, and the cause of the notion that one substance is large.

Shortness is the quality which has a binary atomic compound as its inherent cause, and the cause of the notion with respect to one substance, which is produced by two (atoms), that that is short.

Length is the quality which is caused by plurality, is inherent in a ternary atomic compound, etc., which arise from a certain aggregation, and the cause of the notioı that one substance is long.

Sphericity is of two kinds: (1) absolute minuteness and (2) absolute largeness.

Absolute minuteness is the quality which is possessed by, and inherent in, atoms, and the cause of the notion with respect to one substance that that is absolutely minute.

Absolute largeness is the quality which is inherent in the substances ether, time, space, and self, and the cause of the notion with respect to one substance that that is absolutely large. It is also called all-pervading.

What is individuality? Individuality is the qualities, single individuality, and so forth, which are inherent in every substance, and the cause of the notions with respect to one and more than one substance that that is individual.

What is conjunction? It is called conjunction when two separated things come to conjoin with each other.

It is of three kinds: (1) conjunction produced by the

action of one of the two conjunct things, (2) conjunction produced by the actions of both, and (3) conjunction produced by conjunction.

The conjunction produced by the action of one of the two conjunct things is that which is produced by an active and an inactive thing.

The conjunction produced by the actions of both is that which is produced by two active things.

The conjunction produced by conjunction is that in which an inactive thing, which consists of many substances, conjoins with ether, etc., when the thing is produced (by the conjunction of them).

What is disjunction? Disjunction is the separation of two conjoined things from each other.

It is of three kinds: (1) disjunction produced by the action of one of the disjunct things, (2) disjunction produced by the actions of both, and (3) disjunction produced by disjunction.

The disjunction produced by the action of one of the disjunct things and the disjunction produced by the actions of both are explained by the analogy of the conjunctions.

The disjunction produced by disjunction is that in which a formerly produced substance disjoins (part from part) through another cause, and then from ether, etc., after the substance has been destroyed.

What is priority? Priority is the quality which is produced by one substance, upon which depends the notion of remoteness (of another substance) occupying the same time, etc., and the cause of the notion that that is remote.

What is posteriority? Posteriority is the quality which is produced by one substance, upon which depends the notion of nearness (of another substance) occupying the same time, etc., and the cause of the notion that that is near.

What is cognition? That by which every object is understood is cognition.

It is of two kinds: (1) perception and (2) inference.

Perception is the sensory representation which is originated when sense-organs and so on come into contact with colour and so on, residing in appreciable substances.

Inference is of two kinds: (1) inference from seeing a common property, and (2) inference from not seeing a common property.

Inference from seeing a common property is reasoning which produces knowledge of an inferred object, the whole of which is not seen, by seeing the inferential mark, by recollecting the connection of the inferential mark with the inferred, and by contact of self with mind.

Inference from not seeing a common property is reasoning which produces all kinds of knowledge of any invisible objects by seeing the cause of, the effect of, or a thing conjunct with, them, or by seeing a thing inherent in the same object, or a thing contradictory to them, by recollecting the connection with each (of the five objects), and by contact of self with mind.

What is pleasure? Pleasure is the quality of one substance, self, and its nature is satisfaction.

What is pain? Pain is the quality of one substance, self, and its nature is suffering.

What is desire? Desire is the quality which is inherent in one substance, self, and attaches to colour, etc.

What is aversion? Aversion is the quality which is inherent in one substance, self, and shuns colour, etc.

What is effort? Effort is the quality which is inherent in one substance, self, and is volition which is produced by contact of self with mind caused by desire and aversion.

What is gravity? Gravity is the quality which is

inherent in the substances earth and water, and the cause of falling down of one substance.

What is fluidity? Fluidity is the quality which is inherent in the substances earth, water, and fire, and the cause of flowing of one substance.

What is viscidity? Viscidity is the quality which is inherent in the substance water, and the cause of cohering into one substance, like earth, etc.

What is impression? Impression is of two kinds: (1) cause of reminiscence and (2) cause of actions.

The cause of reminiscence is that which is inherent in self, and it is a particular mental impression produced by the impressions of the perceptive and the inferential knowledge of one substance.

The cause of actions is impetus, which is produced by actions arising from impulsion, etc., and has one substance as its substratum, and is possessed by corporeal substances. This sort of impression is (identical with) impetus.

What is merit? Merit is of two kinds: (1) activity and (2) cessation.

Activity is the cause of (bringing about) pleasure in a desirable body, etc., is inherent in self, and destroys one substance by its effect.

Cessation is the cause of (obtaining) delight in perfect cognition, which is free from attachment, is inherent in self, and destroys one substance by its effect.

What is demerit? Demerit is the cause of pain and imperfect cognition, is inherent in self, and destroys one substance by its effect.

What is sound? That which has one (substance) as its substratum and is perceived by the ears is sound.

Section 4.—*Action*

What is the category action? Five actions are called the category action.

What are the five actions? They are: (1) action

throwing upwards, (2) action throwing downwards, (3) action contracting, (4) action expanding, and (5) action going.

What is the action throwing upwards? The action throwing upwards is the cause of the disjunction of the (formerly) conjunct, like atoms, etc., in the direction of upper and lower, in the intermediate directions, and in ether, etc., and has one substance as its substratum.

What is the action throwing downwards? The action throwing downwards is the cause of the conjunction of the disjunct, like atoms, etc., in the direction of upper and lower, in the intermediate directions, and in ether, etc., and has one substance as its substratum.

What is the action contracting? The action contracting abides in large and long substances, has one substance as its substratum, and is the cause of the disjunction in which a thing (regarded as) fixed in the near end connects with the near region separating from the other region.

What is the action expanding? The action expanding abides in large and long substances, has one substance as its substratum, and is the cause of the disjunction in which a thing (regarded as) fixed in the near end disjoins from the near region connecting with the other region.

What is action going? The action going is that which can be inherent in every corporeal substance, has one substance as its substratum, and is the cause of conjunctions and disjunctions (in order).

Section 5.—*Universality*

What is the category universality? The category universality is existence.

What is existence? Existence is that which is inherent in all (things belonging to the following) categories, substance, attribute, and action, perceived by all the sense-organs, and the cause of the recognitions with

respect to substances, attributes, and actions that they are existent.

Section 6.—*Particularity*

What is the category particularity? The category particularity is that which exists in substances only, has one substance as its substratum, and the cause of the intellection of excluding others and determining the one.

Section 7.—*Inherence*

What is the category inherence? The category inherence is that which is the cause of the recognition with respect to the inseparable connection among substances, etc., that (the one) is here (in the other); its reality is one.

Section 8.—*Potentiality*

What is the category potentiality? The category potentiality is that which is inherent in substances, attributes, and actions, and is indispensable for them to produce sometimes co-operatively their own common effect or sometimes independently their own particular effects.

Section 9.—*Non-potentiality*

What is the category non-potentiality? The category non-potentiality is that which is inherent in substances, attributes, and actions, and is indispensable for them in order to produce neither co-operatively another effect nor independently other effects than their own.

Section 10.—*Commonness*

What is the category commonness? The category commonness is that which is substance-ness, attribute-ness, and action-ness, and (also) earth-ness, colour-ness, and throwing-upwards-ness, etc., which are inherent in one thing contained in each of the three categories.

Substance-ness is that which is inherent in every substance, the cause of the notion with respect to every

substance that it is a substance, exists neither in attributes nor in actions, and is perceived by both the eyes and the touch-organ.

Attribute-ness is that which is inherent in every attribute, the cause of the notion with respect to every attribute that it is an attribute, exists neither in substances nor in actions, and is perceived by all the sense-organs.

Action-ness is that which is inherent in every action, the cause of the notion with respect to every action that it is an action, exists neither in substances nor in attributes, and is perceived by both the eyes and the touch-organ.

Earth-ness and so on are defined in like manner.

Section 11.—*Non-existence*

What is the category non-existence? Five non-existences are called the category non-existence.

What are the five non-existences? (1) Antecedent non-existence, (2) subsequent non-existence, (3) reciprocal non-existence, (4) natural non-existence, and (5) absolute non-existence—these are called the five non-existences.

Antecedent non-existence is that in which the cause and accessories for substances, attributes, or actions do not yet combine, and no effect is produced.

Subsequent non-existence is that in which the produced substances, attributes, or actions have been destroyed after the force of their causes had been exhausted or the accessories for their overthrow had been produced.

Reciprocal non-existence is that whereby some substances, etc., are not mutually present in others.

Natural non-existence is that whereby existence, substances, and so on do not yet come either to conjoin with or entirely to abide in one another.

Absolute non-existence is that whereby a thing cannot be produced and be absolutely arisen in the present, the past, and the future, because there is no cause for it.

CHAPTER II

COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE TEN CATEGORIES

Section 1.—*Substance*

1. *Substances Active and Inactive, etc.*

Which of these nine substances are active; which are inactive?

The five substances, earth, water, fire, wind, and mind, are active, while the other four are altogether inactive.

That they are corporeal or are incorporeal, have impetus or have no impetus, possess priority and posteriority, or possess neither priority nor posteriority, is explained as in the case of being active and inactive.

2. *Substances possessing Attributes, etc.*

Which of these nine substances are possessors of attributes; which are not possessors of them?

All the substances without exception are possessors of attributes.

That they are inherent causes, have each substance-ness, have each particularity, are not destroyed by their effects, and are causes which presuppose others, is explained in like manner.

3. *Substances possessing Touch, etc.*

Which of these nine substances possess touch; which do not possess it?

The four substances, earth, water, fire, and wind, possess touch, but the other five do not possess it.

That they are both productive substances and causes of substances, attributes, and actions, or are only causes of either substances, or attributes, or actions (but are not productive substances), is explained in like manner.

4. *Substances possessing Colour, etc.*

Which of these nine substances possess colour; which do not possess it?

The three substances, earth, water, and fire, possess colour, while the other six do not possess it.

That they are visible or are invisible, and are objects of sight or are not objects of sight, is explained in like manner.

5. *Substances Eternal and Non-eternal, etc.*

Of these nine substances five substances (ether, time, space, self, and mind) are eternal. The other four will be discriminated as follows:—

Among these four substances the non-products are eternal, while the products are not eternal.

That they do not inhere in another substance or do inhere in another, do not consist of parts or do consist of parts, are not destroyed by their causes or are sometimes destroyed by them, are ultimate particulars or are not ultimate particulars, and are spherical or are not spherical, is explained as in the case of being eternal and non-eternal.

6, *Substances and Sense-organs*

Of these nine substances five are (material causes of) the sense-organs, and the other four are not (material causes of) the sense-organs.

What are the five? They are earth, water, fire, wind, and ether.

The sense-organ of smell consists of earth, that of taste consists of water, that of sight consists of fire, that of touch consists of wind, and that of hearing consists of ether.

7. *Substances and Attributes*

Among the nine substances by reason of how many attributes is earth called the possessor of attributes? It is by reason of fourteen attributes.

What are the fourteen attributes? They are (1) colour, (2) taste, (3) smell, (4) touch, (5) number, (6) extension, (7) individuality, (8) conjunction, (9) disjunction, (10) priority, (11) posteriority, (12) gravity, (13) fluidity, and (14) impression.

By reason of how many attributes is water called the possessor of attributes? It is by reason of fourteen attributes.

What are the fourteen attributes? They are (1) colour, (2) taste, (3) touch, (4) number, (5) extension, (6) individuality, (7) conjunction, (8) disjunction, (9) priority, (10) posteriority, (11) gravity, (12) fluidity, (13) viscidity, and (14) impression.

By reason of how many attributes is fire called the possessor of attributes? It is by reason of eleven attributes.

What are the eleven attributes? They are (1) colour, (2) touch, (3) number, (4) extension, (5) individuality, (6) conjunction, (7) disjunction, (8) priority, (9) posteriority, (10) viscidity, and (11) impression.

By reason of how many attributes is wind called the possessor of attributes? It is by reason of nine attributes.

What are the nine attributes? They are (1) number, (2) extension, (3) individuality, (4) conjunction, (5) disjunction, (6) priority, (7) posteriority, (8) touch, and (9) impression.

By reason of how many attributes is ether called the possessor of attributes? It is by reason of six attributes.

What are the six attributes? They are (1) number, (2) extension, (3) individuality, (4) conjunction, (5) disjunction, and (6) sound.

By reason of how many attributes is time called the possessor of attributes? It is by reason of five attributes.

What are the five attributes? They are (1) number,

(2) extension, (3) individuality, (4) conjunction, and (5) disjunction.

Space is explained as in the case of time.

By reason of how many attributes is self called the possessor of attributes? It is by reason of fourteen attributes.

What are the fourteen attributes? They are (1) number, (2) extension, (3) individuality, (4) conjunction, (5) disjunction, (6) cognition, (7) pleasure, (8) pain, (9) desire, (10) aversion, (11) effort, (12) merit, (13) demerit, and (14) impression.

By reason of how many attributes is mind called the possessor of attributes? It is by reason of eight attributes.

What are the eight attributes? They are (1) number, (2) extension, (3) individuality, (4) conjunction, (5) disjunction, (6) priority, (7) posteriority, and (8) impression.

Section 2.—*Attribute*

1. *Attributes Perceptible and Imperceptible*

Which of these twenty-four attributes are perceptible; which are imperceptible?

Colour, taste, smell, and touch are either perceptible or imperceptible.

In what conditions are they perceptible? They are perceptible when they abide in large substances and more than one substance.

In what conditions are they imperceptible? They are imperceptible when they abide in atoms and binary atomic compounds.

Sound is altogether perceptible.

Number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity, viscidity, and impetus are discriminated as in the case of colour, taste, smell, and touch.

Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort are perceptible to self.

Merit, demerit, impression (and gravity) are only imperceptible.

2. *Attributes as Products and Non-products*

Which of these attributes are products; which are non-products?

Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, impression, disjunction, priority, posteriority, and sound are only products.

The other attributes are either products or non-products.

Colour, taste, smell, and touch are, if they are possessed by earth, altogether products.

Colour, taste, touch, fluidity, and viscidity, when inherent in (aqueous) atoms, are non-products, and the same attributes, when inherent in binary atomic compounds, are products.

Gravity is explained in like manner.

Colour and touch abiding in fire, and touch abiding in wind, are explained like the attributes of water.

Fluidity abiding in both earth and fire is altogether a product.

Number one (=unity) and single individuality are either products or non-products, according as they abide in produced substances or non-produced substances, and numbers from duality upwards and dual individualities, etc., are altogether products.

Largeness, smallness, shortness, and length are altogether products, but sphericity is always non-product.

Conjunctions of corporeal substances with another corporeal, and those of corporeal substances with another incorporeal substance, are products.

3. *Attributes Eternal and Non-eternal*

Eternality and non-eternality of attributes are explained as in the case of products and non-products.

4. *Varying Perceptibility of Attributes*

Of these attributes sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell are severally perceived by one sense-organ, number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity, viscidity, and impetus are perceived by the sight- and the touch-organ.

5. *Causes of Attributes*

What have these attributes as their causes? (1)

Colour, taste, smell, and touch, which have things of the same class as their causes (are those which) are inherent in binary atomic compounds (etc.). (2)

Those which have conjunction with fire as their cause are the colour, the taste, the smell, and the touch in the atoms belonging to earth, and the fluidity possessed by both earth and fire. (3)

The gravity possessed by both earth and water, and the fluidity and the viscidity possessed by water—these (three), when inherent in binary atomic compounds, etc., have things of the same class as their causes. (4)

Number one (=unity) and single individuality, when inherent in binary atomic compounds, etc., have things of the same class as their causes. The numbers from duality upwards and the individualities in dual individualities have things of both the same class and different classes as their causes. Single individuality has its notion as its cause. (5)

Largeness and length are caused by plurality and have each a kind of aggregation (of atoms) as their cause. Smallness and shortness have (one substance produced by) two (atoms) as their cause. (6)

Conjunction and disjunction have the action of one of the two conjunct things and of the disjunct things, the actions of both, conjunction and disjunction as their causes. (7)

Priority and posteriority have each as their causes (a substance which) occupies the same time, etc., and (upon which) depend the notion of remoteness and nearness. (8)

Cognition is twofold, perception and inference. (9)

Perception is fourfold, (1) doubtful perception, (2) decisive perception, (3) imperfect perception, and (4) perfect perception. (10)

What is the cause of doubtful perception? Doubtful perception is that which is preceded by the perception of properties common to more than one object, has its cause in contact of self with mind caused by the recollection of specific properties of the alternatives, and is the knowledge in deliberation, as "which is this?" (11)

What is the cause of decisive perception? Decisive perception is that which is preceded by doubtful perception, has its cause in contact of self with mind caused by the ascertainment of the specific property of one of the alternatives, and is the knowledge in assertion, as "it is this". (12)

What is the cause of imperfect perception? Imperfect perception is that which is preceded by the perception of properties common to more than one object, has its cause in contact of self with mind caused by taking improperly the specific property of one of the alternatives for that of the other, and is the knowledge in incorrect assertion. (13)

What is the cause of perfect perception? Perfect perception is that which is preceded by the perception of properties common to more than one object, has its cause in contact of self with mind caused by the perception of the specific property of one of the alternatives, and is knowledge without error. (14)

Inference is also classified and explained, as in the case of perception. (15)

Perception is produced in three ways, (1) perception

produced by contact of four (factors), (2) perception produced by contact of three (factors), and (3) perception produced by contact of two (factors). (16)

What is the perception produced by contact of four (factors)? It is the sensory representation. All the perceptions of colour, taste, smell, touch, number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity, viscidity, impetus, which are altogether appreciable (by residing in more than one and coloured substances), and of the actions throwing upwards, etc., abiding in the substances, earth, water, and fire, and of existence, commonness, potentiality, and non-potentiality, with the exception of the potentiality, non-potentiality, and sound-ness which are inherent in sound, have their causes in contact of four (factors), self, sense-organs, mind, and objects. (17)

What is the perception produced by contact of three (factors)? All the perceptions of sound and of objects like potentiality, non-potentiality, sound-ness, and existence which are inherent in sound have their causes in contact of three (factors), self, sense-organ, and mind. (18)

What is the perception produced by contact of two (factors)? All the cognitions of the objects like pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort, and of the objects like potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness, and existence which are inherent in these (five) attributes, have their causes in contact of two (factors), self and mind. (19)

Inference is that which is preceded by the knowledge of one of two things inherent in the same substance, and of a thing contradictory to the other, and has its cause in contact of self with mind, taking place in consequence of the recollection of the connections between them. (20)

Pleasure and pain have their causes in contact of the four (factors), the three, and the two, caused by merit and demerit. (21)

Desire and aversion have their causes in contact of

self with mind caused by pleasure, pain, reminiscence, and imperfect perception. (22)

Effort has its cause in contact of self with mind caused by desire and aversion, in the instinct to live, because there is as yet no desire, and in actions like breathing in and out, etc. (23)

What is the cause of impetus? Its cause is the impetus of the actions arising from impulsion. (24)

Merit and demerit are preceded by desire and aversion, and have their causes in contact of self with mind, caused by hearing and reflecting on, or by disregarding the fact that merit and demerit (severally) bring about a pure or impure state in the future life. (25)

Impression, i.e. the cause of reminiscence, has its cause in contact of self with mind caused by the impression of perceptive and inferential knowledge. (26)

Sound has a threefold origin, as (1) sound originated by conjunction, (2) sound originated by disjunction, and (3) sound originated by sound. (27)

Sound originated by conjunction has its cause in the conjunction of substances possessing touch, in (a region of) ether accompanied by impetus, which causes the conjunction of the substances. (28)

Sound originated by disjunction has its cause in the disjunction of substances possessing touch, in (a region of) ether accompanied by impetus, which causes the disjunction of the substances. (29)

Sound originated by sound has its cause in the sound in an empty region accompanied by impetus causing the conjunction and disjunction of substances possessing touch. (30)

6. *Attributes abiding in one Substance, etc.*

Which of these twenty-four attributes have one substance as their substratum? Which have more than one substance as their substratum?

Colour, taste, smell, touch, extension, priority, posteriority, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, impression, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, impetus, and sound—these twenty-one attributes have one substance as their substratum.

Conjunction and disjunction have two substances as their substratum.

Numbers have either one substance or more than one substance as their substratum.

Which has one substance as its substratum? It is number one (= unity).

Which have more than one substance as their substratum? They are the numbers from duality upwards.

As for individuality, it is explained as in the case of number.

7. *Attributes pervading, or not, their Substrata*

Which of these twenty-four attributes pervade their substrata; which do not pervade them?

Colour, taste, smell, touch, number, extension, individuality, priority, posteriority, fluidity, viscidity, gravity, and impetus pervade their substrata.

The other attributes do not pervade their substrata.

8. *Attributes destroyed by their Effects, etc.*

Which of these twenty-four attributes are destroyed by their effects, by their causes, or by both? (1)

Sounds originated by conjunction and disjunction and all sounds which originate other sounds are destroyed by their (respective) effects. (2)

Merit is destroyed by its effects, i.e. pleasure and perfect cognition. (3)

Demerit is destroyed by its effects, i.e. pain and imperfect cognition. (4)

All cognitions are destroyed by their (respective) effects, i.e. impressions. (5)

Each special cognition is destroyed by its effects, i.e. the impression of all other cognitions. (6)

The last produced sound is destroyed by all its causes. (7)

The last produced attributes of self are also destroyed by their causes. (8)

Pleasure and pain are destroyed by their (respective) effects, i.e. desire and aversion. (9)

Merit and demerit are destroyed by their (respective) causes. (10)

Desire and aversion are destroyed by their effect, i.e. effort. (11)

Pleasure and pain are destroyed by their (respective) causes. (12)

Intermediately produced sounds are explained as above (i.e. are destroyed by their causes and effects). (13)

Effort and pain, which are the attributes of self, are, when they conjoin with the substances possessing touch, not in the relation of destroyer and destroyed, as effect or as cause. (14)

Impression, i.e. the cause of reminiscence, which is an attribute of self, and pain are not in the relation of destroyer and destroyed as cause or as effect. (15)

Impression, i.e. the cause of reminiscence, is destroyed by its effects. (16)

Impression, i.e. the cause of actions, when it conjoins with substances possessing touch, is not destroyed by its effects. (17)

The numbers from duality upwards are not opposed to their effects, i.e. the notions of duality, etc. (18)

Individualities in dual individualities, etc., priority, and posteriority are explained as in the case of the numbers, duality, etc. (19)

Colour, taste, smell, and touch inherent in atoms belonging to earth, and the conjunction of these (four attributes) with fire, are not in the relation of destroyer and destroyed as effects or as cause. (20)

Conjunction and disjunction are not mutually (in the relation of) cause and effect, but they are opposed to each other. (21)

The colour, etc., in the atoms of a substance, which produce the colour, etc., of binary atomic compounds of the same class, are not destroyed by their effects, because they are effects of the same class. (22)

The last produced effects, i.e. the colour, etc., of substances consisting of parts, are not destroyed by their causes, i.e. colour, etc., because they are of the same class. (23)

All the intermediately produced colour, etc., of substances consisting of parts are not destroyed by their effects and causes of the same class, i.e. colour, etc. (24)

Colour, etc., in a substance are commonly not (in the relation of) effect and cause, and are not opposed to one another. (25)

Every attribute is not opposed to its substance. (26)

9. *Attributes inhering in Substances, etc.*

Which of these twenty-four attributes inhere in substances; which do not inhere in substances?

Every attribute inheres in substance.

That they are altogether without attributes, are inactive, are non-inherent causes, are the signs of the substances possessing the attributes, are incorporeal, and do not consist of parts, is explained in like manner.

Section 3.—*Action*

1. *Actions inhering in Substances, etc.*

Which of these five actions inhere in substances; which do not inhere in them?

All inhere in substances.

That they have each one substance as their substratum, are incorporeal, are without attributes, do not consist of parts, are the (absolute) causes of disjunction and conjunction, are productive and products, are non-aggregates,

are the signs of substance, are causes of impression produced by impulsions, etc., and have causes of different classes, is explained in like manner.

2. *Actions having Substances as their Substrata*

Which substances have these five actions respectively as being their substrata ?

The action throwing upwards has its substrata in all of earth, water, fire, wind, and in mind.

The actions throwing downwards and going are explained as in the case of the action throwing upwards.

The action contracting has its substrata in large and long substances, which are effects of a particular arrangement of very loosely connected parts.

The action expanding is explained as in the case of the action contracting.

3. *Actions pervading their Substrata*

Which of these five actions pervade their substrata ; which do not pervade them ?

All these actions pervade their substrata.

Some say that actions abiding in atoms and mind pervade their substrata, while those abiding in binary atomic compounds, etc., do not pervade their substrata.

4. *Actions in Body, etc.*

Of these five the actions existing inside (of a body) have as their inherent cause the body and its organs, i.e., the four sense-organs of smell, taste, touch, and sight, and mind. (1)

The first action in the body is preceded by desire, and has conjunction with, and effort of, self as its non-inherent causes. (2)

The second action and so forth have (in order) the impression (of their last action) as their non-inherent cause. (3)

Actions residing in mind and in the parts (of the body) are explained like the actions in the body. (4)

The first actions in the nose, the tongue, the skin, and the eyes have conjunction with self and that of effort (of self) with the body as their non-inherent causes. (5)

The second action and so forth have (in order) the impression (of their last action) as their non-inherent cause. (6)

The actions in pestles and staffs, etc., and in a garland, a necklace, and perfume, etc., which belong to the body, are explained like the actions in the nose, etc. (7)

The first action of the falling down of a sleeper's body has gravity as its non-inherent cause. (8)

The second action and so forth have (in order) gravity and the impression (of their last action) as their non-inherent causes. (9)

The actions of breathing in and out, or the first action, of sleepers are, because there is as yet no desire, preceded by the instinct to live, and have their non-inherent cause in conjunction of effort with self. (10)

The second action and so forth have (in order) the impression (of their last action) as their non-inherent cause. (11)

The first action of the running down of water has fluidity as its non-inherent cause. (12)

The second action and so on have (in order) fluidity and the impression (of their last action) as their non-inherent causes. (13)

The first actions of the upward flaming of fire and of the sideward blowing of wind have conjunction of merit and demerit with self as their non-inherent cause. (14)

The second action and so forth are as above explained. (15)

The first action of the causes producing bodies from atoms of the four elements has conjunction of merit and demerit with self as its non-inherent cause. (16)

The second action and so on are as explained above. (17)

Actions causing change in trees, etc., and those residing in binary atomic compounds, etc., are as explained in the case of actions producing bodies. (18)

The first action of the inclination and repugnance in mind has conjunction of merit and demerit with self as its non-inherent cause. (19)

The second action and so forth are as explained above. (20)

The first action of the actions in the (present) world, which represent the ripening of the happy and the unhappy effects of creatures, has conjunction of merit and demerit with self as its non-inherent cause. (21)

The second action and so on are as explained above. (22)

The actions in earth, water, and fire resulting from impulsion, impact, and (conjunction with) the conjunct have conjunction, gravity, fluidity, effort, and impetus as their non-inherent causes. (23)

These can be any of the actions throwing upwards and so on according to the circumstances (or their substrata). If they are in fire, gravity is omitted; if in wind, fluidity is omitted; and if in mind, impulsion and impact are omitted. (24)

Section 4.—*Existence*

Is the before-mentioned existence a product or non-product?

Existence is certainly non-product.

That it is eternal, is without attributes in itself, is inactive, and does not consist of parts, is explained as above.

Existence possesses (i.e. exists in) substances, attributes, and actions; it is something inherent in these (three) categories, with the exception of universality, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness, and particularity, and is one; it is the cause of the general notion (with respect to the first three categories) that they are existent and an independent entity.

Section 5.—*Particularity*

Particularity exists in substances, has one substance as its substratum, is the cause of the intellection of excluding others and determining the one, exists in ether, space, and time, is the cause of the notion with respect to ether, etc. (that that is ether, space, or time), and is eternal, non-product, is without attributes and inactive, does not consist of parts, is something inherent in the category (substance), with the exception of existence, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness, and particularity, and is more than one.

Section 6.—*Inherence*

Inherence is only one, eternal, and non-product; it does not consist of parts; it is incorporeal, and the cause of being inherent of all substances, attributes, actions, universality, particularities, potentiality, non-potentiality, and commonness; it has for mark the recognition (of its existence).

Sections 7–8.—*Potentiality and Non-potentiality*

Is the before-mentioned potentiality a product or non-product?

Potentiality is certainly non-product.

That it is eternal, without attributes, inactive, does not consist of parts, and is incorporeal, is explained in like manner.

Potentiality is different according as it resides in substances, attributes, or actions; it is something inherent in the categories, with the exception of universality, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness, and particularity; it is more than one, and is also the cause of the notions (with respect to the categories that they are potential).

Non-potentiality is explained by the analogy of potentiality.

Section 9.—*Commonness*

Commonness as substance-ness pervades the category substance; it is something inherent in substances, it is one and incorporeal, it does not consist of parts, it is inactive, without attributes, eternal, and non-product; it inheres commonly in all the substances, but it is different from the commonnesses in attributes and actions.

Commonness as attribute-ness, as action-ness, or as earth-ness is explained as in the case of commonness as substance-ness.

Section 10.—*Non-existence*

1. *Non-existences Eternal and Non-eternal*

Which of these five non-existences are eternal; which are non-eternal?

Antecedent non-existence is non-eternal, because it is opposed to the products of substances, attributes, and actions.

Subsequent non-existence, reciprocal non-existence, and absolute non-existence are altogether eternal, because they are not destroyed by substances, etc.

Natural non-existence is either eternal or non-eternal.

In what case is natural non-existence eternal?

The substances earth, etc., are not in the inherence relation to other attributes (than their own).

Universality - particularity (i.e. commonness), like substance-ness, etc., potentiality, non-potentiality, and particularity, does not inhere in substrata other than its own (respective).

Existence does not inhere in universality, etc.

In what case is natural non-existence non-eternal?

There is the case where a substance does not conjoin with other substances, but will certainly conjoin with them afterwards. (Before the conjunction takes place) the former does not exist in the latter.

Or before a substance comes to conjoin with another substance and makes the attributes and actions thereof inherent in itself, the latter do not exist in the former.

2. *Non-existences Perceptible and Imperceptible*

Which of these five non-existences are objects of perception; which are not objects of it?

All the five non-existences are not objects of perception.

On the other hand, even those which exist without being supported by other things are altogether objects of inference.

Section 11.—*Conclusion*

Which of these ten categories are knowable; which are not knowable?

All are knowable and also causes of their recognitions.

DASAPADARTHI

NOTES

Chapter I (pp. 93–101)

Section 1.—*Ten Categories* (p. 93)

The term *padārtha* (category) has been etymologically rendered into Chinese. The translation is literally "the meaning or object of a word".[1] Kwhēi-ci explains, *pada* means a footstep. Just as a man seeks an elephant by tracing his footsteps, we understand the meaning by *pada*, because *pada* is the footstep of the meaning. "Word" was used by earlier translators as the translation of *pada*, and accepted by the present translator (Yuan Chwang).[2]

In *V.S.* the term *pada* is not met with, and the exact meaning of *padārtha* is not explained. *Artha* (object) in *V.S.* has not an abstract meaning, but it is the designation of substances, attributes, and actions.[3] It means, therefore, a thing which exists as an entity in the objective and the subjective world. And *pada* corresponds to *śabda* in *V.S.* But *śabda* in *V.S.* has three meanings, sound and voice, word, and concept.[4] Word and concept are treated as the same, and letters which represent them are also considered as the same. Every concept has a corresponding object, because the origin of a concept is in the object. But the concept and the object are entirely independent of each other, so that there is no connection between them. That the existence of the object can be inferred from the concept is, therefore, conventional (*sāmayika*),[5] though it is always valid.

[1] Cf. Max Müller, "Bedeutung, Ziel oder Gegenstand (*artha*) eines Wortes (*pada*)": ZDMG, vi (1852), p. 11.

[2] Cf. *Tarka-dīpikā*, p. 2, Athalye's notes, p. 73; *N.S.*, 2, 2, 60.

[3] 8, 2, 3.

[4] 8, 1, 25–27; 2, 2, 21–37; 7, 2, 14–20

[5] See *N.S.* 2, 1, 5, 5 (*na; sāmayikāc chabda-artha-sampratyayasya*).

This doctrine results from the fundamental characteristic of the system. The system is a realism, or rather a naive realism in the epistemological and the metaphysical sense of the term. For the system the objective and the subjective world have equally a real existence. This cannot admit of doubt, and the idealistic critics of the objective world or subjective cognition are not at all known to the author of *V.S.* As a matter of fact, the existence of the concept of an object, subjective as well as objective, is the logical reason for and the real consequence of the existence of the object. The meaning of the term *padārtha* is understood from this standpoint. The six categories, as corresponding to the concepts, have each their reality; but the classification into six has its ground in our concepts. That is to say, the distinctions in our concepts have been extended or projected into the objects.

The starting-point of the system is the observation of objects, and an object is analysed principally into three categories. An object itself is called substance (*dravya*); its quality, quantity, and so on are called attributes (*guṇa*), and its activity is actions (*karman*). Substance is thus defined, "the definition of substance is that it is possessed of actions and attributes, and is an inherent cause";[1] attribute thus, "that it has substance as a substratum, is without attributes and is not a cause of conjunctions and disjunctions being unconnected with them, is the definition of attribute";[2] and action thus, "that it abides in one substance, is without attributes, and is the absolute cause of conjunctions and disjunctions, is the definition of action."[3] Substances may be defined

[1] Gough's translation, a little modified. *V.S.* 1, 1, 15, "Kriyā-guṇa-vat samavāyi-kāraṇam iti dravya-lakṣaṇam."

[2] *V.S.* 1, 1, 16, "Dravya-āśrayy aguṇa-vān saṁyoga-vibhāgeṣv-akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇa-lakṣaṇam."

[3] *V.S.* 1, 1, 17, "Eka-dravyam aguṇaṁ saṁyoga-vibhāgeṣv-anapekṣa-kāraṇam iti karma-lakṣaṇam."

simply as entities which possess attributes and actions. Attributes and actions, as such, are the forms of appearance, and the modes of activity, of the substances. Consequently they have no attributes and no activity in themselves.

As existing in an object, these three categories must have an inseparable relation, however independent of one another, because the analysis into the three categories depends upon the observation, or the concept, of the concrete object, and consequently the three categories are always in unity. The relation is called inherence (*samavāya*), which is also an entity.

On the other hand, the concrete object has relations to other objects of the same class and its whole class at the same time. Accordingly the object can be a genus and a species (and an individual). In this relation universality (*sāmānya*) and particularity (*viśeṣa*) (and the ultimate particulars, or the final species, *antya-viśeṣa*) are established. These two categories are likewise independent categories.

The latter three categories are secondary, as later writers call them, including the seventh category, non-existence, *upādhi*, and evidently show that the six categories are established for the explanation of an object, and that the establishment of them is founded on the concepts.

The six categories are enumerated in *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.* But our treatise widely differs from them in this respect, and acknowledges ten categories, that is, potentiality (*śakti*), non-potentiality (*aśakti*), commonness (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*), and non-existence (*abhāva*) added to the six.

In the *Nyāya-kandalī*, a commentary on *Pr. Bh.*, Śrīdhara rejects *śakti*, *sādṛśya* (resemblance or similarity), and *abhāva* as categories,[1] while Udayana, commenting on *Pr. Bh.*, accepts *abhāva* as a seventh

[1] pp. 7. 15. 144. 145.

category, and rejects *śakti*, *saṁkhyā* (number), and *sādṛśya* as categories.[1] Also Śivāditya in his *Sapta-padārthī* acknowledges *abhāva* and rejects *śakti* and *sādṛśya*, etc.[2] Our treatise appears not to have been known to these authors; they oppose some Mīmāṁsakas.

The Mīmāṁsā and the Vaiśeṣika, as stated above, have a close relation to, and have been influenced by, each other. There were at least four commentaries on *M.S.* before the time of Śabara-svāmin, who seems to have lived in the fourth century. The commentaries are by Bhartṛ-mitra, by Bhava-dāsa, by Hari, and by Upavarṣa.[3] After Śabara-svāmin, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhā-kara were the two most eminent Mīmāṁsakas, and the Bhāṭṭa and the Guru schools were founded by them. Still, neither of them were the first pioneers in their theories, and they are certainly later than the author of our treatise, because Kumārila Bhaṭṭa lived after, or was a contemporary of, Dharma-kīrti, and Prabhā-kara was once a disciple of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa may be regarded as a reformer of the Mīmāṁsā in some points, while Prabhā-kara is not a reformer, as usually supposed, but follows the opinions of a certain Vṛtti-kāra, who is not Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, and of Śabara-svāmin.[4]

[1] *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 6, and his *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, pp. 1, 2, 13.

[2] *Sapta-padārthī*, p. 10. Cf. *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, pp. 15–21, *Tarka-dīpikā*, p. 65. For the date of Śivāditya see the editor's Introduction to the work, and A. Winter's remarks on it (ZDMG. liii, pp. 323 f.). Śivāditya lived before Gaṅgeśa-upādhyāya, a famous logician, because the latter quotes a few lines from the work.

[3] Gaṅgā-nātha Jhā, *The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā* (Allahabad, 1911), pp. 6, 7. In this work it is stated that Śabara-svāmin lived 57 B.C., and was the father of king Vikramāditya, Varāha-mitra, and Bhartṛ-hari, according to the tradition held by Paṇḍits. The date 57 B.C. is impossible, because Śabara-svāmin refutes the Śūnya-vāda and the Vijñāna-vāda in his *Bhāṣya* (pp. 8, 9). (Cf. G. Jhā's Introduction to the translation of the *Śloka-vārttika*, Bibl. Ind.) But, if he had been a senior contemporary of the three noted men, he must have lived about the fourth century. Cf. Jacobi's *The Dates of the Sūtras*, quoted in the Introduction.

[4] *Prābhākara School*, pp. 10–13.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa mentions *śakti*, *sādṛśya*, and *abhāva*, not as categories, but as the principles of *pramāṇa*,[1] i.e. *śakti* for *pramāṇa* in general, *sādṛśya* for *upamāna* (analogy), and *abhāva* for *abhāva* (privation, or negation), while in the Prābhākara view *śakti* and *sādṛśya* are two categories beside the others.[2] Consequently it may be inferred that among some earlier Mīmāṁsakas *śakti* and *sādṛśya* were recognized as categories.

The time when these two categories were acknowledged as such is not ascertained, but it may have been, at the latest, about the sixth-seventh century, because one Vṛttikāra, being looked upon by the Prābhākara school as its predecessor, must have been earlier than Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, and Praśasta-pāda seems not to have known such categories. If so, the time is about the same as that of our treatise. In those days the doctrines of the six categories were changed by both the Vaiśeṣikas and the Mīmāṁsakas.

Nevertheless, the author of the treatise appears not to have been influenced by the Mīmāṁsakas, since he does not acknowledge *sādṛśya* as a category, though *śakti* is reckoned as a category. *Śakti* as a category is, in the treatise, derived from *V.S.*, and has no trace of the influence of the Mīmāṁsakas, as stated in the following notes.[3]

As for *abhāva*, Prabhā-kara, differing from Śabarasvāmin, did not accept it even as a *pramāṇa*.[4] But *abhāva* (*asat*) is stated in *V.S.* as a principle of *pramāṇa*, not as a category. *Abhāva* in the treatise is of five

[1] *Śloka-vārttika*, *Codana-sūtra*, śl. 47, and *Anumāna-pariccheda*, śl. 58–69 (English translation, pp. 222 f., 243 f.).

[2] *Prābhākara School*, pp. 89, 90; *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 780.

[3] As for the meaning of *śakti* and *sādṛśya* in the Mīmāṁsā, see the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, pp. 15–21; Max Müller's explanation, ZDMG, vol. vi, 1852, p. 14 (n.); *Prābhākara School*, pp. 89 ff.

[4] Śālika-nātha, a disciple of Prabhā-kara, *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, loc. cit., p. 43; *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* (*Dina-karī*), p. 18.

sorts, and the division into the five sorts is a cross division, which evidently proves that here *abhāva* has been directly derived from *V.S.*

Aśakti is not known to have been recognized as a category by any Mīmāṁsakas or by other followers of the Vaiśeṣika. But if *abhāva* is established as a negative category contrary to the positive categories, substance, attribute, action, and existence, *aśakti* may analogically be recognized as a negative complement to *śakti*.

As for commonness (*sāmānya-viśeṣa*) it has been discussed in the Introduction (pp. 66–72).

The author of the treatise, urged by the thoughts of the time, and following the historical development, established the four categories and well adapted them to the Vaiśeṣika theories.[1]

Section 2.—*Substance* (pp. 93–4)

Earth, Water, Fire, and Wind (p. 93)

The definitions of the four substances exactly correspond to *V.S.* 2, 1, 1–4. The *sūtras*, 2, 1, 1–4, do not describe the substances as atoms, but they mention them as effects, or aggregates. Atoms are discussed in *V.S.* 2, 1, 8–9;

[1] The Vaiśeṣika in Śaṅkara's *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* on 2, 2, 17, exhibits the six categories, and Hari-bhadra, a Jain (the ninth century, ZDMG. xl, p. 103), also mentions the six categories in his *Loka-tattva-nirṇaya* (Giorn. d. Soc. Asia. italiana, 1905, p. 279). It seems that the system still in the seventh-ninth centuries held to the six categories. But Śivāditya and Udayana accepted the seventh category, and the *Pramāṇa-mañjarī* by Sarva-deva (*Tārkika-cakra-cūḍāmaṇi*) holds the seven categories. A manuscript of the work is dated in the eleventh century (Bendall's *Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the British Museum*, p. 138, No. 335; *Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. in the India Office*, p. 666, No. 2075, Bühler's *Reports*, Kasmir, p. xxvi). The seventh category appears to have been acknowledged by the Vaiśeṣika in the tenth century, and the treatise did not influence later Vaiśeṣika works. But even after the tenth century the *Tarka-bhāṣā* (the thirteenth-fourteenth century), the *Padārtha-khaṇḍana* by Śiro-maṇi (the sixteenth century), etc., represent the six categories (*Catalogue of Sanskrit MSS. of the India Office*, p. 670, Nos. 2093-7, No. 2128).

4, 1, 1–5; 4, 2, 4; 5, 2, 13; 7, 1, 18–21; and 2, 2, 1–5; 7, 1, 2–14; 1, 2, 1–2. The atomic theory in these *sūtras* may be summarized as follows:—

The proof of the existence of atoms depends upon reasoning from effects to causes, and it is from substances as effects to the same as causes, from attributes to their substrata, and from imperfect cognition to perfect cognition.

Substances as effects (*kārya-dravya*)[1] are always transitory; but according to the general idea of the system the transitoriness of substances must presuppose their eternity, and the concept of transitoriness depends upon that of eternity, just as imperfect cognition is possible by presupposing perfect cognition. Hence, at the base of transitory substances there are necessarily eternal substances, i.e. real and never produced entities.

And more: attributes are, in their nature, possessed by substances. Some attributes reside in the same substance as effects, while others abide in many substances as effects. By comparing such substances with one another, the definite attribute is inductively known to be extrinsic, or to be intrinsic, to the definite substance. Such an intrinsic attribute must have its eternal substratum, because without an attribute as cause there cannot be any attributes as effects.

All misunderstanding and negation of eternal substances, being due to the existence and the real nature thereof, or misconceptions regarding the final base of the world, lead to the establishment of such substances.[2]

Such eternal substances are of four sorts, i.e. earth, water, fire, and wind, and called *aṇu* (atom), not *paramāṇu* as they are termed in *Pr. Bh.* and our treatise, and in later Vaiśeṣika works.[3] In *N.S.* 4, 2, 17–25, and later Vaiśeṣika

[1] The term is taken from *N.S.* 4, 2, 20. *V.S.* does not use the term.
[2] Cf. 7, 2, 4–6, and notes on ch. i, 3, 5 (number) and 7 (individuality).
[3] Even in *N.S.* *paramāṇu* is not used

works,[1] the existence of atoms is proved by analysis; that is, there must be a final limit or end of analysis, otherwise analysis is endless (*anavasthā*, regressus ad infinitum), and everything must have the same quantity of atoms and consequently the same size. This mode of proof is not known to *V.S.*

Among the four atoms[2] terrene atoms have smell, aqueous atoms have taste, igneous atoms have colour, and aerial atoms have touch as their natural attributes. And to aqueous atoms cold is also intrinsic, and to igneous atoms heat. All these attributes in atoms are eternal.

The four atoms are active and productive; but their first action is caused by *adṛṣṭa* (unseen force, destiny). They are the bases of extension (*parimāṇa*), number (*saṁkhyā*), and individuality (*pṛthaktva*). The extension of them is called *pārimaṇḍalya* (sphericity), contrary to extended things. The meaning of *pārimaṇḍalya* may be understood by comparison with the geometrical point in the strict sense of the term. Consequently they are not non-extensive, but they have no perceptible extensions; they are single entities.

These atoms conjoin with other atoms and produce compound things as their effects. The theory of production in the Vaiśeṣika is not production in the ordinary sense, but aggregation, or combination of materials. For convenience sake the term production will sometimes be used.

The process of the combination of atoms is not clearly stated in *V.S.* But the author of *V.S.* is probably of the following opinion. First, two atoms conjoin together and produce effects. Then the effects conjoin with another atom and produce effects and so on. *Pr. Bh.* calls an

[1] *Nyāya-kandalī*, p. 31; *Upaskāra*, on 1, 2, 6; 4, 1, 2. The *Vṛtti* also uses this mode of proof.

[2] Cf. *Pr. Bh.* "bhūta- (i.e. pṛthivyādīnāṁ pañcānām, *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 37) -ātmanāṁ vaiśeṣika-guṇavattvaṁ" (p. 24); cf. notes on ch. ii, 1, 7.

effect of two atoms *dvyaṇuka* (a binary atomic compound), and an effect of three atoms *tryaṇuka* (a ternary atomic compound), and so on. The Chinese translator of the treatise seems to have given a traditional explanation of the process to his disciple, Kwhēi-ci. This is preserved in the commentaries of the latter. The following is an extract from Kwhēi-ci's commentary on No. 1240[1]:—

"Earth, water, fire, and wind are the atoms. Even at the time of *pralaya* or *saṁhāra* (dissolution of the world) they never yield to complete destruction and exist here and there. They can neither be produced nor be destroyed; they have eternal reality. Atoms are plural in number, even among the atoms of the same class.

"At the time of *sarga* or *sṛṣṭi* (creation of the world) two atoms conjoin together and bring about products.[2] The products have each exactly the same quantity as the original two atoms[3] (i.e., the production is nothing but the aggregation or combination of the two atoms; there is nothing newly created and added), but they have each one mass (because the two atoms make one) and are non-eternal, because they have been produced by the atoms. Every product which in this way has been made from the two separate atoms conjoins with another original (atom), and makes a ternary atom. These ternary atoms conjoin with other ternary atoms and produce products (which are called the seventh). The quantity of the seventh (product) is the same as that of the original six atoms. (Thus the seventh product conjoins with another atom and produces the

[1] The commentary is on the *Vijñapti-mātratā-viṁśaka-śāstra* of Vasu-bandhu, and is preserved in the *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 83, bk. ii, pp. 139*b*–173*b*. The extract is from pp. 154*b*–155*a*. Almost the same explanation is found in his commentaries on Nos. 1197, 1216.

[2] The original two atoms are called "father- and mother-atom", and the product is called "son-atom". The terms are apt to lead to misunderstanding of the process.

[3] Dharma-pāla also mentions this characteristic, No. 1197, p. 3*a*; No. 1198, p. 49*a*.

product consisting of seven atoms.) (The products consisting of) seven atoms conjoin with another (product consisting of seven atoms) and produce products, which are called fifteenth atomic products. The quantity of the fifteenth product is exactly the same as that of the original fourteen atoms. In this way the world is produced. The world, being produced from the original two atoms (and so forth), has the same quantity as all atoms." [1]

According to the traditional explanation an atom first conjoins with another atom and produces a product, which is a binary atomic compound (*dvyaṇuka*), and is called the third product. The third product conjoins with another atom and produces a ternary atomic compound. And this ternary atomic compound conjoins with another ternary atomic compound, and produces a seventh product. And so on. Consequently a third product contains two atoms, a seventh contains six, and a fifteenth contains fourteen.

Among later Vaiśeṣikas the process is differently explained. Śrīdhara in his *Nyāya-kandalī* explains that a ternary atomic compound (*tryaṇuka*) is the aggregate of three *dvyaṇukas* (binary atomic compounds), and a quaternary atomic compound (*caturaṇuka*), etc., are also made of four *dvyaṇukas*, etc.[2] He gives the reason why the *dvyaṇuka* must be the direct component of a *tryaṇuka* and a *caturaṇuka*, etc. A single atom and three atoms have no productiveness, and even a *dvyaṇuka* must conjoin with another *dvyaṇuka* to produce any of the things

[1] The passage has been wrongly explained by later commentators. They understand the meaning as follows :—Two atoms conjoin together and produce a product, which is called the third product. The third product conjoins with another third product (but never with another single atom) and produces the product which is called the seventh product. The seventh product conjoins with another seventh product (but never with another third or with another atom) and produces the product which is called the fifteenth product. Consequently the third product must consist of two atoms, the seventh of four, and the fifteenth of eight atoms.

[2] p. 32. The same explanation is found in Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Tarka-kaumudī* (Bombay, 1907), p. 3.

in the world. Bhāva-viveka, a contemporary of Dharma-pāla, sometimes does not give to single atoms the name substances (*dravya*), but two atoms and three atoms are so called.[1] In his case it is not certain whether the three atoms are the aggregate of three *dvyaṇukas* or of three single atoms; but the literal meaning of the Chinese translation evidently favours the latter alternative. That he did not call single atoms substances may be gathered from Śrī-dhara's explanation. If it be so, Śrī-dhara's theory may have originated at an earlier time. But *Pr. Bh.* seems not to have held that opinion. Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* makes a distinction between the theories of Kaṇāda himself and those of his followers,[2] the latter agreeing with *Pr. Bh.* Śaṅkara's statement of the process of combination is that two atoms make a binary atomic compound, and three and four atoms make a ternary and a quaternary atomic compound, and so on.[3] Therefore, Śaṅkara did not know the process mentioned by Śrī-dhara. Also Śrī-dhara's theory is not known to the author of *V.S.*, and even among later Vaiśeṣikas some writers are of the opinion that a *tryaṇuka* consists of three single atoms.[4] Cf. notes on ch. i, 3, 6′ (extension).

The definitions in this section of the treatise must be those of atoms. Accordingly the concepts of atoms here differ from *V.S.* and are similar to the quotations in Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*.[5] If *V.S.* 2, 1, 1–4 are definitions of atoms, the *sūtras* are contradictory to 2, 2, 2–5,[6] because,

[1] No. 1185, pp. 60*a*, 91*b*. [2] On 2, 2, 12. [3] On 2, 2, 11.

[4] e.g. Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa, the author of the *Dina-karī*, according to the *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 314, and the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, p. 69.

[5] On 2, 2, 16. But Śaṅkara adds that earth is gross, water is fine, fire is finer yet, and wind is the finest of all. This is not known to the treatise.

[6] *V.S.* 2, 1, 1–4, "rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-vatī pṛthivī," "rūpa-rasa-sparśa-vatya āpo dravāḥ snigdhāḥ," "tejo rūpa-sparśa-vat," and "sparśavān vāyuḥ"; *V.S.* 2, 2, 2–5, "vyavasthitaḥ pṛthivyāṁ gandhaḥ," "etena-uṣṇatā vyākhyātā," "tejasa uṣṇatā," and "apsu śītatā".

if earth as an atom has colour, taste, smell, and touch as its natural attributes (2, 1, 1), smell cannot be the only logical mark of its existence (2, 2, 2): the other three attributes also claim to be marks. And water, having colour, taste, touch, fluidity, and viscidity (2, 1, 2), and fire, having colour and touch (2, 1, 3), cannot possibly be inferred from cold and heat (2, 2, 4–5). It must not be held that heat and cold are contained in touch, as explained in *Pr. Bh.*;[1] otherwise water and fire must be inferred from touch, just as in the case of wind (2, 1, 9, and 4). Consequently, the proof of the existence of atoms in *V.S.* is to be regarded as under discussion in 2, 1, 8–13 and 2, 2, 1–5.

On the other hand, if earth has colour, taste, smell, and touch, it must be an aggregate of the four atoms. Now, touch is the attribute of wind, and wind is invisible; things conjunct with wind are invisible.[2] The touch in earth is an effect, so that it presupposes another touch as its cause. Were earth as an aggregate a possessor of touch, which does not abide in a terrene atom, the touch would have no cause at all. In like manner the colour and touch in water and the touch in fire cannot be manifested, if the three attributes do not abide in an aqueous and an igneous atom. The atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika is contradictory on this point. As a logical consequence, earth must have colour, taste, smell, and touch as intrinsic attributes; thus water is the possessor of colour, taste, touch (and fluidity, viscidity, and cold); fire of colour, touch (and heat); and wind of touch.[3]

Attributes in atoms are eternal, because the substrata are eternal; and in effects they are transitory.[4] But colour, taste, smell, and touch in terrene atoms can also be transitory. Such are *pāka-ja*.[5]

[1] Especially see p. 106.
[2] 4, 2, 2–3; 8, 2, 4.
[3] Cf. *N.S.* 3, 1, 64.
[4] 7, 1, 2–5; 7, 1, 18–21.
[5] 7, 1, 6–7.

Aggregates are, in *V.S.*, divided into three classes: bodies, sense-organs, and objects.[1] Bodies are of two kinds: *yoni-ja* and *ayoni-ja*, and are the sites of selves. They are sometimes objective and sometimes subjective. Sense-organs are the juxtaposition of self with objects through mind, and are subjective as well as objective. Objects are the world common to all creatures. Others' bodies, sense-organs, and even selves are included in objects. One's own self, together with the body and the sense-organs, are sometimes treated as objective things.[2] In the world there are no things composed of five or three elements. The body is composed of terrene atoms, and the sense-organs are composed respectively of the four atoms. The tripartite division is not strictly logical and rather a cross-division. But it depends upon the epistemological process.

Ether, Time, and Space (p. 93)

In ancient Sanskṛt literature ether (*ākāśa*) means empty space,[3] and is not enumerated among elements. So also in Jainism.[4] But later speculators reckon it as a fifth element. In *V.S.* ether is not treated as an element.

Ether is the substratum of the attribute sound; but it is not like earth, etc., as the substrata of colour, etc., and is not the material cause of the ear, as earth, etc., are the material causes of the other sense-organs. Ether is only one and has not two aspects, as a cause and an effect. It is inactive, like time and space, and all-pervading. It is by no means material, and naturally not subjective. Therefore ether in *V.S.* is held to be nothing other than

[1] 4, 2, 1 f.

[2] 3, 1, 4; 3, 2, 4, etc.

[3] V. A. Sukthankar, *Teachings of the Vedānta according to Rāmānuja*, loc. cit., p. 306 (2). Max Müller also holds the opinion. "Empty space = freier Raum," *Petersb. Wörterb.* s.v.

[4] See the atomic theory of Jainism.

the cosmic vacuum, which contains all objects and gives room for their activities. *Pr. Bh.* and our treatise have different explanations from *V.S.*, but the definition of ether in the treatise comes from *V.S.* 2, 1, 27.

In *V.S.* the proof of the existence of time (*kāla*) runs, "aparasminn aparaṁ yugapat ciraṁ kṣipram iti kāla-liṅgaṁ."[1] *Pr. Bh.* says, "kāla-para-apara-vyatikara-yaugapadya-ayaugapadya-cira-kṣipra-pratyaya-liṅgaṁ."[2] The definition in the treatise comes from the latter.

"The cause of the notions" (p. 93) is literally "the cause of expression and recognition". Kwhĕi-ci paraphrases this definition, "the cause of expression and the cause of recognition." The original Sanskṛt may have been *pratīti-vyavahāra-kāraṇa* or *-hetu* (the cause of recognition and expression). But *Pr. Bh.* has only *pratyaya* (notion). In the system "word" and "concept" have exactly the same meaning and are expressed by the same term (i.e. *śabda*). Consequently, "expression and recognition" may be quite correct as the translation of *pratyaya*; on the other hand, "expression and recognition" may simply be replaced by "notion". The Chinese "expression and recognition" can also be abridged to "notion".

"Cause" is probably not the equivalent of *liṅga* or *lakṣaṇa*, but of *kāraṇa*[3] or *hetu*, because the translator usually distinguishes *liṅga* or *lakṣaṇa* (mark) from *kāraṇa*.[4]

V.S. and *Pr. Bh.* describe the marks of the existence of time, i.e. how time is known, but the treatise describes the nature of time, i.e. what time is. Consequently, *kāraṇa* is more appropriate than *liṅga*.

[1] 2, 2, 6, "The notions of posteriority in relation to posteriority, of simultaneity, of slowness and quickness are marks of the existence of time" (Gough's translation).

[2] p. 63, "Time is that which has the marks (of its existence) in the notions of simultaneity, non-simultaneity, slowness and quickness with respect to prior and posterior (things)."

[3] See *Upaskāra* on 7, 1, 25, where *pratyaya-kāraṇa* is used.

[4] Cf. notes on ch. ii. 7–8.

"Of simultaneity, non-simultaneity, slowness and quickness with respect to that and this (thing)" (p. 93) is literally "of (being) that, this, simultaneous, non-simultaneous, slow and quick"; but "being that and this" must be understood by referring to *para-apara-vyatikara* in *Pr. Bh.*, because in the treatise time has neither priority (that) nor posteriority (this).

Space (*diś*) is proved in *V.S.* as "ita idam iti yatas taddiśyaṁ liṅgaṁ",[1] and in *Pr. Bh.* as "dik pūrva-apara-ādi-pratyaya-liṅgā".[2] "Etc." implies the intermediate divisions of space, S.E., N.W., etc.[3] Our treatise also defines what space is. In all other cases it defines the nature of things.

Time and space, like ether, have each one eternal reality, but their effects are divers.

As for the all-pervading nature of time and space, *V.S.* says, "guṇair dig vyākhyātā" and "kāraṇe kālaḥ".[4] According to *Pr. Bh.* and the treatise the attributes of time and space are only five—number, extension, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction. The enumeration of the attributes agrees with *V.S.*[5]

Now the attributes common to all nine substances are only these five; it is accordingly impossible that the nature of all-pervadingness and inactivity in space is inferred from the five attributes (*guṇa*). Consequently the term *guṇa* in the passage of *V.S.* must have meaning other than the usual one, although it is rare in *V.S.* to ascribe two different meanings to the same term. *V.S.* says "kārya-viśeṣeṇa nānātvaṁ", "āditya-saṁyogād

[1] 2, 2, 10, "The mark pertaining to space is that whence the knowledge arises that one thing is remote or not remote from another."

[2] p. 66, "Space has the notions of the east, the west, and so forth as the marks (of its existence)."

[3] *V.S.* 2, 2, 13-16; 2, 2, 7-9.

[4] 7, 1, 24-5, "By its qualities space is explained (to be all-pervading)," and "Time relates to a cause".

[5] *V.S.* ascribes priority and posteriority to time and space, but not to ether. See notes on ch. ii, 1, 1.

bhūta-pūrvād bhaviṣyato bhūtāc ca prācī", "tathā ca dakṣiṇā pratīcī udīcī ca", and "etena dig-antarālāṇi vyākhyātāni".[1] These *prācī* (east), *dakṣiṇā* (south), *pratīcī* (west), *udīcī* (north), and *dig-antarālāṇi* (the intermediate divisions) may be called *guṇa* (= *upādhi*, limiting adjuncts[2]) of space. As space is all-comprehensive in respect to these *guṇas* which are universally pervasive, space is known to be all-pervading.

"Kāraṇe kālaḥ" undoubtedly relates to "nityeṣv-abhāvād anityeṣu bhāvāt kāraṇe kāla-ākhyeti",[3] and supports the above supposition. Time is applicable to the cause, so that time is also all-pervading.

Time and space are necessarily inactive and can be *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*[4] (non-inherent causes); but in *Pr. Bh.*[5] they are called *nimitta-kāraṇa* (efficient causes). These two substances have the same nature as ether, except that they have diversity in their effects and are non-inherent causes. What is, then, the essential difference between ether and space and time considered as causes? In what sense is it possible that these three substances have individually unity and are all-pervading at the same place and time? *V.S.* cannot satisfactorily answer the question. *Pr. Bh.* and the *Sapta-padārthī* may, as a logical consequence, be justified when they assert: "ākāśa-kāla-diśām eka-ekatvād (i.e. vyakti-bheda-abhāvāt[6])

[1] 2, 2, 13–16, "Its (space's) diversity is (caused to be conceived) by the difference of its effects," "(Space is regarded as) east because of a past, future, or present conjunction of the sun," "So likewise (space is regarded as) south, west and north," and "By this (similarly) the intermediate divisions of space are explained".

[2] See *Sapta-padārthī*, p. 17, which is quoted at the end of this subsection.

[3] 2, 2, 9, "The term *time* is applicable to a cause, inasmuch as it exists not in eternal and exists in not eternal things."

[4] 7, 1, 24–5.

[5] p. 25. See *Bhāṣā-pariccheda*, "evaṁ nyāya-naya-jñais tṛtīyam uktaṁ nimitta-hetutvaṁ" (śl. 17; Röer, *Divisions of the Categories*, Bibl. Ind., pp. 12, 9–10).

[6] The explanation in the *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 105.

apara-jāty-abhāve sati pāribhāṣikyās tisraḥ saṁjñā bhavanti,"[1] and "ākāśa-ādi-trayaṁ tu vastuta ekam eva upādhi-bhedān nānā-bhūtam".[2] If the opinion be acceptable, ether exists as the cause, while time and space are designated from the effects. Consequently time and space in the modern sense are in reality one. At any rate, the inactivity and *asamavāyi-kāraṇatva* of time and space are unsuitable for substances, because activity and *samavāyi-kāraṇatva* are two out of three characteristics of substances. And their five attributes are not special to them. Ether is an inherent cause, and has a special attribute, sound, but it is inactive. Candra-kānta, in his *Bhāṣya* on 1, 1, 15, says that ether is active, as it were, at the time of *ādi-sarga* (the first creation of the world).

But *Pr. Bh.*'s opinion that the three substances are in reality one only shows the way to a logical consequence and has a contradiction in itself, because *Pr. Bh.* ascribes ultimate particularity (*antya-viśeṣa*) to the three. Cf. ch. i, 5; i, 6; i, 9; and ii, 5.

Self (p. 94)

Self (*ātman*), as one of the nine substances, is treated like the other material substances; but it has a great significance and is discussed throughout the third chapter of *V.S.* Some teachers start to prove the existence of self from the propositions "the objects of sense are universally known", and "the universal cognition of the objects of sense is an argument for (the existence of) objects other than the objects of sense".[3] The author of *V.S.* does not approve of this proof and fully discusses the nature

[1] *Pr. Bh.*, p. 58.

[2] *Saptap.*, p. 17. The *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya* has the same opinion, 1, 1, 5; 2, 1, 27; 2, 2, 12; 7, 1, 24.

[3] 3, 1, 1–2, "prasiddhā indriya-arthāḥ," and "indriya-artha-prasiddhir indriya-arthebhyo 'rtha-antarasya hetuḥ". This explanation of the *sūtras* depends upon the *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya*, which is more reliable, especially in the third chapter, than the *Upaskāra* and the *Vivṛti*.

of proof. That the author is so careful in this matter shows that the proof, as well as self, is highly important in the system. The author's very proof of self is "the ascending and descending vital airs (or the breathing out and in), the opening and closing of the eyes, life, motions of mind, affections of the other organs of sense, pleasure and pain, desire and aversion, and effort, are marks of existence of self (prāṇa-apāna-nimeṣa-unmeṣa-jīvana-manogati-indriyāntaravikārāḥ sukha-duḥkha-icchā-dveṣa-prayatnāś ca-ātmano liṅgāni, 3, 2, 4)". These marks have evidently been obtained by comparison of a living with a dead body, and by observation of other persons.[1] The proof is an indirect one and must presuppose one's own self-consciousness, which is entirely intuitive. The author seems to have been aware of this point and discusses it in 3, 2, 6–18, which show that self is essentially self-consciousness and directly proved. That self is self-consciousness in essence is quite natural in the system, because one of the principal tenets is that self is something different from cognition.

It is curious enough to observe that there is in the proof no mention of cognition as one of the attributes of self. But from the *sūtras* 3, 1, 18;[2] 3, 2, 1; 3, 2, 3; 3, 2, 19, etc., self is known to be the possessor of cognition, and the original text used by *Pr. Bh.* must have had it in the *sūtra* 3, 2, 4,[3] and some Chinese translations also enumerate it.

The first half of the marks is by no means an indispensable part. *N.S.* abridges it thus: "icchā-dveṣa-prayatna-sukha-duḥkha-jñānāny-ātmano liṅgaṁ"[4]; but it also uses the first half of the Vaiśeṣika proof in the

[1] Cf. *Śloka-vārttika*, English translation, pp. 398–400 (śl. 92–101).
[2] The *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya's* explanation is reasonable.
[3] p. 70, ll. 12–13, "ātma-liṅga-adhikāre buddhy-ādayaḥ prayatna-antāḥ siddhāḥ." Cf. *N.S.* 2, 1, 23.
[4] 1, 1, 10, *Jñāna* (=*buddhi*) is enumerated.

proof that self is different from the body, the sense-organs, and the mind.[1]

The definition in our treatise is more accurate and better adapted to the system. The addition of impression, merit, and demerit is derived from *Pr. Bh.* But the intuitive nature of self is entirely unknown to the treatise.

"The recognition of an inherent cause (*samavāyi-kāraṇa-pratyaya*)" needs some explanation. *Samavāyi-kāraṇa*, as a technical term, is always used with regard to substances only, except time and space, that is, substances are the *samavāyi-kāraṇas* for attributes and actions. *Samavāyi-kāraṇa* means the cause (*kāraṇa*) of attributes and actions by virtue of inherence (*samavāya*), or the cause (*kāraṇa*) of inherence (*samavāya*) with respect to attributes and actions. Inherence is the intimate and inseparable connection of attributes and actions with substances, and substances are the causes of attributes and actions by virtue of inherence.[2] This causality is spatial and lies within one substance. Consequently *samavāyi-kāraṇa* can be simply replaced by the term substratum for (or the possessor of) attributes and actions. In this relation the substance is always the cause, while attributes and actions are its effects. The whole meaning of the definition is as follows:—

The attributes, cognition, etc., cannot exist apart from a substance, but they always reside in it, that is, they have a substratum, which is their *samavāyi-kāraṇa*. The notion that they must have a substratum leads to the conclusion that the substance exists. This substance is nothing but self. In this sense self is simply called the substratum of cognition, etc. Therefore the existence of self is proved from knowing that there are cognition, etc.

"Etc." in the definition may include *prāṇa*, etc., or

[1] 3, 1, 1–27.

[2] "sva-samaveta-kārya-kāritvaṁ samavāyi-kāraṇam ity-arthaḥ."

may contain "number", and "disjunction", etc., if the commentators are reliable; but in Chinese "etc." is often used to denote the plural number of the things enumerated in what precedes and does not serve to include things other than those enumerated.

Self in *V.S.* is all-pervading and in reality one, but it is manifold according to circumstances, and everyone has one. *Pr. Bh.* calls self *aneka* and *apara-jāti-mat* on the one hand, and *sarva-gata, parama-mahat,* and *sarva-saṁyogi-samāna-deśa* on the other.[1] The treatise is naturally of the same opinion, though the author does not distinctly mention the two sorts. See ch. i, 3, 6 (extension); ch. ii, 1, 5; ii, 2, 5; ii, 2, 8; ii, 3, 4.

Ether and self are immaterial; but the latter is conscious and active. With regard to the nature of self the system is in contrast with the Vedānta and the Sāṁkhya. The latter systems maintain that self is cognition itself (*jñā* and *cit* or *cetanā*) and entirely inactive. In the Vaiśeṣika cognition is an effect of self, and self can recognize other things by means of cognition, so that self may be regarded as the knower (*jñātṛ*).[2] The Vedānta holds that self is one, but manifold in its appearance, while the Sāṁkhya insists upon the manifoldness of self (*puruṣa*) as the fundamental thought of the dualistic system, though some teachers hold that *puruṣa* in reality is one.[3] In these respects *V.S.* agrees with the two systems.

Mind (p. 94)

The definition of mind (*manas*) differs from that of self only in "a non-inherent cause (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*)".

[1] Cf. *Saptap.*, "ātmā tu parama-ātmā kṣetra-jñāś ca-iti, parama-ātmā-īśvara eka eva, kṣetra-jñā asmad-ādayo 'nantā eva" (p. 18). Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī*, "sa (ātmā) dvividhaḥ īśvara-anīśvara-bhedāt, aṅkurādikaṁ sakartṛkaṁ kāryatvād ghaṭavad iti-īśvara-siddhiḥ, dvitīyas tv-ahaṁ-pratyaya-vedyaḥ sa ca nānā vyavasthā-vacanād iti" (p. 7).

[2] Ch. ii, 2, 1; ii, 2, 5 (19).

[3] *Gauḍa-pāda-bhāṣya* on *S.K.* vv. 11, 44 (*paramātman*).

V.S. says, "ātma-indriya-artha-sannikarṣe jñānasya bhāvo 'bhāvaś ca manaso liṅgaṁ";[1] and *Pr. Bh.* proves its existence as "saty-apy-ātma-indriya-artha-sānnidhye jñāna-sukha-ādīnām abhūtvā-utpatti-darśanāt kāraṇa-antaram anumīyate . . ."[2] The present definition can be understood by the help of these two.

Asamavāyi-kāraṇa includes all causal relations other than *samavāyi-kāraṇa,* and is the relation between two attributes or attributes and actions presupposing and affecting their substance, i.e. *samavāyi-kāraṇa.* *V.S.* and the treatise acknowledge only these two sorts of causality; but *Pr. Bh.* and later works add *nimitta-kāraṇa* (the efficient cause). *Asamavāyi-kāraṇa* is usually divided into two sorts: "non-inherent causality is causality inherent in one object connected with the relation of cause and effect; such causality results either from inherence in the same object with the effect (as that of conjunction of self and mind in the particular attributes of self, or of conjunction, disjunction, and sound in sound, or of conjunction of threads in a cloth), or from inherence in the same object with the cause (as that of the colour, etc., of potsherds, etc., in the colour, etc., of a water-pot, etc., or of the colour, etc., of threads in the colour of a cloth); of these the former is called in the terminology of the Vaiśeṣika the lesser, the latter the greater."[3]

[1] 3, 2, 1, "Existence and non-existence of knowledge on contact of self with sense-organs and objects are the mark of the existence of mind."

[2] p. 89, "Even when there is a contact of self with sense-organs and objects, we find that cognition, pleasure, and so forth are not produced, and from this we infer (the necessity of) another cause (for the production of cognition, etc.)."

[3] *Upaskāra* on 10, 2, 3-6; 2, 1, 22; 5, 2, 24. "Asamavāyi-kāraṇatvañ ca kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva-sambandhy-ekārtha-samaveta-kāraṇatvaṁ tac ca kārya-ekārtha-samavāyāt (yathā-ātma-manaḥ-saṁyogasya-ātma-viśeṣa-guṇeṣu saṁyoga-vibhāga-śabdānāṁ śabde tantu-saṁyogasya paṭe) kāraṇa-ekārtha-samavāyād vā (yathā kapālādi-rūpādīnāṁ ghaṭādi-rūpādiṣu tantu-rūpāṇāṁ paṭa-rūpeṣu) tatra-ādyā laghvī dvitīyā mahatī-iti vaiśeṣika-paribhāṣā."

When self is in contact with sense-organs and objects, cognition, etc., sometimes occur and sometimes do not. This irregularity is caused by the presence or absence of another factor in the contact. That is to say, the conjunction of that factor with the other three factors can produce cognition, etc. If cognition, etc., have been produced, that factor is inferred to have been present, and the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* for the production of cognition, etc., has been sufficient. That factor is nothing but mind.

As for the definition of self and mind, some commentators give curious explanations. They explain that self is the cause of cognition, etc., residing in (*samavāya*) self, and recognition, which is known to take place in self, is the mark of the existence of self. And mind is the *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* of cognition, etc., and the mark of mind is also the recognition produced in self. The Chinese translation may allow this reading; but mind as a substance cannot be *asamavāyi-kāraṇa* and recognition as the mark of both substances is an undistributed middle (*anaikāntika*).

Mind, like time and space, has not its own special attributes and is complementary to self, as time and space are to ether. Mind, though a necessary factor in the psychical process, is not at all mental, but entirely physical. Mind is active, and its first action comes from *adṛṣṭa*. There is one mind in every body, and its extension is atomic (*aṇu*).[1] Mind is, in *V.S.*,[2] sometimes called *antaḥ-karaṇa* (the internal organ), and *Pr. Bh.* regards it as one of the sense-organs[3] (*indriya*), which view is not known to our treatise or to *V.S.*

Among the nine substances ether, time, and space are the place and condition for the other substances, and the other substances are divided into two classes, mental and material. The system is, therefore, a dualism and at

[1] Cf. *N.S.* 3, 2, 63.
[2] 9, 1, 13.
[3] p. 186.

the same time a pluralism. The Sāṁkhya is also a dualism and a pluralism. In the Sāṁkhya the material factors are reduced to one *prakṛti*, but the mental are considered as plural. In the Vaiśeṣika the mental factor is in reality one, while the material are always plural. The difference comes from different methods of thinking. The Sāṁkhya advocates the theory of emanation (*pariṇāma*), while the Vaiśeṣika adheres to the theory of aggregation (*ārambha*). For the Sāṁkhya the first cause must be one; but for the Vaiśeṣika the materials of aggregation cannot be simply one. See Professor Garbe, *Sāṁkhya-Philosophie*, pp. 285–90.

Section 3.—*Attribute* (pp. 94–8)

Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch (p. 94)

V.S. enumerates seventeen attributes, while *Pr. Bh.* adds seven others, and so makes up the twenty-four attributes. This number is the standard among later writers. Even the order of the attributes is preserved almost as in the treatise.[1]

V.S. defines attribute in general, but it does not give the special definitions of colour (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*), smell (*gandha*), and touch (*sparśa*). But from many passages colour, etc., are known to be perceived by the eyes, etc.[2] *Pr. Bh.* defines colour, etc., *cakṣur-grāhyaṁ* (that which is perceived by the eyes), etc.[3]

The definitions in the treatise are literally "one dependent, which is perceived by the eyes, is called colour", etc. Dependent (*āśrayin*) in "one dependent" corresponds to "quality" or "attribute". Earlier Chinese translators used the term "dependent" as the translation

[1] The *Tarka-bhāṣā* (p. 78) and the *Tarka-saṁgraha* (p. 5) change the order, while the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, the *Sapta-padārthī*, the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* (*Bhāṣā-pariccheda*) and the *Tarka-kaumudī* have the same order as our treatise.

[2] 2, 1, 1–4; 4, 1, 6–11; 8, 2, 5, 6.

[3] pp. 104–6.

of *guṇa*. "One" does not, according to the commentators, directly qualify "dependent". Consequently, it must be rendered by "the dependent on one", or "dependent having one substance as its substratum". The commentators are quite correct. "One substance" here and in all the following passages means "a particular individual substance", not "a kind of substance, e.g. earth".

"The quality which has one substance (as its substratum)" is not the exclusive condition of the four attributes, because it is applicable to actions and even to some substances too.[1] And "perceived by the eyes", etc., can also be applied to substances and actions. Thus the definitions may be too wide. But "perceived by the tongue or the nose" is exclusive, and accordingly the definitions are allowable.

Number (p. 94)

V.S. remarks "because of occurrence apart from colour, taste, smell, and touch unity (*ekatva*) is a different object"[2] and "numbers from duality (*dvitva*) upwards, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction (are originated by more than one substance)".[3] *Pr. Bh.* defines it "eka-ādi-vyavahāra-hetuḥ saṁkhyā sā punar eka-dravyā ca-aneka-dravyā ca".[4]

It must be noted that number, as an attribute, is inherent in substances only and never in attributes or actions, because attributes and actions are *aguṇa* or *aguṇavat*. But attributes are always dependent upon substances, as the forms of appearance of the latter, and can be numbered one and two, etc. Cf. 8, 1, 4.

That attributes cannot possess an attribute in themselves is an important doctrine of the system. As

[1] *Upaskāra* on 1, 1, 16.

[2] 7, 2, 1, "rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-vyatirekād artha-antaram ekatvam" (yad etad ekatvaṁ nāma saṁkhyā, *Bhāṣya*).

[3] 1, 1, 25, "dvitva-prabhṛtayaḥ saṁkhyāḥ pṛthaktva-saṁyoga-vibhāgāś ca" (aneka-dravya-ārabdhāḥ, *Upaskāra*; dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṁ kāryaṁ sāmānyaṁ, *Bhāṣya*).

[4] p. 111, "Number is the cause of such expressions (or usages) as one and the rest. It inheres in one and more than one substance."

a consequence of the doctrine, concepts (*śabda*) and objects (*artha*) have no relation to each other,[1] and there cannot exist such a thing as unity in all things (*sarva-ekatva*).[2] The latter is probably against the doctrines of the Vedānta and the Sāṁkhya *prakṛti*. Though there is not *sarva-ekatva*, which is an erroneous (*bhrānta*) notion, the existence of secondariness (*bhakti*) presupposes the existence of *ekatva* (unity), because there is no secondariness without unity.

Extension (p. 95)

The definition of extension (*parimāṇa*) is given by *Pr. Bh.* as *māna-vyavahāra-kāraṇa*.[3] *V.S.* discusses extension in 7, 1, 8–25, and divides it into four kinds, large (*mahat*), small (*aṇu*), long (*dīrgha*), and short (*hrasva*).

Extension produced in consequence of *kāraṇa-bahutva* (a plurality of causes) is called large and is perceptible. Perception is possible of things which are large, because the things possess *aneka-dravya* (more than one substance) and *rūpa*. Small is contrary to *kāraṇa-bahutva* and is accordingly imperceptible. In like manner long and short are explained. The four kinds of extension are eternal, when they reside in eternal substances, and are non-eternal, when in non-eternal substances. The extension of atoms is called *parimaṇḍala* (sphericity), which is naturally always eternal. Ether and self together with time and space are (absolutely) large, because they are all-pervading (*vibhu*). Mind is small (*aṇu*). Sphericity and (absolutely) large are the two extremes, but they are not excluded from small and large.[4] Sphericity is a part of small, and (absolutely) large is a part of large. Between them there are many relative extensions, and these

[1] 7, 2, 14–20.
[2] 7, 2, 5–6.
[3] p. 130, "The cause of the usages of measure."
[4] See notes on ch. ii, 2, 1.

relative extensions are determined by the existence of particularity (*viśeṣa-bhāva*) and the non-existence of particularity (*viśeṣa-abhāva*), in things which exist at the same time.

Pr. Bh. precisely explains extension. Both small and large are of two kinds, eternal and non-eternal. Eternal smallness (*nitya-aṇutva*) exists in atoms (*paramāṇu*) and mind. These two are called spherical (*pārimaṇḍalya*). Non-eternal smallness is in binary atomic compounds (*dvyaṇuka*). Eternal largeness (*nitya-mahattva*) is in ether, time, space, and self, and is called absolutely large (*parama - mahat*). Non-eternal largeness is in from ternary atomic compounds (*tryaṇuka*) upwards. There are also relative extensions.[1]

The definitions in the treatise are derived from *Pr. Bh.*, but they differ therefrom in some aspects. The treatise explains the five kinds of extension. "Etc." (l. 2) includes the intermediate extensions and corresponds to the relative extensions.

Smallness (*aṇutva*) resides in binary atomic compounds, i.e. binary atomic compounds are the *samavāyi-kāraṇa* of smallness. The binary atomic compound is the aggregation of two atoms, and its quantity is the same as the original two atoms. Smallness is the cause of the notions with respect to binary atomic compounds that they are small. Consequently smallness is a real entity in the objective world and corresponds to the concept small in the subjective world.

In *V.S.* the term *aṇu* represents both atoms and the atomic extension; but in *Pr. Bh.* and our treatise *aṇu* is the name of an extension and applicable to binary atomic compounds, not to atoms as such. Atoms are called *parama-aṇu* in the latter. This is a difference between *V.S.*, and *Pr. Bh.* and the treatise. *Pr. Bh.* seems to aim at precision, because *parama-aṇu* as the name of atoms

[1] pp. 130–2.

does not allow the term *aṇu* to be applied to them; their size is called *pārimaṇḍalya,* and ether, etc., are called *parama-mahat* instead of *mahat* in *V.S.* Consequently *aṇu* and *mahat* are only applicable to relative extensions and always non-eternal.

If mind is still called *aṇu,* it must be a binary atomic compound; therefore *Pr. Bh.* calls it *pārimaṇḍalya.* Kwhēi-ci explains that "mind is *aṇu,* corporeal, and as large as a binary atomic compound. But it has no (visible) extension; it is eternal". "As large as a binary atomic compound" is the explanation of "mind is *aṇu*". But if mind is *aṇu,* it cannot be eternal. Kwhēi-ci's explanation involves a confusion and shows the development from *V.S.* to *Pr. Bh.*

Largeness (*mahattva*) is in all things from ternary atomic compounds upwards and does not exist in binary atomic compounds. *V.S.* explains *mahat* by *aneka.* The commentators curiously explain this passage. According to their explanation two atoms conjoin together and produce a product, which is called the third product, and this third product conjoins with another third product and produces a product, which is called the seventh product.[1] The seventh product is the beginning of largeness; accordingly, largeness is the extension of four atoms. Śrīdhara also agrees with the explanation in this connection. "A ternary atomic compound" in the Chinese translation is literally "a product of three atoms"; but this is not consistent with the commentators' explanation. Therefore, the commentators take "a product of three atoms" for "a product of the third atoms". The explanation is too far-fetched. It is quite natural to explain that every atom has no visible extension, while smallness begins with an aggregate of two atoms and largeness with an aggregate of three atoms. There is no reason at all in the treatise for changing this process

[1] See notes on ch. i, 2, 1–4 (earth—wind).

of combination. The commentators base their explanation upon a misunderstanding of Kwhēi-ci's mention of the atomic combination. Śrīdhara's theory is also not correct in this connection. Śaṅkara in his *Bhāṣya* states that atoms have smallness and shortness, and ternary and quaternary atomic compounds have largeness and length. The beginning of largeness and length is from a ternary atomic compound, which is the combination of three single atoms.[1] If a ternary atomic compound is the combination of two binary atomic compounds, i.e. four atoms, there is a gap between smallness and largeness.

Plurality (*bahutva*) in the treatise corresponds to *kāraṇa-bahutva* in *V.S.* and is usually from three upwards. "A kind of aggregation, or a certain aggregation" is literally "aggregation-difference", which evidently shows that the original word was *saṁghāta-viśeṣa* or *saṁhata-viśeṣa*.

Sphericity (*pārimaṇḍalya*) is applied to atoms, ether, time, space, and self; this is different from *V.S.* (*aṇu*) and *Pr. Bh.* (*aṇu* and *manas*). In Chinese "atom" is translated "absolutely minute", which appears to be the equivalent of *parama-aṇu*. *Aṇu* is usually translated "minute object",[2] which is used by Kumāra-jīva and others. "Absolute minuteness" (*parama-aṇutva*) is the atomic extension, while "absolute largeness" (*parama-mahattva*) is possessed by ether, etc. The author of the treatise understands *mahat* of ether, etc., in *V.S.*, or *parama-mahat* in *Pr. Bh.* by *pārimaṇḍalya*, and calls it *sarva-gata*, etc. (= *vibhu*).

The author has failed to mention the extension of mind and has caused different opinions among later commentators. But the treatise asserts that the substances having absolute largeness are only four, and the substances having sphericity are the four atoms as well as the other

[1] On 2, 2, 11.
[2] Some translators use "things contiguous to void".

five substances as causes.[1] Consequently mind is included in sphericity, and is of "absolute minuteness". The author's understanding of ether as sphericity is probably due to its spherical appearance, and the other three substances follow the analogy of ether.

Individuality (p. 95)

Individuality (*pṛthaktva*) is treated like number in *V.S.* and in *Pr. Bh.* The latter defines it as *apoddhāra-vyavahāra-kāraṇa.*[2] The difference between number and individuality is that the former is synthetical, while the latter is analytical; but they depend upon each other. Individuality as an attribute has no individuality in itself. Consequently there is no individuality in two things, just as unity does not exist between two things. By these doctrines the Vaiśeṣika rejects the *sat-kārya-vāda* of the Sāṁkhya and the Vedānta.[3] See *V.S.* 7, 2, 7–8; 7, 2, 13.

Conjunction and Disjunction (pp. 95–6)

The before-mentioned attributes are static, while these two are rather dynamical and are the important factors in the system. *V.S.*[4] does not give exact definitions of them. *Pr. Bh.* defines conjunction *saṁyukta-pratyaya-nimitta*, and *aprāptayoḥ prāptiḥ*, and disjunction *vibhakta-pratyaya-nimitta*, and *prāpti-pūrvikā aprāptiḥ.*[5]

The definitions in the treatise exactly agree with the latter parts of the definitions in *Pr. Bh.* Kwhēi-ci says that conjunction consists in the beginning of the conjunction between two separate things.

[1] Ch. ii, 1, 5.
[2] p. 138, "The cause of the expression of separateness."
[3] Professor Garbe, *Sāṁkhya-Philosophie*, pp. 228–233.
[4] 7, 2, 9–10.
[5] pp. 139, 151, "That which causes the cognition of the conjunct, and the conjoining of two separated things with each other," and "That which causes the cognition of the disjunct, and the separation of formerly conjoined things from each other".

Conjunction is of three sorts, *anyatara-karma-ja*, *ubhaya-karma-ja*, and *saṁyoga-ja*. Kwhēi-ci illustrates the first sort as occurring in the case of beating a drum with a hand, and the second sort in the case of clapping the hands. The definition of the third sort may also be translated "the conjunction produced by conjunction is that in which many inactive substances conjoin with ether, etc., when produced (by the conjunction of the component substances)". Kwhēi-ci explains that "the conjunction produced by conjunction is the conjunction of young shoots, etc., which are inactive, with the substances ether, etc., when they are sprouting". *Pr. Bh.* says, "saṁyogajas tu utpannamātrasya-eva cira-utpannasya vā niṣkriyasya kāraṇa-saṁyogibhir akāraṇaiḥ kāraṇa-akāraṇa-saṁyoga - pūrvakaḥ kārya - akārya-gataḥ saṁyogaḥ."[1] "Ether" in the treatise and Kwhēi-ci's explanation corresponds to *akāraṇa* and *akārya*, and "an inactive thing, which consists of many substances (or many inactive substances)" and "young shoots" to *utpannamātra - eva cira - utpanno vā niṣkriyaḥ*. The whole meaning is that when things, which are in contact with ether, produce another thing by conjunction with other things, a conjunction again takes place between the product and ether.. This last conjunction is the effect of the former conjunction.

Disjunction may be understood by the analogy of conjunction.

Conjunction is possible between separate things; but inherence is the relation between unseparated things, and disjunction takes place after conjunction has taken place. The theories of conjunction and disjunction also support the *asat-kārya-vāda*, which is the necessary consequence of the theory of aggregation and of the analytical observation of the six categories. Causality in the system has, like that in the Sarvāsti-vāda, a wider

[1] p. 139.

meaning than usual. Generally cause and effect do not occupy the same time; but in the system even substances are the causes of their attributes and actions. *V.S.* says, "inasmuch as there is non-existence of unconnectedness, there is no conjunction and disjunction of an effect and its cause."[1] And see 7, 2, 14–20.

Priority and Posteriority (p. 96)

V.S. remarks, "eka-dikkābhyām eka-kālābhyāṁ sannikṛṣṭa-viprakṛṣṭābhyāṁ param aparañ ca" and "kāraṇa-paratvāt kāraṇa-aparatvāt".[2] *Pr. Bh.* defines them, "para-apara-abhidhāna-pratyaya-nimitta,"[3] and divides each of them into two sorts, "dik-kṛta" = "dig-viśeṣa-pratyāyaka" and "kāla-kṛta" = "vayo-bheda-pratyāyaka".[4] They are fully explained.

The definitions in the treatise are derived from these two works and common to both *kāla-kṛta* and *dik-kṛta*, because "occupying the same time, etc." includes in "etc." "the same space". The Chinese translations of *paratva* and *aparatva* are literally "that-ness" and "this-ness" which are applied to both *kāla-kṛta* and *dik-kṛta*.

"The same time, etc.," is literally "one time, etc.", and the translation of *eka-kāla*, etc. Kwhēi-ci explains that "that-ness depends upon the numbers one, two, etc., and upon the substances time, space, etc. That-ness is that on which depends the notion of remoteness. This-ness is explained like that-ness". The explanation keeps too much to the words and fails to be correct.

[1] 7, 2, 13, "yuta-siddhy-abhāvāt kārya-kāraṇayoḥ saṁyoga-vibhāgau na vidyete."

[2] 7, 2, 21–2, "The prior and posterior (are produced) by two objects occupying the same space or time and near and remote," and ("priority and posteriority result) from posteriority of the cause and from priority of the cause".

[3] p. 164, "Those which cause the designation and the recognition of being near and remote."

[4] "Relating to space—causing the ideas of particular directions," and "relating to time—causing the ideas of the diversity of age".

Cognition (p. 97)

Cognition (*buddhi*) is one of the most important factors in the system, because most parts of the system depend on inference. The relation between cognition and objects has been explained. If self as self-consciousness is looked upon as the innermost subject, cognition becomes objective; but, if cognition is subjective, self may be objective, as stated in the proof of self (3, 2, 4).

The definition of cognition is found only in the treatise. Cognition in *V.S.* is divided into two sorts, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). The latter is called *laiṅgika* in *V.S.* These two sorts of cognition are the *pramāṇas*, and the system does not acknowledge other sorts of *pramāṇa* like *śabda*, etc., because *śabda*, etc., are included in inference.[1]

Perception in *V.S.* is of two sorts, *laukika* and *alaukika*. The term *pratyakṣa* is used for the sensory cognitions from the five sense-organs; but it is sometimes used for the visual sensation only,[2] because the visual sensation is typical of the sensory cognitions. In this sense *pratyakṣa* is almost the same as *dṛṣṭa*, *cākṣuṣa*, and *upalabdhi*.[3] In the terminology of *V.S.* the term *upalabdhi* is limited to visual cognition; accordingly *Pr. Bh.* is not correct when it asserts that *buddhi*, *jñāna*, *pratyaya*, and *upalabdhi* are synonymous (*paryāya*).[4] The conditions and possibility of perception of the nine substances, etc., will be fully explained in chapter ii.

Alaukika-pratyakṣa is mentioned in *V.S.* 9, 1, 11–15 and in *Pr. Bh.*, p. 187, but it is omitted in the treatise.

Kwhēi-ci explains that "according to the Vaiśeṣika doctrine the eyes have light, and, when a man faces

[1] 9, 2, 3; *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 213-230.
[2] 2, 1, 16; 8, 1, 2, etc.
[3] 4, 1, 11; cf. 4, 1, 12; 2, 1, 15-16; 4, 1, 6, etc.
[4] p. 171. This is an influence of *N.S.* on *Pr. Bh.* *N.S.* 1, 1, 15 says, "buddhir upalabdhir jñānam ity anarthāntaram."

coloured objects, the light reaches to the colour of the objects and he can perceive it, just as a lamp shines upon things. Sound, smell, and taste come to and touch the sense-organs respectively, and they are perceived. When a bell is sounded in the distance, its sound is heard after a little while. This proves that sound comes to the ear". The explanation is confused with the Nyāya theory; but the other part is perhaps correct.

The cognitions of substances suppose (*apekṣā*) the substance, attributes, and actions, and those of attributes and actions have necessarily the substances as their causes; accordingly, the cognitions of attributes and actions do not suppose attributes and actions; attributes and actions have in themselves no attributes and actions.[1] When we look at a white thing, the cognition of the white thing results from the whiteness of its substratum, and from the cognition of whiteness.[2] Therefore the first impression is only "the white thing" without the distinction between whiteness and a thing. Next the first impression is analysed into the concepts, the attribute, whiteness, and the substance, a thing, and assumes the form, "this thing is white." Between the white thing and its first impression, and between the first impression and the concepts, there are causal relations. This first impression corresponds to *nirvikalpaka-pratyakṣa* (the perception without conception) and the analysed concepts to *savikalpaka-pratyakṣa* (the perception with conception). The latter is called *buddhy-apekṣa* and expressed by the words *ayam* (this), *eṣa* (this), *tvayā kṛta* (done by thee), and *bhojaya enam* (feed him), etc.[3] Though this second sort is the indirect cognition of the immediate experience, it is included in the perception. The first sort of perception is explained in the first section (*āhnika*) of

[1] 8, 1, 7; 8, 1, 4; 8, 1, 8.
[2] 8, 1, 9.
[3] 8, 2, 1.

the eighth chapter (*adhyāya*), while the second sort is in the second section.[1]

Thus all the analysed concepts result from immediate experiences. They are conveyed to fellow-creatures and acknowledged among them as representing definite things. And they are handed down from generation to generation. This is an important theory of the system. In this connection all cognitions are empirical on the one hand, and some of them are innate on the other. But there is no entirely transcendent cognition. Our concepts, which appear to be inborn, presuppose the experiences of former generations. The *Veda*, which is looked upon by the Mīmāṁsā as revelation, comes from the experiences of ancient sages (*ṛṣi*) and is consequently called *buddhi-pūrva*. The authority of the *Veda* is just the same as that of some of our concepts which are authoritative in daily life. And what is stated in the *Veda* has a corresponding entity, just as our concept has it. From the empirical standpoint comes the dogma that, where there is cognition, there is naturally the corresponding entity.

The definition of perception in the treatise is a general one. "The sensory representation" corresponds to the first impression, including the analysed concepts.[2] "Appreciable substances" corresponds to "aneka-dravya-samavāyāt rūpa-viśeṣāc ca (rūpa-upalabdhiḥ)",[3] and is from ternary atomic compounds upwards. "Colour and so on, residing in appreciable substances," is *artha*, one of

[1] In the Nyāya the first stage of perception is regarded as the only perception. *N.S.*, "indriya-artha-sannikarṣa-utpannaṁ jñānam avy-apadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāya-ātmakam pratyakṣam" (1, 1, 4). If perception is *avyapadeśya*, the second sort cannot be a sort of perception. The second sort of perception relates to *upamāna* and *śabda*. And the establishment of *upamāna* and a part of *śabda* depends upon the theory that concepts and the corresponding objects have no connection (2, 1, 55).

[2] See *Pr. Bh.*, p. 186.

[3] *V.S.* 4, 1, 8, "Perception of colour is consequent on inhesion of substances more than one, and on particularity of colour." *N.S.* 3, 1, 36 is exactly the same as this.

the four factors of perception (*artha*, *indriya*, *ātman*, and *manas*), and is explained by the commentators thus: the perception of colour, etc., supposes a substance, but the perception of sound does not suppose it. "Sense-organs and so on" includes self and mind. Cf. *N.S.* 2, 1, 20–5.

Inference takes place when the analysed cognition is active for immediate experiences or other indirect cognitions. Inference is divided into two sorts, usually *laiṅgika* (3, 1, 9–17; 9, 2, 1–5; and 1, 2, 1–2; 2, 1, 8; 2, 1, 24–7; 2, 2, 1) and *ārṣa-siddha-darśana* (9, 2, 13). The latter is mentioned in *Pr. Bh.*,[1] but our treatise does not allude to it.

Pr. Bh. fully discusses inference, but it deviates from *V.S.* and accepts the theory of Dig-nāga. In the treatise inference is of two kinds; the first kind corresponds to 2, 1, 8, and the second to 3, 1, 9–17; 9, 2, 1–5.

V.S. says that "having horns, a hump, a tail hairy at the extremity, and a dewlap is the visible mark of being an ox".[2] This is similar to *upamāna* in *N.S.* with a slight difference. *Upamāna* is defined thus, "analogy is the instrument (in the ascertaining) of that which is to be ascertained through its similarity to something (previously) well known."[3] For instance, a man who has been told that the *gavaya* (*Bos gavæus*) is like a cow, sees an animal like a cow. Having recollected what he had heard, he concludes that "this animal is a *gavaya*". In this case a *gavaya* had not yet been experienced in fact, and exists vaguely in his concept. The reasoning is, therefore, that between two similar things. But in the case of *V.S.* 2, 1, 8 the inferred object is only one, and had been actually known. The reasoning is essentially

[1] pp. 258–9.
[2] 2, 1, 8, "viṣāṇī kakudvān prānte-bāladhiḥ sāsnāvān iti gotve dṛṣṭaṁ liṅgam."
[3] 1, 1, 6, "prasiddha-sādharmyāt sādhya-sādhanam upamānam."

from some parts, which can be seen, to the whole. The process of the reasoning is: first, one sees the characteristic parts, i.e. the mark (*liṅga*), then he recollects the object, which has the parts, and the connection of the parts with the object. The contact of self with mind is naturally present through the process. Finally he concludes that that is the object, although not all the parts of it are perceivable at the time. This reasoning is also applied to that from one thing to another of the same class. The definition is perhaps more appropriate to the latter case.

The second kind of inference is more logical and important. It is the reasoning from one thing (*artha-antara*) to another (*artha-antara*).

V.S. says, " asya idaṁ kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ saṁyogi virodhi samavāyi ca-iti laiṅgikaṁ,"[1] " saṁyogi samavāyy-ekārtha-samavāyi virodhi ca," and "asya idaṁ kārya-kāraṇa-sambandhaś ca avayavād bhavati".[2] *Idaṁ kāryaṁ, kāraṇaṁ*, etc., are the conclusions of the reasoning and technically called "*pratijñā* (thesis)" in *N.S.*, and *asya* indicates " *hetu* (the reason)", which is synonymous with *apadeśa, liṅga, pramāṇa*, and *karaṇa* in *V.S.*[3]

Idaṁ kāryaṁ is reasoning from cause to effect, e.g., " from existence of the cause is existence of the effect," and " from non-existence of cause is non-existence of effect ".[4]

Idaṁ kāraṇaṁ is reasoning from effect to cause, e.g., " the effect of a cause is the mark of the existence

[1] 9, 2, 1, "Inferential cognition is that one thing is the effect or cause of, conjunct with, repugnant to, or inherent in, another." The *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya* remarks, " eka-artha-samavāyi ca-iti ca-arthaḥ."

[2] 3, 1, 9, "The conjunct, the inherent, the inherent in one [and the same] thing, and the contradictory (are means of proof)," and 9, 2, 2, " That one thing belongs to another, the connexion of cause and effect, arises from a portion." Vātsyāyana, commenting on *N.S.* 3, 2, 44, quotes *V.S.* 3, 1, 9, and gives examples for each case. The example of *virodhī* is the quotation of *V.S.* 3, 1, 12.

[3] 9, 2, 4.

[4] 4, 1, 3, "kāraṇa-bhāvāt kārya-bhāvaḥ," and 1, 2, 1, "kāraṇa-abhāvāt kārya-abhāvaḥ."

of the cause," and "an attribute of an effect is observed to be preceded by an attribute of the cause".[1]

Idaṁ saṁyogi and *samavāyi* are reasoning from *saṁyukta* and *samaveta* to *saṁyogin* and *samavāyin*, e.g. (the cognition) of that which possesses conjunction (results from knowledge of the conjunct, e.g.) from a staff; and (the cognition) of that which possesses inhesion (results) from the particular mark.[2]

Idaṁ eka-artha-samavāyi is reasoning from one thing to another, both of which reside in the same substance, e.g. one effect is (a mark of the existence) of another effect.[3]

The before-mentioned five sorts are altogether affirmative and correspond to *Barbara* in the Aristotelian logic.

Idaṁ virodhi is reasoning between two contradictory things. This is explained as "a non-existent contradictory (is a mark) of the existent", "that which is actual (is

[1] 4, 1, 2, "tasya kāryaṁ liṅgaṁ," and 2, 1, 24, "kāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvakaḥ kārya-guṇo dṛṣṭaḥ." See 1, 2, 2, "na tu kārya-abhāvāt kāraṇa-abhāvāḥ."

According to the rule of logic the *sūtra* 4, 1, 3 seems to be contradictory to *sūtras* 1, 2, 1; 1, 2, 2; 2, 1, 24, and 4, 1, 2. The rule tells us, if "kāraṇa-bhāvāt kārya-bhāvaḥ" is correct, only "kārya-abhāvāt kāraṇa-abhāvaḥ" can 'logically be inferred, while "kāraṇa-abhāvāt kārya-abhāvaḥ" and "kārya-bhāvāt kāraṇa-bhāvaḥ (i.e. tasya kāryaṁ liṅgaṁ)" are not logically correct. The reason is that "the necessary relations between the antecedent and the consequence in a hypothetical proposition are only twofold: from affirmation of the antecedent to affirmation of the consequence, and from negation of the consequence to negation of the antecedent. The former is the express meaning of the proposition; accordingly the latter is the only logically possible reasoning. The other two ways, from negation of the antecedent to negation of the consequence, and from affirmation of the consequence to affirmation of the antecedent, are not logically valid". But 4, 1, 3 is stated from the standpoint of fact (i.e. Realgrund), while the other four *sūtras* are from the standpoint of reasoning (i.e. Erkenntnissgrund). In the former case the cause is the first principle in producing effects, but in the latter case the cause is the last principle to be known by us. Consequently they are not contradictory to each other; they are stated from different points of view. Such is an usual case in *V.S.*

[2] 7, 2, 19, "saṁyogino daṇḍāt samavāyino viśeṣāc ca."

[3] 3, 1, 10, "kāryaṁ kārya-antarasya."

a mark) of that which is not actual," and "that which is actual (is a mark of something repugnant) which is actual".[1] And in 2, 1, 25–6; 10, 1, 2–6. This is a negative case and corresponds to *Cesare*.

Idaṁ karyaṁ, etc., are in relation to *asya*; consequently these six sorts represent the cases and conditions of *hetu*.

Idaṁ karyaṁ is the same as the first explanation of *pūrvavat* in the *Nyāya-bhāṣya*; *idaṁ kāraṇaṁ* is the same as the first explanation of *śeṣavat*, and *idaṁ samavāyi* is the same as *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* in the second explanation. *Sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* in the first explanation and *pūrvavat* in the second explanation sometimes agree with *idaṁ kāryaṁ* and *kāraṇaṁ*, and sometimes with *idaṁ samavāyi*.[2] *Idaṁ virodhi* has an equivalent in *N.S.* 1, 1, 35 and 37, while *idaṁ saṁyogi* and *ekārtha-samavāyi* are not clearly stated in *N.S.*

Śeṣavat in the second explanation of Vātsyāyana is a special case of *idaṁ virodhi*. This is used in *V.S.* 2, 1, 25–7 and *N.S.* 3, 2, 42. *Pr. Bh.* uses this mode of proof thrice,[3] but in the latter three works it is named *pariśeṣa*. *V.S.* 2, 2, 1, is also a case of this *śeṣavat*, and is the method of residue in Mill's terminology.

Indian logic in general is not pure reasoning or inference, but is proof and accordingly methodological. In *V.S.* as well as *N.S.* the reasoning is also proof. The proof in the former is more conceptual than in the latter, and seems to be more advanced.

Asya idaṁ karyaṁ, etc., contain two or three important relations. *Idaṁ* is the subject of the *pratijñā* (*dharmin*, *anumeya*, *viśeṣya*), and *kāryaṁ*, etc., are the predicates (*dharma*, *liṅgin*, *vyāpaka*, *viśeṣa*, *gamya*).[4] *Asya* indicate

[1] 3, 1, 11, "virodhy-abhūtaṁ bhūtasya"; 3, 1, 12, "bhūtam abhūtasya"; and 3, 1, 13, "bhūto bhūtasya."

[2] See the Introduction. [3] pp. 58, 69, 288.

[4] *Śloka-vārttika*, *Anumāna-pariccheda*, śl. 2–16.

hetu (*liṅga, vyāpya, gamaka*). The relation between *vyāpya* and *vyāpaka* is called *vyāpti*, and is exhibited in the *udāharaṇa* (or *dṛṣṭānta*). Therefore, *vyāpti* is the condition between the subject and the predicate in the *udāharaṇa* (the major premiss). And *vyāpti* in the case of *idaṁ virodhi* is called *vyatireka-vyāpti*, while that in the other five cases is *anvaya-vyāpti*. These names are given by later writers, but the essence is found in *V.S.*; it seems to be strange to *N.S.*

The relation between *liṅga* and *anumeya* is also not known to *N.S.*, but it is an important factor in Dig-nāga's logic, which is followed by *Pr. Bh.*, Siddha-sena, Kumārila, and Prabhā-kara.[1] This relation is the condition between the subject and the predicate of the *hetu* in the form of a proposition (the minor premiss). There are contained here the essential conditions of *hetu*, i.e. the *tri-rūpa-liṅga* of *hetu*. The *tri-rūpa-liṅga* consists of the relation between *liṅga* and *anumeya*, and of the *anvaya-vyāpti* and the *vyatireka-vyāpti*. See *Pr. Bh.*, p. 200 (a traditional verse) and p. 204.

"Any invisible objects" in the treatise means that the inferred objects are not necessarily seen, and shows that the second sort of inference is more conceptual than the first sort. "The cause of them" corresponds to *idaṁ kāryaṁ*, "the effect of them" to *idaṁ kāraṇaṁ*, "a thing conjunct with them" to *idaṁ saṁyogi*, "a thing inherent in the same object" to *idaṁ ekārtha-samavāyi*, and "a thing contradictory to them" to *idaṁ virodhi*. *Idaṁ samavāyi* is probably included in "a thing inherent in the same object", or is analogically understood by "a thing conjunct with them". Cf. ch. ii, 2, 5 (inference).

[1] See *Nyāyāvatāra* (Calcutta, 1909), *Śloka-vārttika* (*anumāna-pariccheda*), *Śāstra-dīpikā* (Paṇdit, vol. viii, pp. 54 f., 1886), *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā* (Paṇdit, vol. i, pp. 44 f.), *The Prābhākara School* (pp. 42 ff.); cf. *Nyāya-bindu* (the second and the third chapters), *Nyāya-vārttika* (noted in the Introduction).

Kwhēi-ci explains: "the first sort is reasoning in which the major term, i.e. the predicate of the *pratijñā*, is ascertained by seeing an uncontradictory property, e.g. fire is proved by seeing smoke. The second sort is that in which the major term is concluded from seeing a contradictory property, e.g. the breaking of rice-plants is inferred from seeing hail, and hail is proved by seeing the breaking of rice-plants." The explanation probably depends upon ch. ii, 2, 5, but "an uncontradictory property" as the explanation of "a common property" is too wide, and "a contradictory property" is too narrow and cannot properly explain the second sort.

Candra-kānta differently explains the reasoning in *V.S.*, and classifies it under two sorts, *viśeṣato dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*.[1] But the classification is not sufficiently comprehensive.

As for fallacies, *V.S.* mentions them in 3, 1, 15–17 and 3, 1, 1–8,[2] but the treatise does not allude to them.

Pleasure and Pain (p. 97)

V.S. says, "iṣṭa-aniṣṭa-kāraṇa-viśeṣād virodhāc ca mithaḥ sukha-duḥkhayor artha-antara-bhāvaḥ,"[3] and *Pr. Bh.* defines them "anugraha-lakṣaṇaṁ sukhaṁ" and "upaghāta-lakṣaṇaṁ duḥkhaṁ".[4] Pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*) are produced by contact of the four factors, just as in the production of cognition[5]; accordingly, *V.S.* 10, 1, 2–7 proves that pleasure and pain are something different from cognition. Pleasure and pain belong to emotion, while cognition is intellect and effort is volition.

[1] p. 48.

[2] See *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya*.

[3] 10, 1, 1, "Inasmuch as the causes of the desirable and the undesirable are different and opposed, the relation of pleasure and pain is that of reciprocally different objects."

[4] pp. 259–60, "The characteristic of pleasure is satisfaction" and "the characteristic of pain is suffering".

[5] 5, 2, 15.

Desire and Aversion (p. 97)

Desire (*icchā*) and aversion (*dveṣa*) arise from pleasure and pain, and through *adṛṣṭa* or *jāti-viśeṣa* (particularity of race).[1] They are derivative; pleasure and pain are passive, while desire and aversion, caused by pleasure and pain, are active. Consequently, desire and aversion cause transmigration. *Pr. Bh.* defines them, "svārthaṁ parārthaṁ vā 'prāpta-prārthana-icchā" and "prajvalana-ātmako dveṣaḥ, yasmin sati prajvalitam iva-ātmānaṁ manyate sa dveṣaḥ".[2]

Effort (p. 97)

V.S. does not define effort (*prayatna*), but effort is the cause of actions physical and mental. In some cases effort is produced unconsciously. *Pr. Bh.* divides it into two sorts, *jīvana-pūrvaka* (unconscious) and *icchā-dveṣa-pūrvaka* (conscious).[3] Kwhēi-ci explains, "where there occurs an action to do something, there is a volition (*utsāha*) preceding the action. This is effort." The definition in this passage does not clearly mention the unconscious effort, but the next chapter alludes to it.

The before-mentioned seventeen attributes are enumerated in *V.S.* as attributes, and the last six are the special attributes of self not common to any other substances.

Gravity (pp. 97–8)

The following seven attributes are added by *Pr. Bh.* to the seventeen. Gravity (*gurutva*) is mentioned in *Pr. Bh.* as "jala-bhūmyoḥ patana-karma-kāraṇaṁ".[4] This agrees

[1] 6, 2, 10–13.

[2] pp. 261–2, "Desire is the wishing for something not obtained, either for one's own sake or for the sake of another," and "Aversion is of the nature of heart-burning or irritation. It is the feeling that makes one think himself burning or being irritated" (Gaṅgā-nātha Jhā's translation).

[3] p. 263.

[4] p. 263, "(Gravity is) the cause of the action falling of water and earth."

with *V.S.* 5, 1, 7; 5, 1, 18; 5, 2, 3. But *V.S.* 1, 1, 29 ascribes to gravity causation of the action throwing upwards. *Pr. Bh.* follows this *sūtra* in the explanation of the action; but our treatise does not mention it. Gravity is, if there is no impression (*saṁskāra*) and conjunction, the cause of falling down; accordingly, gravity can be the absolute cause (*anapekṣa - kāraṇa*) of conjunction and disjunction. This is contradictory to the essential nature of attributes (1, 1, 16).

Fluidity and Viscidity (p. 98)

Pr. Bh. explains, "dravatva-syandana-karma-kāraṇaṁ, tri-dravya-vṛtti, tat tu dvividhaṁ sāṁsiddhikaṁ naimittikañ ca, sāṁsiddhikaṁ apāṁ viśeṣa-guṇaḥ, naimittikaṁ pṛthivī - tejasoḥ sāmānya-guṇaḥ."[1] According to *V.S.* fluidity (*dravatva*) is possessed by water, and the cause of flowing (*syanda*).[2] Fluidity exists in butter, lac, wax, tin, lead, iron, silver, and gold, through their conjunction with fire.[3]

Concerning viscidity (*sneha*) *V.S.* says, "āpo dravāḥ snigdhāḥ,"[4] and there is no further allusion to it. *Pr. Bh.* defines it "sneho 'pāṁ viśeṣa-guṇaḥ saṁgraha-mṛjādi-hetuḥ".[5] The definitions in our treatise are derived from *Pr. Bh.* But fluidity and viscidity are not attributes in the strict sense.

Impression (p. 98)

Impression (*saṁskāra*) in *V.S.* may be divided into two sorts; according to 9, 2, 6–8 and 9, 2, 10, impression is a cause of reminiscence (*smṛti*), dreaming (*svapna*),

[1] p. 264, "Fluidity is the cause of the action flowing and exists in the three substances. But it is (divided into) two sorts, intrinsic and extrinsic. The former is a specific attribute of water, while the latter is a common attribute to both earth and fire."

[2] 2, 1, 2; 5, 2, 4.

[3] 2, 1, 6–7.

[4] 2, 1, 2.

[5] p. 266, "Viscidity is a specific attribute of water and the cause of cohesion, smoothness, etc."

consciousness in dreaming (*svapnāntika*), and imperfect knowledge (*avidyā*), while according to 5, 1, 7; 5, 1, 18; and 4, 1, 7, it is produced from the first action of things, and is the cause of the second action, and so forth. Consequently, impression is an impressed energy, physical and mental. *Pr. Bh.* divides it into three sorts, impetus (*vega*), mental impression (*bhāvanā*), and elasticity (*sthiti-sthāpaka*),[1] and says, "vego mūrtimatsu pañcasu dravyeṣu nimitta-viśeṣa-apekṣāt karmaṇo jāyate niyata-dik-kriyā-prabandha - hetuḥ sparśavad - dravya - saṁyoga - viśeṣa - virodhī (kvacit kāraṇa-guṇa-pūrva-krameṇa-utpadyate); bhāvanā-saṁjñakas tv-ātma-guṇo dṛṣṭa-śruta-anubhūteṣv-artheṣu smṛti-pratyabhijñāna-hetur bhavati."[2] *Bhāvanā* corresponds to the first sort of impression in *V.S.*

"The cause of reminiscence" is the translation of *smṛti-hetu*, and "a particular mental impression" corresponds to *smṛti-pratyabhijñāna* in *Pr. Bh.*, but it is literally "repeated-exercise-difference" and may be the translation of *abhyāsa-viśeṣa* or *bhāvanā-viśeṣa*.[3] "Produced by the impressions of the perceptive and the inferential knowledge of one substance," corresponds to *dṛṣṭa-śruta-anubhūteṣv-artheṣu*. In *Pr. Bh.* *smṛti* is an effect of *bhāvanā* and one of the four sorts of perfect knowledge (*vidyā*); but in our treatise *smṛti* is not included in perfect knowledge. *Smṛti* is the cause as well as the effect of perfect knowledge.

Impetus is a cause of actions and at the same time an effect of actions in *V.S.* 1, 1, 20; 1, 1, 30;[4] 1, 1, 27.[5] "The cause of actions," or "the cause of activity" is the

[1] p. 266, "Impetus is produced in the five corporeal substances by an action through some causes; it is the cause of a series of motions in a definite direction; it is counteracted by a certain conjunction of tangible substances," and "what is called mental impression is an attribute of self; it is the cause of the remembrance and recognition of things previously seen or heard or experienced".

[2] Cf. p. 156.

[3] See *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 156, 266.

[4] The *sūtra* of the *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya*.

[5] The *sūtra* of the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya*.

translation of *kriyā-hetu*, or it may be that of *kṛti-hetu*, but *kṛti* is more mental than physical.[1] "Impulsion, etc.," is literally "striking, or throwing, etc.", and is the translation of *nodana*, and "etc." includes "*abhighāta* (impact)" and "*saṁyukta-saṁyoga* (conjunction with the conjunct)".[2] "Impetus, or physical energy" is the equivalent of *vega*. "The corporeal substances" are five: earth, water, fire, wind, and mind. "Has one substance as its substratum" states the essential nature of actions (1, 1, 17).

Impetus (*vega*) is dynamic, while elasticity (*sthiti-sthāpaka*) is rather static (inertia). The latter is not clearly set out in *V.S.*, and even *Pr. Bh.* does not allude to it in other passages;[3] but impetus (seven times) and mental impression (*bhāvanā*) (five times) are mentioned[3] in other passages. The treatise refers to elasticity in the explanation of actions.

Merit and Demerit (p. 98)

In *Pr. Bh.* *adṛṣṭa* has the same meaning as merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*), because the seven additional attributes are enumerated as *gurutva, dravatva, sneha, saṁskāra, adṛṣṭa,* and *śabda*.[4] In *V.S.* *adṛṣṭa* is mentioned in 5, 1, 15; 5, 2, 2; 5, 2, 7; 5, 2, 13; 5, 2, 17–18; 6, 2, 2; 6, 2, 13. The first four or five *sūtras* describe it as an objective force, and the last three treat it as subjective; but even the first four may also be explained subjectively; accordingly, *adṛṣṭa* is considered as the latent energy residing in self and the final cause of transmigration, because it is stated, "tad-abhāve saṁyoga-abhāvo 'prādur-bhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ,"[5] and *tad* is undoubtedly *adṛṣṭa*.

[1] *Nyāya-kośa*, pp. 733–4, 211, 523. *Pr. Bh.* distinctly calls impetus one of *kriyā-hetus* (p. 101). See notes on ch. ii, 2, 9.

[2] 5, 2, 1; 5, 2, 6.

[3] pp. 95–102.

[4] p. 10, "adṛṣṭa-śabdena dharma-adharmayor upasaṅgrahaḥ" (*Nyāya-kandalī*).

[5] 5, 2, 18, "Where there is non-existence of this (that is, of destiny), there is non-existence of conjunction and non-existence of manifestation, emancipation."

Adṛṣṭa is very similar to impression (*saṁskāra*), which as "the cause of reminiscence" is partly coincident with it; but impression is rather mechanical and mental, while *adṛṣṭa* is moral and religious. *Adṛṣṭa* principally means a latent force resulting from the actions in the previous life and continuing to exist in the present life. This *adṛṣṭa* causes the first action of the natural phenomena, as explained in ch. ii, 3. The theory of *adṛṣṭa* is very likely to lead to the conclusion that the sphere of transmigration is the common result of the individual *adṛṣṭa*, and everyone's body and other personal circumstances are the special results of the individual *adṛṣṭa*. This is a general idea in Buddhism.

But *adṛṣṭa* is not the *adṛṣṭa* of God in *V.S.* God is not mentioned in *V.S.*, though the *Upaskāra* and the *Vivṛti* maintain that *V.S.* acknowledges the existence of God. Their explanations will be examined.

The commentators explain that the *sūtras* "saṁjñā-karma tv-asmad-viśiṣṭānāṁ liṅgaṁ" and "pratyakṣa-pravṛttatvāt saṁjñā-karmaṇaḥ"[1] are the proof of the existence of God. But this is hardly possible, because an important discussion like the proof of God should be found in its proper place; the author of the *sūtra* discusses the proof of self in the whole third *adhyāya*. The two *sūtras* are really the author's answer to an opponent (2, 1, 15–17). The author proves the existence, the invisibility, the substantiality, the eternity, and the multiplicity of wind in 2, 1, 9–14. Then an opponent says, "vāyu-sannikarṣe pratyakṣa-abhāvād dṛṣṭaṁ liṅgaṁ na vidyate," "sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc ca-aviśeṣaḥ," and "tasmād āgamikaṁ"[2] (2, 1, 15–17). The author answers the

[1] 2, 1, 18-19, "But word and work are the mark of those beings who are distinguished from ourselves," and "because words and works are known by perception to be produced".

[2] "Inasmuch as in the contact with wind there is no act of perception, there exists (in it) no visible mark," and "(even) by general inference it is not a particular (substance)", and "it is therefore proved by revelation (the *Veda*)".

objections in the two *sūtras*. The *sūtras* mean that some of our concepts have their origin in the perceptions of former generations and have been handed down to us. And they are the logical ground for the proof of the corresponding objects and the criterion of our actions.[1]

The above explanation will be also proved by 3, 2, 4–9. The author proves the existence, the substantiality and eternity of self in 3, 2, 4–5, and the objections are raised in 3, 2, 6–8,[2] in almost the same words as in 2, 1, 15–17. *Sūtra* 3, 2, 9 is the author's answer to the objections, just as *sūtras* 2, 1, 18–19 are to *sūtras* 2, 1, 15–17. If *sūtras* 3, 2, 6–8 are the objections, as the commentators explain, *sūtras* 2, 1, 15–17 must be objections, because the words and the line of argument are the same; then *sūtras* 2, 1, 18–19 must be the answer to them. They cannot be the proof of God. And other *sūtras* have no trace of the proof of God; therefore it is concluded that *V.S.* does not acknowledge the existence of God. *Pr. Bh.* for the first time acknowledged "Brahmā sakala-bhuvana-patir maheśvaraḥ" and "Brahmā sarva-loka-pitāmahaḥ".[3] But this is an influence from a theistic system.[4]

Merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are mentioned in *V.S.* (6, 2, 3), 6, 2, 14–15; 9, 2, 9; 9, 2, 13, and 1, 1, 1–2; 1, 1, 4. If *sūtras* 6, 2, 14–15, "icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā dharma-adharma-pravṛttiḥ, tat saṁyogo vibhāgaḥ,"[5] are compared with *sūtra* 6, 2, 12, "adṛṣṭāc ca (rāga-dveṣau, i.e. icchā-dveṣau)," merit and demerit are seen to be residual

[1] Cf. 6, 1, 2; 4, 2, 9; 4, 2, 11; 5, 2, 10; 6, 1, 1, etc. See *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya* on the *sūtras*.

[2] 3, 2, 6 runs: "yajña-datta iti sannikarṣe pratyakṣa-abhāvād dṛṣṭa-liṅgaṁ na vidyate," 3, 2, 7 "sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc ca-aviśeṣaḥ", and 3, 2, 8 "tasmād āgamikaḥ".

[3] pp. 48–9, and see the beginning and the end of *Pr. Bh.*
Sapta-padārthī, paramātmā īśvara eka eva.
Lakṣaṇāvalī, sa (ātmā) dvividhaḥ īśvara-anīśvara-bhedāt.

[4] Handt, loc. cit., p. 26.

[5] "Tat-saṁyoga" means after all "saṁsāra", and "tad-vibhāga" is "mokṣa". Cf. the next *sūtra*, "ātma-karmasu mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ."

forces *a posteriori*. Consequently they are sometimes distinguished from *adṛṣṭa*, though the latter is not really different from them.

Sūtras 1, 1, 1–2 and 4 say, "now then, we will explain (what) *dharma* (is)," "*dharma* is that from which (results) attainment of exaltation (*abhyudaya*) and of the highest good (*niḥśreyasa*)," and "the highest good (results) from knowledge of truth (*tattva-jñāna*), which springs from *dharma-viśeṣa* (and is obtained) by means of the similarity and dissimilarity (*sādharmya-vaidharmya*) of the categories . . ." *Dharma* in these *sūtras* has not the same meaning as *dharma*(*-adharma*) above stated. The whole system of the Vaiśeṣika is included in *dharma* (1, 1, 1), and this *dharma* is divided into two divisions (*dharma-viśeṣa*) (1, 1, 2). The one (*dharma-viśeṣa*) is *tattva-jñāna* of the six categories, and the other (*dharma-viśeṣa*) is the religious practices derived from the *Veda* (6, 1, 1–16; 6, 2, 1–9; 10, 2, 8–9). The former brings about *niḥśreyasa* (= *mokṣa*), as stated in 1, 1, 4, and the latter effects *abhyudaya*[1] (*svarga*, or the *sukha* in *svarga*),[2] as shown by *sūtra* 1, 1, 3 (*tad-vacanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam* = 10, 2, 9).

Pr. Bh. fully explains merit and demerit, and transmigration (*saṁsāra*) and emancipation (*apavarga*).[3] The explanation includes all the statements in *V.S.*; but in some points *Pr. Bh.* is different from *V.S.* According to *Pr. Bh.* transmigration is the result of demerit and the activity of merit, while emancipation is the result of the cessation of merit.

The two sorts of merit in the treatise exactly agree

[1] The *Upaskāra* explains *abhyudaya* by *tattva-jñāna*; but this is not correct, as in the comment on 6, 2, 1, the commentator admits that *abhyudaya* is *svarga*. Otherwise the *sūtras* 1, 1, 2–3; 6, 2, 1; 6, 2, 8–9; 6, 2, 8–9 can hardly be understood.

[2] See *Vṛtti* (quoted in the *Upaskāra* on 1, 1, 2), *Vivṛti*, *Bhāṣya*, and *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya*.

[3] pp. 272–82.

with the activity and the cessation of merit in *Pr. Bh.*, but the treatise explains them too concisely.

"Activity" in the treatise is the translation of *pravṛtti*. "A desirable body, etc.," is the result of merit and happy conditions in the *deva-* and the *manuṣya-loka*. "Activity destroys one substance by its effect" is explained by the commentators as follows: After a man has got rid of the present body and conditions, he can obtain, owing to the activity of merit, a happy body and condition in the next life. One substance is the body in the present life, and its effect is a happy and desirable body in the next life. Both are contrary and do not exist at the same time. *Pr. Bh.* says, "dharmaḥ puruṣa-guṇaḥ kartuḥ priya-hita-mokṣa-hetuḥ atīndriyo 'ntya-sukha-saṁvijñana-virodhī"[1] (this refers to the two sorts of merit, *priya-hita* to *pravṛtti* and *mokṣa* to *nivṛtti*). By the help of the commentators and *Pr. Bh.* the definition in the treatise may be understood. Kwhēi-ci explains that "activity is the cause of obtaining a desirable body, that is, the cause of an excellent body in the cycle of transmigration".

"Cessation" is *nivṛtti*. "Delight in perfect cognition, which is free from attachment" can be understood by the help of *Pr. Bh.*, " . . . utpannasya ṣaṭ-padārtha-tattva-jñānasya-ajñāna-nivṛttau viraktasya rāga-dveṣādy-abhāvāt taj-jayor dharma-adharmayor anutpattau pūrva-saṁci-tayoś ca-upabhogān nirodhe santoṣa-sukhaṁ śarīra-pari-khedaṁ (or - paricchedaṁ) ca - utpādya rāgādi - nivṛttau nivṛtti-lakṣaṇaḥ kevalo dharmaḥ paramārtha-darśana-jaṁ sukhaṁ kṛtvā nivartate, tadā nirodhān nirbījasya-ātmanaḥ śarīrādi-nivṛttiḥ punar-anutpattau . . . mokṣa iti."[2]

[1] pp. 272–82, "Merit is an attribute of man (i.e. self); it brings about to the agent happiness, good, and emancipation; it is supersensuous; it is destructible by the experiencing of the last item of pleasure."

[2] pp. 281–2, "He obtains (from the teacher) the true knowledge of the six categories, which removes his ignorance; then having acquired thorough dispassion he becomes free from all affections, aversions, and other such-like feelings; and the absence of these puts a stop to the production of

As for demerit *Pr. Bh.* says, "adharmo 'py-ātma-guṇaḥ kartur ahita-pratyavāya-hetur atīndriyo 'ntya-duḥkha-saṁvijñāna-virodhī," and "prakṛṣṭād adharmāt svalpa-dharma-sahitāt preta-tiryagyoni-sthāneṣv-aniṣṭa-śarīra-indriya-viṣaya-duḥkhādibhir yogo bhavati".[1]

It will be seen that merit and demerit cannot properly be attributes in the strict sense.

According to *V.S.* the present life in the cycle of transmigration is the result of *adṛṣṭa.* Pleasure and pain are produced by contact of self with mind, sense-organs, and objects (5, 2, 15). Pleasure and pain cause desire and aversion; desire and aversion impress merit and demerit on self; and this merit and demerit are *adṛṣṭa* for the next life (6, 2, 10–16). Among self, mind, sense-organs, and objects the two last are neutral, and self is one and all-pervading in its real nature. Mind plays the principal part in the production of cognition, reminiscence, dreaming, and consciousness in dreaming, and especially of pleasure and pain. Consequently, for the attainment of emancipation it is necessary to restrain the mind. Restraint of mind is succeeded by *yoga,* which is defined: "Absence of action in mind reposing in self; non-existence of pain in the body—this is

any merit or demerit; the merit and demerit of his previous lives being exhausted by his experiences of pleasures and pains, and all affections, etc., having ceased, all his actions henceforth are only such as are of the nature of pure merit, tending towards cessation; and these actions produce in him the happiness of contentment and the disregard for the body; and, having brought about happiness due to the vision of the highest truth, this merit also disappears, the self becomes seedless, and the present body falling off it takes no other bodies, and this cessation of equipment with bodies and so forth . . . constitutes what is called emancipation" (Gaṅgā-nātha Jhā's translation).

[1] pp. 280-1, "Demerit is an attribute of self; it brings about to the agent unhappiness and unpleasantness; it is supersensuous: it is destroyed by the experiencing of the last item of pain," and "pronounced demerit, accompanied by a slight touch of merit, brings about the combination (of the self) with undesirable body, sense-organs, objects and pains in the world of ghosts and animals".

yoga."[1] By practising *yoga adṛṣṭa*, which causes the egress and ingress of mind from, and into, bodies, etc., can be extinguished (5, 2, 17). After that the conjunction with new bodies is stopped, and a new life never takes place. This is emancipation (5, 2, 18 ; 6, 2, 16). *Pr. Bh.* calls emancipation "dagdha-indhana-analavad upaśama",[2] which is the well-known expression for the Buddhist Nirvāṇa.

Sound (p. 98)

Sound (*śabda*) is here treated like the other four attributes, colour, etc. In *V.S.* *śabda* has three meanings, but in this passage it relates to the first sort. *Pr. Bh.* divides it into two sorts, *varṇa-lakṣaṇa* and *dhvani-lakṣaṇa* (= *avarṇa-lakṣaṇa*), and calls it "momentary (*kṣaṇika*), like all the attributes of self".[3]

V.S. states that sound is not an attribute of things which possess touch, nor of self, nor of mind, but is the mark of the existence of ether, and is perceived by the ear (*śrotra-grahaṇa*) ; it is an attribute. Though the author of *V.S.* clearly states that sound is an attribute, he does not enumerate it among the seventeen attributes, because sound has a special quality, which will be described in the notes on ch. ii.

Section 4.—*Action* (pp. 98–9)

The definition of action has been quoted in the notes on ch. i, 1, 1. *V.S.* says further that action is the common cause of conjunction, disjunction, and impetus (1, 1, 20), but it can never be the cause of substances and actions (1, 1, 21 ; 1, 1, 31), nor the effect of actions (1, 1, 24 ; 1, 1, 31). *Pr. Bh.* explains it in detail and calls it momentary (*kṣaṇika*).[4]

[1] 5, 2, 16, "tad-anārambha ātma-sthe manasi śarīrasya duḥkha-abhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ."

[2] p. 282.

[3] pp. 287–8.

[4] pp. 11, 290 ff.

The Action throwing upwards (p. 99)

In the Chinese translation the action throwing upwards is literally "the action taking off, or separating", and does not clearly represent *utkṣepaṇa.* The express meaning of the definition is that this sort of action is the cause of separation of a thing, formerly conjoined with a certain place, from that place. The author or the Chinese translator understood it by "taking up something with the hands".

V.S. says that the action throwing upwards is the effect of gravity, effort, and impression,[1] and casting upward (*udasana*) results from a particular impulsion.[2] Effort is an essential factor in the action throwing upwards.

Pr. Bh. clearly defines it "śarīra-avayaveṣu tat-sambandheṣu ca yad ūrdhva-bhāgbhiḥ pradeśaiḥ saṁyoga-kāraṇam adho-bhāgbhiś ca pradeśaiḥ vibhāga-kāraṇaṁ karma-utpadyate gurutva-prayatna-saṁyogebhyas tad utkṣepaṇam".[3]

The Action throwing downwards (p. 99)

The action throwing downwards is also literally "the action throwing off, or conjoining", which does not distinctly represent *avakṣepaṇa.* Things, being thrown off by the hands, conjoin with their former place. This sort of action is contrary to the first sort;[4] but the definition is not accurate, so that "the action taking off" sometimes corresponds to *avakṣepaṇa* and "the action throwing off" to *utkṣepaṇa.* But the two sorts of action,

[1] 1, 1, 29; cf. 5, 1, 1–6.

[2] 5, 1, 10.

[3] p. 291, "The action throwing upwards is that which brings about the conjunction of the parts of body, and things in contact with these parts, with points of space above them, and also the disjunction of these from those below them; this action is produced by gravity, effort, and conjunction."

[4] Cf. *Pr. Bh.*, "tad-viparīta-saṁyoga-vibhāga-kāraṇaṁ karma-avakṣepaṇaṁ" (p. 291).

together with the action going, are distinguished from the following two sorts on account of residing in atoms. "Etc." in both definitions includes binary atomic compounds, etc., and other corporeal substances.

V.S. says that falling (*patana*) results from gravity, when conjunction or impression is absent.[1] But this falling is not exactly the same action as *avakṣepaṇa*, which is not specially explained in *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.*

The Actions contracting, expanding, and going (p. 99)

The actions contracting (*ākuñcana*) and expanding (*prasāraṇa*) are understood when we contract and expand the hands. "A thing (regarded as) fixed in the near end, or thing connected at the near end" presupposes large and long substances, i.e. substances from ternary atomic compounds upwards. Accordingly, these actions do not take place in atoms and binary atomic compounds.

By applying these actions to trees, etc., inertia is explained. Elasticity (*sthiti-sthāpaka*) in *Pr. Bh.* is one of the causes of these actions.

V.S. does not distinctly mention these actions, but *Pr. Bh.* defines them, "ṛjuno dravyasya-agra-avayavānāṁ tad-deśair vibhāgaḥ saṁyogaś ca mūla-pradeśair yena karmaṇā-avayavī kuṭilaḥ saṁjāyatė tad ākuñcanaṁ,"[2] and "tad-viparyayeṇa samyoga-vibhāga-utpattau yena karmaṇā-avayavī ṛjuḥ saṁpadyate tat prasāraṇaṁ".

As for the action going (*gamana*), Kwhēi-ci remarks that "the action going is the cause of the conjoining and disjoining (in succession) of corporeal substances". The action going resides in atoms and other large and long substances as well.

[1] 5, 1, 7; 5, 1, 18 f.; 5, 1, 8 f.

[2] pp. 291–2, "The action contracting is the action by which a straight substance becomes curved by reason of its particles at the further end becoming disjoined from that place and coming in contact with the place near the base," and "the action expanding is the action whereby the substance becomes straightened by reason of the bringing about of conjunction, disjunction in directions opposed to the aforesaid".

V.S. says that upward or sideward motion (*ūrdhva-* or *tiryag-gamana*) results from a particular impulsion, which is produced by a particular effort;[1] but *Pr. Bh.* clearly defines it "yad aniyata-dik-pradeśa-saṁyoga-vibhāga-kāraṇaṁ tad gamanaṁ".[2]

V.S. explains the actions in bodies and their members, and in things in nature;[3] this part of the *sūtra* exhibits a characteristic of the system as a natural philosophy of ancient India. *Pr. Bh.* also explains *sat-pratyaya-*, *asat-pratyaya-*, and *apratyaya-karma*,[4] and generally agrees with *V.S.* Some of these explanations are stated in the treatise (ch. ii, 3).

The above three categories in dependence upon one another explain all objects as they actually are. The three categories have two aspects, as principles of classification and as principles of analytical observation. In the latter aspect they are further analysed into causes and effects, and into eternal and non-eternal, except actions, which are always non-eternal, while in the former aspect they are the names of the three classes of things, and include things in all the states, causes, and effects, etc.; consequently, they are characterized as follows: "existence, non-eternity, inhesion in substance, effect, cause, and possession of universality and particularity are the common (characteristics) of substances, attributes, and actions."[5]

Sections 5–6.—*Universality and Particularity* (pp. 99–100)

V.S. says, "sāmānya - viśeṣa iti buddhy - apekṣaṁ."[6] *Buddhy-apekṣa* has not the idealistic meaning in the

[1] 5, 1, 8–10.

[2] p. 292, "The action going is that which is the cause of conjunctions and disjunctions with and from points of space in any direction."

[3] 5, 1, 1–5, 2, 21.

[4] pp. 297–309.

[5] 1, 1, 8, "sad anityaṁ dravyavat kāryaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānya-viśeṣavad iti dravya-guṇa-karmaṇām aviśeṣah." Cf. Röer, *Vaiśeṣika sūtra*, ZDMG., vol. xxii, p. 320.

[6] 1, 2, 3, "Universality and particularity both depend upon intellection.'

epistemological sense, that is, universality and particularity are not, as some idealists hold, the mere forms of idea, but they each have reality, like the other categories. The meaning of the *sūtra* is that universality and particularity are relative and not absolute. For instance, substance-ness, attribute-ness, action-ness, earth-ness, colour-ness, throwing-upwards-ness, pot-ness, and so on, are sometimes included in universality and sometimes in particularity. The highest universality is existence and only one, while the lowest particularity is the ultimate particulars (or the final species) and more than one.[1] The former corresponds to the "category" in the classification of concepts in logic, and the latter to individual or single concepts. There are many relative universalities and particularities, which correspond to genera and species, intervening between the two extremes.

Pr. Bh., as stated in the Introduction, divides universality into two sorts, the highest universality and the lower universality. The former contains existence only, while the latter includes relative universalities and particularities, that is, substance-ness down to pot-ness. The highest universality is universality proper, and the lower is sometimes called particularity.[2]

Particularity is "nitya-dravya-vṛttayo 'ntyā viśeṣāḥ (the ultimate particularities which exist in the eternal substances)", and includes atoms, ether, time, space, self, and mind.

"Universality" in the treatise is exactly the same as the highest universality in *Pr. Bh.*, sometimes simply called existence. In ch. ii the term universality is omitted and existence is used. Consequently, the word. excludes the lower universality, which is a distinct category, called in the treatise universality-particularity (=common-ness).

[1] 1, 2, 4–7.

[2] pp. 11, 311. *V.S.* 1, 2, 4, "bhāvo 'nuvṛtter eva hetutvāt sāmānyam eva." *Sāmānyam eva* might have been understood as *sāmānya* proper, or itself.

Universality is the common cause of the recognitions with respect to the first three categories that they are existent. "Perceived by all the sense-organs" exactly agrees with *V.S.* 4, 1, 13[1] and *Pr. Bh.* p. 187.

The historical development of universality and particularity has been discussed. In Chinese translations the lower universality is not classified under universality. If the categories are only six and universality is really the highest universality, the lower universality is naturally a part of particularity. Consequently, particularity is called universality-particularity. On the other hand, if universality is confined to existence only, particularity also claims to be confined to the ultimate particulars. Hence the lower universality has no place in the two categories, so that it must have a distinct category.

"Particularity" in the treatise exactly corresponds to the particularity in *Pr. Bh.* "Which exists in substances only" is literally "which always exists in substances" and is parallel to nitya-dravya-vṛtti; but in Chinese it is not at all possible to read "which exists in the eternal substances". Consequently, the definition may suggest at first sight that the category particularity in the treatise includes all substances whatsoever; but ch. ii (1, 2) asserts that one of the common characteristics of the nine substances, as causes, is that they each have particularity. Particularity exists, therefore, in atoms, ether, time, space, self, and mind. Each of the four atoms is plural in number, so that particularity is innumerable.

Śivāditya in his *Sapta-padārthī* says, "viśeṣās tu yāvan-nitya-dravya-vṛttitvād anantā eva."[2]

"The cause of the intellection of excluding others and determining the one"[3] is explained by Kwhēi-ci: "the

[1] 4, 1, 13, "etena guṇatve bhāve ca sarva-indriyaṁ jñānaṁ vyākhyātaṁ."

[2] p. 12. As atoms are innumerable, their particularity must have universality in some degree.

[3] *Pr. Bh.*, "atyanta-vyāvṛtti-buddhi-hetavaḥ" (pp. 13, 321).

cause of excluding attributes, etc., and determining that the one is a substance different from attributes, etc." ; but the explanation is not acceptable. Cf. ch. ii, 6, and the notes on that section. The other details will be stated in the notes on ch. i, 10.

Section 7.—*Inherence* (p. 100)

V.S. defines inherence (*samavāya*) " iha-idam iti yataḥ kārya-kāraṇayoḥ sa samavāyaḥ",[1] and, again, "niṣkriyāṇāṁ samavāyaḥ karmabhyo niṣiddhaḥ ".[2]

Pr. Bh. defines it " ayuta-siddhānām ādhāry-ādhāra-bhūtānāṁ yaḥ saṁbandha iha-pratyaya-hetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ".[3] *Ayuta-siddha* is the essential condition of inherence, by which inherence is distinguished from conjunction. This definition has a relation to *V.S.* "yuta-siddhy-abhāvāt kārya-kāraṇayoḥ saṁyoga-vibhāgau na vidyete".[4] *Kārya-kāraṇayoḥ* in *V.S.* (7, 2, 26) principally refers to the spatial causality between substances and their attributes and actions, and is replaced by " ayuta-siddhānām ādhāry-ādhāra-bhūtānāṁ sambandhe " in *Pr. Bh.*

The definition in the treatise comes from *Pr. Bh.* " Substances, etc." includes, according to *Pr. Bh.*,[5] attributes, actions, universality, and particularity; but in the treatise it includes the eight categories other than inherence itself and the tenth category non-existence. " With respect to the inseparable connexion " corresponds to "ayuta-siddhānāṁ . . . sambandhe". "Its reality is

[1] 7, 2, 26, "That is inherence by virtue of which it may be said of cause and effect that the one is in the other."

[2] 5, 2, 23, " The inherence of things inactive (i.e. attributes and actions) is excluded from actions."

[3] pp. 12, 324, "Inherence is the cause of the notion (that the one) is here (in the other) in the relationship subsisting among things that are inseparable, standing to one another in the character of the container and the contained."

[4] 7, 2, 13, "Inasmuch as there is non-existence of unconnectedness, there is no conjunction and disjunction of an effect and its cause."

[5] p. 324.

one" has the same meaning as *V.S.* "tattvaṁ bhāvena"[1] and as *Pr. Bh.* "na ca saṁyogavan nānātvaṁ bhāvaval liṅga-aviśeṣād viśeṣa-liṅga-abhāvāc ca tasmād bhāvavat sarvatra-ekaḥ samavāya iti".[2]

According to the commentators' reading the definition is to be translated by "the category inherence is that which makes substances, etc., inseparable and connected, and the cause of the recognition (with respect to them) that (the one) is here (in the other)". Kwhēi-ci explains that "it makes substances, attributes, and actions inseparable and connected with one another"; and the commentators explain that "it makes separated things inseparable and connected", or, strangely, "it makes substances inseparable and connected, so that substances produce effects."

Inherence consists in *ayuta-siddha-bhūtatva* and can never make separated things inseparable and connected with one another; that is to say, the inseparable connexion in things is not produced anew by inherence, and inherence has no productiveness at all, but is the intimate connexion in the inseparably connected things. If the definition should be understood as the commentators explain it, the idea of inherence in the treatise would be quite different from *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.*, and would not be consistent with the general mode of thinking in the Vaiśeṣika. And inherence would not be distinguished from conjunction, so that it would not be a distinct category.

The Vaiśeṣika classifies objects and analyses them into effects and causes, the latter of which are eternal and not produced from others.[3] Even in substances as causes there are attributes and actions residing. If these causes could be produced from certain final causes, which

[1] 7, 2, 28, "Its reality (is explained) by existence" (see 1, 2, 17).

[2] p. 326, "Inherence has no diversity such as conjunction has, and because of the non-particularity of the mark and of the non-existence of a particular mark therein like existence there is only one in every place, as in the case of existence" (see *V.S.* 1, 2, 17).

[3] *V.S.* 4, 1, 1, "sad akāraṇavan nityaṁ."

have no attributes and actions, they would be made inseparable and connected by the force of inherence with other substances, attributes, and actions in the course of being produced. But inherence is eternal and always resides in substances. Besides, inherence, like the other categories, originally came from the conceptual analysis of things, and was considered, from the realistic standpoint of the system, as really existing in the objective world. Therefore, inherence, like the other categories, has its origin in abstraction, and has not existence before substances, however independent it is of the latter.

Consequently, the commentators' reading must be understood as follows: "That substances, etc., are inseparable and connected with one another is possible by virtue of inherence, or that substances, etc., are inseparable and connected is nothing but inherence."

Sections 8–9.—*Potentiality and Non-potentiality* (p. 100)

According to *V.S.* the first three categories have productive faculties, although attributes and actions are inactive.

(1) One substance originates a substance, attributes, actions, and substances, and (2) many substances originate another substance of the same class.[1] (3) One attribute originates substances, attributes, and actions, and (4) many attributes also originate substances, attributes, and actions.[2] And (5) one action originates attributes, and (6) many actions originate attributes[3]; but action never originates any substance or any action.

In the definition of the treatise *śakti* (potentiality) is rendered by "having potentiality or faculty"; but the text of the Bodleian Library has "potentiality" in ch. i, 1. This is a better translation, because "having

[1] 1, 1, 9–10; 1, 1, 23; 1, 1, 18; 1, 1, 25.
[2] 1, 1, 9–10; 1, 1, 27–9; 1, 1, 19.
[3] 1, 1, 30; 1, 1, 20. Cf. 1, 1, 11; 1, 1, 21–2; 1, 1, 24; 1, 1, 26; 1, 1, 31.

potentiality" might seem to suggest that the original Sanskṛt may have been *sa-śakti* or something like that. But even that text has "having potentiality" in all other passages, and the texts of the other editions always have "having potentiality". "Having" is added so as to use two characters, in order to make a parallel to the next category "non-potentiality". "Having potentiality" has, of course, the same meaning as "potentiality".

"Co-operatively" in the definition means both "co-operatively among substances, or among attributes, or among actions" and "co-operatively among substances, attributes, and actions". The former case can easily be understood from the above summary (2, 4, 6) of *V.S.* However inactive attributes and actions are in their nature, they always reside in substances. In this sense they are regarded as co-operative with substances.

"Independently" is literally "without becoming one", and Kwhēi-ci explains it as "separately" and "not co-operatively". This is the case in 1, 3, and 5.

That the author uses the expressions "co-operatively" and "independently" evidently shows that he has thought out the category directly from *V.S.* Therefore he seems not to have been influenced by the Mīmāṁsakas.

Non-potentiality is not mentioned in other works. It is the negative or excluding aspect of potentiality. The inclusion of the category has been suggested probably by particularity or the ultimate particulars and non-existence. Particularity or the ultimate particulars are in some points the excluding aspect of universality. And non-existence is the negative side of existence. They relate to the first three categories. Potentiality and non-potentiality also relate to the three categories. Non-potentiality has just the same relation to potentiality as non-existence to existence.

Kwhēi-ci remarks, "if there is no such category as non-potentiality (in the case of production), one thing

may originate one and all effects; but by virtue of the category everything productive originates its own effects and is prevented from originating the effects of others."

Section 10.—*Commonness* (pp. 100–1)

Commonness (universality-particularity) is here rendered in Chinese "common-difference". The Chinese translator usually translates *sāmānya* by "universality or generality", and *viśeṣa* by "particularity", so that "common-difference" seems at the first sight the translation of other words; but the translator uses the term universality-particularity as the translation of *sāmānya-viśeṣa* in ch. ii, 10. And Kwhēi-ci asserts that the category commonness is the same as the (fifth) category *sāmānya-viśeṣa* acknowledged by former teachers. The assertion is not strictly correct; but it shows that the Sanskrt equivalent of "common-difference" is *sāmānya-viśeṣa*.

Commonness, as a consequence of the historical development, corresponds to *V.S.* "dravyatvaṁ guṇatvaṁ karmatvañ ca sāmānyāni viśeṣāś ca",[1] and to the lower universality in *Pr. Bh.* *Pr. Bh.* says, "aparaṁ dravyatva-guṇatva - karmatva - ādi (i.e. pṛthivītva - rūpatva - utkṣe - paṇatva - gotva - ghaṭatva - paṭatva - ādi) anuvṛtti - vyāvṛtti-hetutvāt sāmānyaṁ viśeṣaś ca bhavati."[2]

Kwhēi-ci explains, "commonnesses are the essences of substances, attributes, and actions (i.e. commonnesses are substance-ness, attribute-ness, and action-ness). They are the general commonnesses in the three categories. Earth-ness, colour-ness, and so on are the particular commonnesses. Commonness does not exist in the other categories (i.e. universality, particularity, inherence,

[1] 1, 2, 5, "Substance-ness, attribute-ness, and action-ness are universalities and particularities."

[2] p. 311, "The lower universality is substance-ness, attribute-ness, action-ness, etc. (i.e. earth-ness, colour-ness, throwing-upwards-ness, cow-ness, pot-ness, cloth-ness, etc.), and is regarded as universality as well as particularity, inasmuch as it is the cause of inclusion as well as exclusion."

potentiality, and non-potentiality, except naturally non-existence and commonness). It is perceived by all the sense-organs. Commonness is the same as the (fifth) category, universality-particularity, acknowledged by former teachers. It is named commonness, because it denotes that a thing is, on the one hand, common to, and on the other hand, particular in distinction from, another." "It is perceived by all the sense-organs" is not accurate, as stated later on.

As for the (fifth) category, universality-particularity, we have Kwhēi-ci's explanation in his commentary on No. 1216.[1]

"Kaṇāda then proceeded to explain the category universality-particularity. It is that which makes substances, attributes, and actions general and particular. These three categories have each one universality-particularity common to their respective members (i.e. the universality-particularity of substances, which is substance-ness, is common to all the substances; but it is particular in distinction from attributes and actions, and so on). And every member contained in these three categories has the special universality-particularity (that is, the universality-particularity of earth, which is earth-ness, is not common to the other substances, water, etc., but it is common to all the members contained in earth, and so on). Thus, there are, further, the common and the special universalities-particularities among all things contained in the three categories (that is, cow-ness, pot-ness, atom-ness, etc.)." The category universality-particularity, being the fifth of the six categories, naturally includes the ultimate particulars. If the ultimate particulars are put aside, the category is exactly the same as the ninth category.

Kwhēi-ci, explaining the fifth category particularity in the treatise, says, "particularity is manifold, because it

[1] *Dainihon-zoku-zōkyō*, 86, bk. 4, p. 388*b*.

resides in the nine substances. Its numbers are indefinite, because there are the common particularity possessed by all the substances (or the particularities commonly possessed by each of the substances), and many of the special particularities possessed by every substance. The nine substances have each their differentiations." "The common particularity" means substance-ness (or the particularities mean earth-ness, mind-ness, etc.); and "the special particularities" earth-ness, atom-ness, cow-ness, pot-ness, etc. The explanation seems to be confused with the ninth category.

As to substance-ness *Pr. Bh.* says, "dravyatvaṁ paraspara-viśiṣṭeṣu pṛthivy-ādiṣv-anuvṛtti-hetutvāt sāmānyaṁ, guṇa-karmabhyo vyāvṛtti-hetutvāt viśeṣaḥ." Attribute-ness and action-ness are similarly defined.[1] Earth-ness, etc., are stated as "pṛthivītva-rūpatva-utkṣepaṇatva-gotva-ghaṭatva-paṭatva-ādīnām api prāṇy-aprāṇi-gatānāṁ anuvṛtti-vyāvṛtti-hetutvāt sāmānya-viśeṣa-bhāvaḥ siddhaḥ".[1] *V.S.* does not distinctly state them.

Perceptibility of substance-ness, etc., is stated in *V.S.* as "etena guṇatve bhāve ca sarva-indriyaṁ jñānaṁ vyākhyātaṁ"[2]; and *Pr. Bh.* says, "bhāva-dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatvādīnām upalabdhy-ādhāra-samavetānāṁ āśraya-grāhakair indriyair grahaṇaṁ."[3] That substance-ness and action-ness are perceived by the eyes and the touch-organ can be inferred, because the objects of the other three organs are excluded from substance-ness and action-ness.

[1] p. 311, "Substance-ness is universality, inasmuch as it is the cause of the inclusion with respect to such mutually different things as earth, etc., and it is particularity, inasmuch as it is the cause of the exclusion of attributes and actions." "Earth-ness, colour-ness, throwing-upwards-ness, cow-ness, pot-ness, cloth-ness, etc., that inhere in animate and inanimate things, are also established as universalities and particularities inasmuch as they are the causes of inclusion and exclusion."

[2] 4, 1, 13; 4, 1, 6–12.

[3] p. 187, "Existence, substance-ness, attribute-ness, action-ness, etc., which are inherent in the receptacles of presentation, i.e. substances, are perceived by means of these sense-organs that perceive their substrata."

" Substance-ness," " earth-ness," " pot-ness," and so on mean the objective realities substance, earth, pot, and so on, corresponding to the concepts substance, earth, pot, and so on. The system maintains that there are necessarily entities in the objective world corresponding to the concepts; this dogma comes from the realistic standpoint of the system. Even category-ness (*padārthatva*) is used in the system. See Roha-gutta's explanation of *sāmānya* (p. 35).

Section 11.—*Non-existence* (p. 101)

"*Asat* (= *abhāva*, non-existence)" is mentioned in *V.S.* 9, 1, 1–10. Whether the author of *V.S.* regards *asat* as a category or not can be judged from the context. The first section (*āhnika*) of the eighth chapter (*adhyāya*) explains the first stage of *laukika-pratyakṣa*, the second section mentions its second stage, then come the *sūtras* 9, 1, 1–10 (*asat*), and the remaining part, 11–15, explains *alaukika-pratyakṣa*. The second section of the ninth chapter expounds *laiṅgika* and *ārṣa-siddha-darśana*, etc. It is hardly doubtful that the author does not regard *asat* as a category, nor an entity, but *asat* is only a form or principle of recognition.

The author of our treatise acknowledges non-existence as a category, as an entity. The positing of the category has probably been suggested by the fourth category. If that fourth category, universality, is restricted to existence, which relates to the three categories, the establishment of its negative complement is perhaps natural.

Non-existence is usually divided into four sorts, but the treatise has five sorts.

"Antecedent non-existence" is literally "not-yet-produced non-existence", and is the translation of *prāg-abhāva* or *-asat*. *V.S.* says, " kriyā-guṇa-vyapadeśa-abhāvāt prāg-asat."[1] *Kriyā-guṇa* originally refers to a substance,

[1] 9, 1, 1. " (An effect) is antecedently non-existent, inasmuch as there is non-existence of assertion of actions and attributes " (see 9, 1, 7).

and then to its attributes and actions. "The cause and accessories" means the producing substances, potentiality and non-potentiality.

"Subsequent non-existence" (*pradhvaṁsa-* or *dhvaṁsa-*, *abhāva*, or *-asat*) is literally "already-destroyed non-existence". This non-existence is explained in *V.S.* 9, 1, 2–3 and 9, 1, 6 "After the force of their causes had been exhausted or the accessories for their overthrow had been produced" relates to potentiality and non-potentiality.

Reciprocal non-existence (*anyonya-abhāva* or *-asat*) and absolute non-existence (*atyanta - abhāva* or *-asat*) are explained in *V.S.* 9, 1, 4; 9, 1, 8 and 9, 1, 5; 9, 1, 9. "Etc." includes attributes, etc.

Natural non-existence is literally "unassociated non-existence". This non-existence is, in the treatise, of two sorts, eternal and non-eternal. Chapter ii (10, 1) explains them as follows:—

"In what case is natural non-existence eternal?

The substances, earth, etc., are not in the inherent relation to other attributes (than their own). Universality-particularity (i.e. common-ness), like substance-ness, etc., potentiality, non-potentiality, and particularity, does not inhere in substrata other than its own (respective one).

Existence does not exist in universality, etc.

In what case is natural non-existence non-eternal?

There is the case where a substance does not conjoin with other substances, but will certainly conjoin with them afterwards. (Before the conjunction takes place) the former does not exist in the latter.

Or, before a substance comes to conjoin with another substance and makes the attributes and actions thereof inherent in itself, the latter do not exist in the former."

The former case is hardly different from reciprocal (and absolute) non-existence, while the latter is nothing but antecedent non - existence. Subsequent non - existence

cannot be included in the latter case, because subsequent non-existence, together with reciprocal and absolute non-existence is, according to the treatise, eternal; but it cannot possibly be included in the former case, as the name itself opposes. Hence the five non-existences may be classified into two sorts, natural and subsequent non-existence. But in both cases the division is a cross division. The fact evidently shows that the enumeration of this natural non-existence came from *V.S.* "nāsti ghaṭo gehe iti sato ghaṭasya geha-saṁsarga-pratiṣedhaḥ." [1] Therefore, the author derived the first four non-existences from *sūtras* 9, 1, 1–9, and the fifth from 9, 1, 10.

Natural non-existence corresponds to *saṁsarga-pratiṣedha*, and the original Sanskṛt seems to have been *saṁsarga-abhāva* or *-asat*, or *saṁsarga-pratiṣedha-abhāva* or *-asat*. In *V.S.* *saṁsarga-pratiṣedha* relates to a pot and a house, that is, to substances as effects; but the treatise applies it to the categories. Cf. *Nyāya-kośa*, pp. 857–8, *V.S.* 1, 2, 1–2.

[1] 9, 1, 10, "(The proposition) that there is not a water-pot in a house is a negation of connexion between an existent water-pot and the house."

But the *Siddhānta-muktāvalī* (pp. 33–4) and the *Tarka-kaumudī* (p. 19) divide non-existence into two sorts, *anyonya-abhāva* and *saṁsarga-abhāva*. The latter contains *prāg-abhāva*, *pradhvaṁsa-abhāva*, and *atyanta-abhāva*.

Chapter II

Section 1.—*Substance* (pp. 102–5)

1. *Substances Active and Inactive* (p. 102)

V.S. says, "dik-kālāv ākāśañ ca kriyāvad-vaidharmyān niṣkriyāṇi";[1] but *Pr. Bh.* mentions that earth, water, fire, wind, and mind are only active (*kriyāvat*).[2] The author of the treatise follows the latter. The *Upaskāra*, the *Vivṛti*, and even the *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya*[3] accept the opinion and consider that the *sūtra* implies the addition of self. This opinion seems not to be correct.

V.S. states, "ātma - saṁyoga - prayatnābhyāṁ haste karma," "ātma-karma hasta-saṁyogāc ca," and "ātma-karmasu mokṣo vyākhyātaḥ".[4]

The *Upaskāra* explains the first *sūtra*, "Action in the hand as its inherent cause is by means of conjunction with self, and of effort of self. Of this action the non-inherent cause is conjunction with self possessing effort. Effort is the efficient cause."[5] The second *sūtra* is explained thus: "The term self tropically signifies a portion of the body. The action then of the self, that is, of a member of the body, that is, of the hand, results from conjunction of

[1] 5, 2, 21, "Space and time, together with ether, are inactive, being dissimilar to that which possesses action."

[2] p. 21.

[3] But it remarks, "ātmā tu tathā-bhūto 'pi manasā saṁsṛjyamānaḥ kriyāvān iva bhavati vyavahāra-bhūmāv iti."

[4] 5, 1, 1, "Action in the hand is by means of conjunction with, and effort of, self"; 5, 1, 6, "Action of self is also from conjunction with the hand," and 6, 2, 16, "Emancipation is declared as dependent on the actions of self."

[5] Gough's translation, a little modified. "ātmanaḥ saṁyoga-prayatnau tābhyāṁ haste samavāyi-kāraṇe karma tasya ca karmaṇaḥ prayatna-vad-ātma-saṁyogo 'samavāyi-kāraṇam prayatnaś ca nimitta-kāraṇaṁ." But *nimitta-kāraṇa* is not mentioned in *V.S.*, therefore the explanation must be as follows: "Action in the hand has the hand as its *samavāyi-kāraṇa*, and conjunction with, and effort of, self as its *asamavāyi-kāraṇa*." "Conjunction with self possessing effort" is not the correct explanation.

the hand and pestle. The word 'and (*ca*)' implies also impetus. In the action of the hand conjunction with the hand is the non-inherent cause. This conjunction is at some times conjunction with self possessing effort, at other times conjunction with pestle possessed of impetus."[1]

According to this explanation *ātma-karma hasta-saṁyogāc ca* is replaced by *haste karma* (or *hasta-karma*) *hasta-saṁyogāc ca*. But the action in the hand has, as the first *sūtra* asserts, its non-inherent cause in conjunction with, and effort of, self, and *hasta-saṁyoga* must, on the analogy of *ātma-saṁyoga*, be "conjunction of the hand with the hand". If *hasta-saṁyoga* is "conjunction of the hand with a pestle", the conjunction is the non-inherent cause of the action in the pestle, as *sūtra* 5, 1, 2 and the *Upaskāra* on it assert, and the inherent cause must be the pestle. But of *hasta-karma* the hand must be the inherent cause. Therefore, if *ātma-karma* is *haste karma, hasta-saṁyogāt* cannot be understood. The *Upaskāra's* explanations are far-fetched. The truth is that the second *sūtra* is the case of the first *sūtra* reversed, and self is naturally the inherent cause of its own action, while its non-inherent cause is the conjunction with the hand. Therefore, self must have, in some cases, action. The *Upaskāra's* explanation comes from the opinion that self is entirely inactive. Inactivity of ether, time, and space is due to their dissimilarity to the active substances; but self has no such dissimilarity, because the expression *ātma-karma* denies it. Compare with mind, which is explained in *V.S.* 5, 2, 14 on the analogy of the hands as being active. If self is entirely inactive, the third *sūtra* cannot be understood. Even the *Upaskāra* explains this *sūtra* "when there exist the actions of

[1] "ātma-śabdaḥ śarīra-avayava-para upacārāt tathā ca-ātmanaḥ śarīra-avayavasya-api hastasya yat karma tad hasta-musala-saṁyogāt ca-kārāc ca vega-samuccayaḥ hasta-karmaṇi hasta-saṁyogas tāvad asamavāyi-kāraṇaṁ sa ca kvacit prayatnavad-ātma-saṁyogaḥ kvacid vegavan-musalādi-hasta-saṁyogaḥ.'

self, emancipation ensues".[1] Besides, the Vaiśeṣika's characteristic doctrine is the Kriyā-vāda, differing from the Sāṁkhya, the Vedānta, and other systems. The *Kriyā-vāda* means the doctrine which holds that self is active, or self is affected by pleasure or desire, etc.[2] Bhāva-viveka in his *Prajñā-dīpa-śāstra* states that the self of the Vaiśeṣika is called *kartṛ*[3] (an agent).

On the other hand, if "the dissimilarity to the active substances" means "the incorporeality of space, etc., for action resides only in the corporeal",[4] as the *Upaskāra* maintains, the activity of self must be rejected, as in the case of attributes and actions.[5] The commentators accept this consequence. If so, the meaning of the Kriyā-vāda is to be restricted to "self is not active, but it is affected by the attributes and the actions". This is also not correct.

The definition of substances is that substances possess actions and attributes, and are inherent causes. But possessing actions and attributes has almost the same meaning as being inherent causes, because inherent cause means the substratum of both attributes and actions, or of either attributes or actions. The characteristic of ether, time, and space, consists in being the inherent causes of attributes, while the five corporeal substances, the four atoms and mind, are the inherent causes of both attributes and actions. But the first action of atoms and mind comes from *adṛṣṭa*, and mind has no activity when *yoga* is practised.[6] Accordingly, even the five substances are not necessarily active. Again, *Pr. Bh.* distinctly states that *adṛṣṭa* has no activity (*vṛtti*) during the time of the

[1] "ātma-karmasu satsu mokṣo bhavati."

[2] *SBE.*, vol. xlv, p. xxxv.

[3] No. 1185, p. 110*b*, cf. *N.S.* 3, 1, 6. Dharma-pāla states that self in absolute emancipation is not active any more.

[4] The *Upaskāra* on 5, 2, 21 says, "kriyāvatāṁ vaidharmyaṁ digādīnām amūrtatvaṁ mūrty-anuvidhānāt kriyāyāḥ."

[5] 5, 2, 22.

[6] 5, 2, 13; 5, 2, 16.

world's dissolution.[1] The substances have naturally no activity during that time. Therefore, the necessary condition common to all the substances is solely that of being inherent causes of attributes. The distinction between space, etc., and the five corporeal substances is that the latter have capability of actions, while the former have it not. "The dissimilarity of space, etc., to the active substances" cannot logically mean the incorporeality of space, etc.

It is evident from what has been said that in the Vaiśeṣika the first and only source of actions is *adṛṣṭa.* What then is *adṛṣṭa?* *Adṛṣṭa* is, as explained above, a kind of merit and demerit, and causes the combination of atoms forming the body on the one hand and the world on the other. In the former case the egress and ingress (of mind from and into bodies), etc., are caused by it, and even in daily life the production of desire and aversion, etc., is caused by it. Consequently, *adṛṣṭa* is the principal hinderer of emancipation.[2] In the latter case particular actions in earth, the circulation in trees, the upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing of wind, the movement of the gem, and the approach of the needle[3] are caused by it.

Pr. Bh. holds that *adṛṣṭa* is an attribute; but in the strict sense it is not an attribute, because *adṛṣṭa* is an absolute cause of conjunction.[4] On the other hand, *adṛṣṭa* is not an action, because it is a cause of actions. *V.S.* says that inaugurations, fasting, continence, residence in the family of a spiritual guide, life in the forest, sacrifice, almsgiving, oblation, the cardinal points, constellations, sacred texts, seasons, and religious observances conduce to

[1] pp. 48–9. If *adṛṣṭa* be an attribute, it cannot have an action at any time.

[2] 5, 2, 17; 6, 2, 12; 5, 2, 18. See 6, 2, 15.

[3] 5, 2, 2; 5, 2, 7; 5, 2, 13; 5, 1, 15.

[4] 5, 2, 17–18.

adṛṣṭa.[1] From this *sūtra* and as "the principal hinderer of emancipation" *adṛṣṭa* must be regarded as being a kind of quality of self. *Pr. Bh.* distinctly calls it an attribute of self (*sarva-ātma-gata-adṛṣṭa*). Śaṅkara begins one of his objections against the Vaiśeṣika with "Is this unseen principle to be considered as inhering in the self or in the atom?"[2]

If *adṛṣṭa*, as a certain quality of self, causes the combination of atoms to form the body and the world, all sorts of actions are to be considered as coming from the self. Self, then, is the only cause of actions,[3] as the consequence of what has been stated. Therefore, the self in the Vaiśeṣika system cannot be entirely inactive. But the activity of self is principally concerned with the individual self.

As for the other qualities enumerated in the treatise, *Pr. Bh.* says that earth, water, fire, wind, self, and mind are manifold (*anekatva*) and contain lower species (*apara-jātimattva*). And earth, water, fire, wind, and mind have activity (*kriyāvattva*), corporeality (*mūrtatva*), priority, posteriority, and impetus.[4]

Self is on the one hand one and on the other hand manifold. In the latter case it must have priority and posteriority. Time and space have also priority and posteriority, because they have effects. Ether has in *V.S.* no priority and posteriority at all,[5] but *Pr. Bh.* and the treatise have special opinions concerning ether.

2. *Substances possessing Attributes, etc.* (p. 102)

See the definition of substance. *Pr. Bh.* enumerates the following qualities as the properties common to all

[1] 6, 2,2, "Abhiṣecana-upavāsa-brahmacarya-gurukulavāsa-vānaprastha-yajña-dāna-prokṣaṇa-diṅ-nakṣatra-mantra-kāla-niyamāś ca-adṛṣṭāya."

[2] *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* on 2, 2, 12.

[3] "Ūrdhvajvalana-tiryakpavanāny-ātma-viśeṣa-guṇa-kṛtāni" (*Nyāya-kandalī*, p. 88).

[4] p. 21.

[5] 2, 1, 29–31.

the nine substances: belonging to substance-ness, giving rise to effects residing in themselves, possessing attributes, being not destroyed by their effects and causes, and possessing ultimate particulars.[1]

The treatise has "they have each particularity" instead of *antya-viśeṣavattva*, which is found in the following sub-section 5. "They are causes which presuppose others" is not quite clear. It literally runs "having-dependence-cause" or "possessing-supposing-cause", and may be the translation of *sa-apekṣā-kāraṇa* or *apekṣā-kāraṇa-vat*. The meaning may be that substances always exist together with other substances and attributes, etc., but never stand alone, or substances cannot produce their effects by themselves; they produce their effects by virtue of potentiality and non-potentiality, and so on, according to the treatise.

3. *Substances possessing Touch, etc.* (p. 102)

See *V.S.* 2, 1, 1–5 and the treatise, ch. i, 2, 1–4. *Pr. Bh.* says that the four substances, earth, water, fire, and wind, produce substances (*dravya-ārambhakatva*) and possess touch (*sparśavattva*).[2]

"Productive substances" or "substances which produce substances" exactly corresponds to *V.S.* "substance is the common effect of substances"[3] and *dravya-ārambhakatva* in *Pr. Bh.* "Causes of substances, attributes, and actions" has the same meaning as *V.S.* "substance is the common cause of substance, attribute, and action",[4] and means that substances are inherent causes. The four substances can produce substances, and are at the same

[1] p. 20, "pṛthivy-ādīnāṁ navānām api dravyatva-yogaḥ (*V.S.* 1, 1, 5; 1, 1, 8; 1, 2, 11) svātmany-ārambhakatvaṁ (1, 1, 9–10; 1, 1, 18; 1, 1, 23) guṇavattvaṁ kārya-kāraṇa-avirodhitvam (1, 1, 12) antya-viśeṣavattvam (1, 2, 6)." *Svātmany-ārambhakatva* means, according to the *Nyāya-kandalī*, *sva-samaveta-kārya-janakatva*.

[2] p. 24.

[3] 1, 1, 23, "dravyāṇāṁ dravyaṁ kāryaṁ sāmānyaṁ."

[4] 1, 1, 18, "dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṁ dravyaṁ kāraṇaṁ sāmānyaṁ."

time inherent causes. But none of the other five substances are productive substances and inherent causes as well. Cf. notes on ch. i, 2, 5–7 (ether, time, and space) and ch. ii, 1, 1.

4. *Substances possessing Colour, etc.* (p. 103)

Pr. Bh. says that the three substances, earth, water, and fire, have *pratyakṣatva*, *rūpavattva*, and *dravatva* as their common properties.[1] *Pratyakṣatva* means visibility, or being the objects of sight. As to invisibility, see *V.S.* 4, 1, 7 ; 8, 1, 2 ; 9, 1, 11–15.

5. *Substances Eternal and Non-eternal, etc.* (p. 103)

The last paragraph requires special attention.

In the texts of the Bodleian Library and the Library of the India Office, it runs: "That they inhere in another substance or do not inhere in another (1), consist of parts or do not consist of parts (2), are not destroyed by their causes or are (not not) destroyed by their causes (3), are not ultimate particulars or are ultimate particulars (4), and are not spherical or are spherical (5), is explained as in the case of being eternal and non-eternal."

The texts of the commentaries Nos. 9 and 10 have the following order: "That they do not inhere in another substance or inhere in another (1), do not consist of parts or consist of parts (2), are not destroyed by their causes or are (not not) destroyed by their causes (3), are not ultimate particulars or are ultimate particulars (4), and are spherical or are not spherical (5), is explained . . ."

In the former texts the order of the affirmative and the negative clauses agrees with that of being eternal and non-eternal, except (4) and (5). The order seems to have been reversed in the course of transmission by copying with a view to retaining them in good order. But in the Chinese Nos. (3), (4), and (5) have the following arrangement of the characters: "*By-causes-not-destroyed*

[1] p. 24.

(*or*) *not-by-causes-not-destroyed (3), not-ultimate-particulars* (*or*) *ultimate-particulars (4),* and, *not-spherical* (*or*) *spherical (5).*" In No. (3) the position of the negative particle agrees with the case of being eternal and non-eternal; accordingly, the order was not changed. Nos. (4) and (5) were probably changed on the analogy of the latter half of No. (3).

The latter texts show that the order was recovered when the misreading and failure of sense had been noticed. But number (3) did not need to be changed, because the meaning is clear and has no absurdity. Number (4) was not clearly understood and remained as it was. The commentaries on (4) have strange explanations. Consequently, the correct meaning is obtained when we reverse the order in the former texts except (3).

Pr. Bh. mentions that "independency" (*anāśritatva*) and "eternity" are common to all the nine substances with the exception of *avayavi-dravya*[1] (i.e. "effects"). "Independency" has the same meaning as "they do not inhere in another substance, or they have no substrata (*adravyavat* or *adravya*)". *Avayavi-dravya* is substances "consisting of parts".

Chapter ii (1, 2) explains that the nine substances are not destroyed by their effects, and here it is stated that the nine substances, which are non-products, are not destroyed by their causes. The two passages agree with *kārya-kāraṇa-avirodhitva* in *Pr. Bh.* But the treatise further mentions that the four substances as products are sometimes destroyed by their causes. This is not stated in *V.S.* Cf. *Nyāya-kandalī*, p. 21, "dravyāṇi tu na kāryeṇa vināśyante na-api kāraṇena-iti kārya-kāraṇa-avirodhīni nityānāṁ kāraṇa-vināśayor abhāvād eva kāraṇena-avināśaḥ anitya-dravyāṇāṁ kāraṇa-vināśayoḥ sambhave 'pi kāraṇena na vināśaḥ kiṁ tv-anyena-iti vivekaḥ."

[1] p. 21. As to *avayavi-dravya* see *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 79.

"Ultimate particulars" is literally "extreme-having-particulars, or end-possessing-species" in Chinese. "Extreme-having-particulars" is hardly intelligible. The original Chinese must have been "having-extreme-particulars", which is the translation of *antya-viśeṣa-vat*, or simply *antya-viśeṣa*.

The author of the treatise follows *Pr. Bh.* in the present passage and explains the ultimate particulars ether, time, space, self, mind, and atoms.

Sphericity has been explained.

6. *Substances and Sense-organs* (p. 103)

The description in this passage differs from *V.S.* and agrees with *Pr. Bh.* The latter states that the five substances, earth, water, fire, wind, and ether, have the common properties of being elements (*bhūtatva*), and of being the material causes of the sense-organs (*indriya-prakṛtitva*), and have the particular attributes of being perceived by the respective sense-organs (*bāhya-ekaika-indriya-grāhya-viśeṣa-guṇavattva*).[1]

V.S. says that "in the organ of smell earth is the material cause, inasmuch as it possesses plurality and smell",[2] and in like manner water, fire, and wind, are the material causes of the organs of taste, sight, and touch.[3] But as to sound and the organ of hearing *V.S.* differs from *Pr. Bh.* and the treatise. Sound is an object (*artha*) which is perceived by the ear and is the mark of ether; but the relation between ether and sound is different from that between earth, etc., and smell, etc. In the latter case the substances and the attributes are perceived at the same time, while in the former case sound is perceived, but

[1] p. 22. But the *Kiraṇāvalī* explains the last property "atra vivakṣā-'bhedena bāhya-eka-eka-indriya-grāhya-guṇavattvaṁ bāhya-indriya-grāhya-viśeṣa-guṇavattvaṁ ca-iti bodhavyaṁ" (p. 37). Further, *Pr. Bh.* says, "śrotraṁ punaḥ śravaṇa-vivara-saṁjñako nabho-deśaḥ" (p. 59).

[2] 8, 2, 5, "bhūyastvād gandhavattvāc ca pṛthivī gandha-jñāne (i.e. ghrāṇa-indriye) prakṛtiḥ."

[3] 8, 2, 6. See *N.S.* 3, 1, 63.

ether is not perceived at all, that is, sound, as the object of the ear, does not suppose ether as the other attributes do. Besides, ether is one and immaterial. Therefore, ether can by no means be the material cause of the ear, and the ear is not a part of ether (*nabho-deśa*).

Pr. Bh. calls ether an element (*bhūta*) on the one hand, and one, all-pervading, and the common place for all corporeal things on the other hand.[1] These qualities are contradictory, if they reside in the same substance. Consequently it must be admitted that *Pr. Bh.* divides ether into two sorts, material (*bhūta*) and immaterial.[2]

Kwhēi-ci explains that there exists ether as an element distinguished from ether (the fifth substance), and this ether as an element is not the same thing as *ākāśa-asaṁskṛta*, or things in *ākāśa-dhātu* (in the Buddhist terminology).

7. *Substances and Attributes* (pp. 103–5)

The description exactly agrees with *Pr. Bh.* In *V.S.* some attributes are not distinctly ascribed to the definite substances; but *Pr. Bh.* proves that a substance has such and such definite attributes by referring to the corresponding passages in *V.S.*

Among the attributes number, extension, individuality, conjunction, and disjunction are possessed by all the nine substances. Smell in earth, viscidity in water, sound in ether, and cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, and demerit in self are not common to any other substances. Fire, wind, time, space, and mind have not their own particular attributes.

The distribution of the attributes is not in consistency with *V.S.* For instance, self as an individual self must have priority and posteriority. Otherwise the attributes in the passage would be those of the substances as causes;

[1] pp. 22, 58–9. See *Kiraṇāvalī*, p. 35.

[2] *Sapta-padārthī*, "ākāśas tu ghaṭa-ākāśa-ādi-bheda-bhinno 'nanta eva" (p. 16).

but fluidity in earth and fire could not be intrinsic according to *Pr. Bh.* and the treatise.

Section 2.—*Attribute* (pp. 105–13)

1. *Attributes Perceptible and Imperceptible* (pp. 105–6)

"Perceptible" in this passage is rather "object of perception" (*pratyakṣa-viṣaya*). Cf. notes on ch. i, 3, 6.

As for the perceptibility of colour, taste, smell, and touch, *V.S.* says that they are perceptible in consequence of inhesion in more than one substance (*aneka-dravya-samavāyāt*) and of particularity of colour, etc.[1] *Pr. Bh.* is of the same opinion.[2] *Aneka-dravya* has the same meaning as *mahat*, which is applied to ternary atomic compounds and so forth in *Pr. Bh.* and the present treatise. Consequently, the four attributes residing in atoms and binary atomic compounds are not perceptible.

In *V.S.* *mahat* is not clearly explained, whether it is applied to the aggregate of three atoms, etc., or to the aggregate of two atoms. According to *Pr. Bh.* and the treatise the former case is correct. *V.S.* begins the explanation of extensions with the *sūtra* "kāraṇa-bahutvāc ca".[3] *Bahu* corresponds to *mahat* and *aneka*. Then follows the *sūtra* "ato viparītam aṇu". *Aṇu* in this *sūtra* does not mean an atom, but small (an extension), which is applicable to binary atomic compounds. Accordingly *bahu*, and *mahat* too, must be from three upwards, though *aneka* may logically be from two upwards, because it seems to be contradictory to *eka*. Therefore the four attributes of binary atomic compounds are imperceptible.

But there are different opinions. Vasu in his commentary on the *Śata-śāstra* states that the aggregates of two atoms are perceptible, and Dharma-pāla refutes the Vaiśeṣika theory as follows:—

[1] 4, 1, 6-10. [2] p. 186. [3] 7, 1, 9.

"If products have the same quantity as their causes (= atoms), they cannot be called gross things, since atoms are not named gross, and the colour, etc., of the products are not perceived by the eyes. This is contradictory to your theory." [1]

According to the commentators product means the binary atomic compounds, because they are stated to be the immediate effects of atoms. Accordingly, "your theory" must be the opinion that binary atomic compounds are perceptible. Kwhēi-ci also says that the original atoms are not perceptible, but binary atomic compounds, etc., are perceptible. This is not in accordance with our treatise; but the opinion was probably derived from Dharmapāla's work. Even among later Vaiśeṣikas some teachers like Mahādeva Bhaṭṭa hold that binary atomic compounds are not supersensuous (*atīndriya*).[2]

Sound is different from the four attributes, and is in *Pr. Bh.*[3] called momentary and continuous. The theory of two qualities of sound was probably due to Buddhist influence. The four attributes need corporeal substances, and are sometimes perceptible and sometimes imperceptible, according to the kinds of their substrata, while sound has no such differences and only needs an empty space. There may be sound which has not reached the ear, but it is not because sound resides in a special ether. Consequently, sound must be heard, if it reaches to the ear. See *Pr. Bh.* p. 288, quoted in the notes on ch. ii, 3, 4, 5.

Concerning number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, and posteriority *V.S.* says that they are visible (*cākṣuṣa*), when they reside in coloured substances (*rūpi-dravya-samavāyāt*), but invisible when they do not reside in such.[4] *Rūpi-dravya-samavāya* is

[1] *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi-śāstra*, p. 3a.
[2] *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 350.
[3] pp. 287–8.
[4] 4, 1, 11–12.

the necessary condition, and the substrata must be compounds of more than (two or) three atoms. *Pr. Bh.* adds fluidity, viscidity, and impetus (a part of impression) to these attributes.[1]

Gravity is imperceptible (*apratyakṣa*) or supersensuous (*atīndriya*) according to *Pr. Bh.*[2] and the *Upaskāra.*[3] But all the extant texts of the treatise have gravity between viscidity and impetus in this passage. Kwhēi-ci says, "The text (the Chinese translation or the original Sanskṛt text) does not mention gravity in this passage; but gravity may be an object of perception, because the attribute is a common attribute of water and earth, as seen in chapter ii (i, 7)." From his statement it is seen that the Sanskṛt text and the translation by Yuan Chwang had not enumerated gravity in this passage. C'-ceu (Chi-shū), the third patriarch of the Fā-hsiang-tsung, commenting on Kwhēi-ci's commentary, says, "The commentary states that the text does not mention gravity in this passage. This assertion is due to the fact that the author of the commentary had consulted a corrupt text, since the present text, which I have consulted, has the mention of gravity in the passage. Consequently, gravity must be considered as perceptible and imperceptible according to the substrata."[4] The corruption in the Chinese translation took place in the interval between Kwhēi-ci and C'-ceu. Kwhēi-ci's opinion on gravity is not correct, according to *Pr. Bh.* and the present treatise. But gravity has been differently explained. The *Upaskāra* states that Vallabhācārya is of opinion that gravity is perceived by touch.[3]

As for cognition, etc., *Pr. Bh.* says, "buddhi-sukha-

[1] p. 187.

[2] pp. 263, 98.

[3] On 4, 1, 10.

[4] Commentary No. 10, p. 206. See *Nyāya-kośa*, p. 238. Vallabhācārya is sometimes called Vatsa and the author of the *Līlāvatī*, a commentary on *Pr. Bh.*

duḥkha-icchā-dveṣa-prayatnānāṁ dvayor ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād upalabdhiḥ."[1]

According to *Pr. Bh.* merit, demerit, and mental impression (*bhāvanā*) are, like gravity, supersensuous (*atīndriya*).[2] "Impression" in the treatise naturally means mental impression (*bhāvanā*), because impetus, which is the physical impression, has been enumerated among the perceptible attributes. For accuracy gravity may be inserted in this paragraph.

2. *Attributes as Products and Non-products* (p. 106)

Pr. Bh. says that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression, sound, aggregate extension (*tūla-parimāṇa*), secondary conjunctions(*uttara-saṁyoga*), incidental fluidity (*naimittika-dravatva*), priority and posteriority are produced by conjunction and are not produced by combustion (*a-pākaja*). Conjunction, disjunction, and impetus are produced by actions, and sound and secondary disjunctions are produced by disjunction.[3]

According to *V.S.* cognition, pleasure, and pain are produced by the contact of the four factors; desire and aversion by pleasure, pain, and *adṛṣṭa*; merit and demerit by desire and aversion; impression by actions; disjunction by actions, conjunction, and disjunction; and both priority and posteriority are caused by two substances; sound by conjunction, disjunction, and sound; and effort is caused by self.[4]

Colour, taste, smell, and touch, when possessed by earth, are altogether products, because *V.S.* says that (colour, taste, smell, and touch) produced by combustion have for their antecedents the qualities of their causes,

[1] p. 187, "Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort are perceived by self and mind in conjunction with each other."

[2] p. 98.

[3] pp. 98–9.

[4] 3, 2, 1. See notes on ch. i, 3.

and that there is only one substance.[1] "Earth" in this passage represents combust terrene atoms. The Vaiśeṣika is called the *Pīlu-pāka-vāda* and maintains that combustion takes place in atoms. This theory is different from the *Piṭhara-pāka-vada* (the Nyāya), which holds that combustion occurs in an earthen pot as a whole. Terrene atoms are combustible, and their four attributes are therefore products. *V.S.* says that "the colour, taste, smell, and touch of earth, etc., inasmuch as substances are non-eternal, are also non-eternal",[2] and "by this is declared their eternity in things eternal (etena nityeṣu nityatvam uktam)". By this the four attributes in earth are known in some cases to be eternal and non-products. According to the *Upaskāra* the *Vṛtti* replaced the latter *sūtra* by "nityeṣv-anityatvam uktam". The *Vṛtti* means that the four attributes in earth disappear on its disjunction from fire, so that the four attributes in both raw and combust terrene atoms are altogether non-eternal. The author of the treatise is probably following such an opinion when he states that the four attributes are, when possessed by earth, altogether products. "Product" is almost synonymous with "non-eternal", as the next subsection (3) proves. Things are non-eternal and products as well, when they have been produced; but they are not products before having been produced, even though non-eternal. Therefore "earth", i.e. terrene atoms, must mean things produced by combustion, because this subsection treats of attributes as products. But in the next subsection (3) "earth" is to be understood as implying both raw and combust terrene atoms. The author does not allude to the eternal and non-produced attributes of earth; perhaps he thought the four attributes of earth are altogether non-eternal, and accordingly

[1] 7, 1, 6–7.

[2] 7, 1, 2–3, "pṛthivy-ādi-rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśā dravya-anityatvād anityāś ca."

products. This is not strictly correct, and is inconsistent with the opinions of the authors of *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.*

Colour, taste, touch, fluidity and viscidity, when inherent in aqueous atoms, are non-products, because *V.S.* says "the four attributes are eternal in water, fire, and wind, inasmuch as the substances are eternal".[1] From binary atomic compounds upwards substances are non-eternal and products; therefore their attributes also are non-eternal and products, since *V.S.* says that in things non-eternal they (the attributes) are non-eternal, because the substances are non-eternal. There is no mention of smell in this paragraph, which shows that the passage refers to water.

As to gravity *Pr. Bh.* says, "gurutvasya ca-apādi-paramāṇu-rūpa-ādivan nitya-anityatva-niṣpattayaḥ."[2] "Gravity is explained in like manner" refers to the paragraph on water. Cf. *V.S.* 2, 1, 2; *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 264–6.

All the extant texts of the treatise have in this paragraph the following addition: "Eternity and non-eternity are explained as in the case of products and non-products." But this is probably superfluous, because there is a special paragraph in the next subsection (3) for eternity and non-eternity. Accordingly the addition is omitted in the translation and in the edition of the Chinese text.

Fluidity in earth and fire is stated in *V.S.* as "fluidity, through conjunction with fire, of clarified butter, lac and wax is common to them and water", and "fluidity, through conjunction with fire, of tin, lead, iron, silver, and gold is common to them with water".[3] *Pr. Bh.* also states that earth and fire have the incidental fluidity (*naimittika-dravatva-yoga*).[4] See *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 264–5.

[1] 7, 1, 4, "apsu tejasi vāyau ca nityā dravya-nityatvāt."

[2] p. 263, "The eternity and non-eternity of this (gravity) are explained in the same manner as those of the colour, etc., in aqueous atoms, etc."

[3] 2, 1, 6–7.

[4] p. 25.

Concerning the remaining paragraphs see *Pr. Bh.* pp. 111–13, 138.

3. *Attributes Eternal and Non-eternal* (p. 106)

All the attributes are non-eternal, when they reside in non-eternal substances.[1] Kwhēi-ci explains, " Among the twenty-four attributes cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, impression, disjunction, priority, posteriority, sound, and smell—these fourteen attributes are non-eternal. Smell, which abides in earth only, is altogether non-eternal, even when it resides in terrene atoms, as the text (chap. ii, 2, 7, and chap. ii, 5, 3) asserts. The other ten attributes are either eternal or non-eternal; but colour, taste, smell, and touch possessed by earth are non-eternal, etc."

4. *Varying Perceptibility of Attributes* (p. 107)

Pr. Bh. states that sound, touch, colour, taste, and smell are severally perceived by one sense-organ, and number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, fluidity, viscidity, and impetus are perceived by two sense-organs (the sight- and the touch-organ); but cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort are perceived by the internal organ (*antaḥ-karaṇa*, i.e. *manas*), while gravity, merit, demerit, and mental impression are supersensuous.[2] The treatise does not mention cognition, etc., down to mental impression, because these are not perceived by any sense-organs. Mind is not in the treatise called *antaḥ-karaṇa* (see ch. ii, 2, 1).

The texts of the commentaries Nos. 9 and 10 have, in this paragraph, gravity between posteriority and fluidity; but Kwhēi-ci remarks that " the organ of touch perceives the eleven attributes, i.e. touch, number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority,

[1] 7, 1, 2–4; 7, 1, 18–20.
[2] pp. 96–8.

posteriority, fluidity, viscidity, and impetus". The remark evidently shows that the original Sanskṛt text and the Chinese translation had not enumerated gravity in this paragraph.

5. *Causes of Attributes* (pp. 107–10)

(1) Compare this subsection with *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 99–100.

(2) Colour, taste, smell, and touch, when inherent in binary atomic compounds, have those of the same class for their causes, that is, colour, etc., in atoms are the causes of colour, etc., in binary atomic compounds. *Pr. Bh.* says that colour, taste, smell, and cool touch (*anuṣṇa-sparśa*), together with sound, extension, unity, single individuality, and viscidity produce effects of the same class respectively (*samāna-jāty-ārambhaka*).

(3) Colour, taste, smell, and touch possessed by earth have conjunction with fire as their cause, even though they are attributes of the atoms. "The atoms" mean those produced by combustion.

The treatise does not explain the theory of *pāka-ja*, and the commentators could not properly understand the meaning of the paragraph.

(4) "Etc." includes ternary atomic compounds. Gravity, fluidity, and viscidity in atoms have naturally no causes. According to *Pr. Bh.* gravity and fluidity produce effects of both the same and a different class.

(5) Unity and individuality produce effects of the same class, i.e. duality, etc., and dual individualities are their effects. But duality and dual individualities, like priority and posteriority, are called *buddhy-apekṣa*, i.e. they have cognition for their efficient cause.[1] Therefore duality and dual individualities have causes of both the same class and different classes.

"Single individuality has its notion as its cause" may be understood by the help of *Pr. Bh.*, "apākaja-rūpa-rasa-

[1] *Pr. Bh.*, p. 99.

gandha-sparśa-parimāṇa-ekatva-ekapṛthaktva-gurutva-dravatva-sneha-vegāḥ kāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvakāḥ."[1] Unity and individuality have not as their causes attributes other than cognition.

(6–8) See the definition of extension and the notes thereupon.

(9–10) Perception and inference are equally divided into four sorts: doubtful (*saṁśaya*), decisive (*nirṇaya*), imperfect (*avidyā*), and perfect knowledge (*vidyā*).

V.S. mentions *saṁśaya*, *nirṇaya*, *smṛti*, *svapna*, *svapnāntika*, *vidyā*, *avidyā*, and *ārṣa-siddha-darśana*,[2] besides cognition. *Pr. Bh.* divides cognition into *vidyā* and *avidyā*. The latter contains *saṁśaya*, *viparyaya* (contrary or contradiction), *anadhyavasāya* (indecisive), and *svapna(-jñāna)*, while the former is perception, inference, (*nirṇaya*), *smṛti*, and *ārṣa-siddha-darśana*.[3] *Viparyaya* and *anadhyavasāya* are not mentioned in *V.S.*, though *viparyaya* is said, by the commentators,[4] to be the same as *avidyā*. These two are enumerated in *Pr. Bh.* on the analogy of the case of inference. In our treatise *smṛti* is included in impression, and *svapna*, *svapnāntika*, *ārṣa-siddha-darśana* are omitted.

(11) *Saṁśaya* in *V.S.* is caused by perception of a general, non-perception of a particular, and remembrance of particularity, and by knowledge and want of knowledge.[5]

"Preceded by the perception of properties common

[1] p. 98, "Colour, taste, smell, and touch, when not produced by combustion, extension, unity, single individuality, gravity, fluidity, viscidity, and impetus are preceded (or originated) by (like) attributes in their (respective) causes."

[2] See notes on ch. ii, 3, 22–3 (merit and demerit).

[3] pp. 172, 186.

[4] 9, 2, 10.

[5] 2, 2, 17, "sāmānya-pratyakṣād viśeṣa-apratyakṣād viśeṣa-smṛteś ca saṁśayaḥ." 2, 2, 20, "vidyā-avidyātaś ca saṁśayaḥ." The first three cases are explained by "dṛṣṭañ ca dṛṣṭavat" and "yathā-dṛṣṭam ayathā-dṛṣṭatvāc ca" (2, 2, 18–19). See 10, 1, 3.

to more than one object" corresponds to "perception of a general (*sāmānya-pratyakṣa*)"; but the whole definition is more similar to *N.S.*, "samāna-aneka-dharma-upapatti . . . viśeṣa-apekṣo vimarśaḥ,"[1] and to its *Bhāṣya,* "samāna-dharma-upapatter viśeṣa-apekṣo vimarśaḥ saṁśayaḥ . . . kiṁ svid ity-anyataran na-avadhārayati tad-anavadhāraṇaṁ jñānaṁ (= vimarśaḥ) saṁśayaḥ."

(12) *V.S.* has no mention of the nature of *nirṇaya,* which is said to be produced, like *saṁśaya,*[2] by perception and inference.

Pr. Bh. explains it, "viśeṣa-darśana-jaṁ avadhāraṇa-jñānaṁ saṁśaya-virodhī nirṇayaḥ."[3]

(13–14) As to *vidyā* and *avidyā*, *V.S.* explains that "imperfect cognition results from derangement of the organs of sense and from defect in impression"; "this is defective cognition," and "free from defect it is perfect cognition".[4]

"Preceded by the perception, etc.," implies contact of the four factors and is the indirect cause of the four sorts of perception, while "contact of self with mind" is the special and direct cause.

(15) The four sorts are also enumerated with regard to inference, and this is correct, because *saṁśaya* and *nirṇaya* are produced by perception and inference, and *vidyā* and *avidyā* relate to sense-organs (i.e perception) and impression (reminiscence = inference).

(16–17) See the notes on ch. i, 2, 9; ch. ii, 2, 1, and 4; *V.S.* 3, 1, 18.[5] The description agrees with *Pr. Bh.* p. 186 and *V.S.* 4, 1, 11; 8, 1, 4. The treatise mentions the actions which reside in earth, water, and fire only, because

[1] 1, 1, 23.

[2] 10, 1, 3.

[3] p. 255, "*Nirṇaya* is the ascertained knowledge brought about by the due perception of particularity and is opposed to *saṁśaya.*"

[4] 9, 2, 10–12, "indriya-doṣāt saṁskāra-doṣāc ca-avidyā," "tad duṣṭa-jñānam," and "aduṣṭaṁ vidyā".

[5] Cf. *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya.*

in wind action is invisible, but the touch of wind is of course perceptible. Existence relates to substances, attributes, and actions, and is perceptible, if the substrata are perceptible. "Of existence, commonness, potentiality, and non-potentiality, with the exception of the potentiality, non-potentiality, and sound-ness which are inherent in sound" refers to the next paragraph. Sound is perceptible, but it is not perceived by contact of the four factors. Commonness, potentiality, and non-potentiality are not stated in *V.S.* and *Pr. Bh.*, but *V.S.* "sāmānya-viśeṣeṣu sāmānya-viśeṣa-abhāvāt tata (i.e. dravyata) eva jñānaṁ", and "sāmānya-viśeṣa-apekṣaṁ dravya-guṇa-karmasu"[1] may be regarded as the explanation of commonness; and *Pr. Bh.* "bhāva-dravyatva-guṇatva-karmatva-ādīnām upalabhy-ādhāra-samavetānām āśraya-grāhakair indriyair grahaṇam"[2] is the explanation of it. Potentiality and non-potentiality are treated just as in the case of commonness, because these three categories equally relate to the first three categories. The cognitions of them are produced by contact of the four factors.

All the extant texts of the treatise have gravity between posteriority and fluidity; but this, as stated in the notes on ch. ii, 2, 1, and 4, is not correct.

(18) See notes on ch. ii, 1, 4. *Pr. Bh.* states, "śabdasya (pratyakṣaṁ) traya-sannikarṣāc chrotra-samavetasya tena-eva-upalabdhiḥ."[3] "Sound-ness" is, of course, a kind of commonness, and "existence" is the cause of the notion that sound is existent. This sort of cognition results from contact of the three factors.

[1] 8, 1, 5–6, "Inasmuch as in universality and particularity there exist not universality and particularity, cognition of them results from that (substance)," and "(cognition) of substances, attributes, and actions supposes universality and particularity".

[2] p. 187.

[3] p. 187, "(The perception of) sound results from contact of the three factors, and, being inherent in the ear, it is perceived by the ear alone."

(19) *Pr. Bh.* says, "buddhi-sukha-duḥkha-icchā-dveṣa-prayatnānāṁ dvayor ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād upalabdhiḥ."

V.S. states that pleasure and pain result from contact of self, sense-organs, mind, and objects[1]; this is the origin of the two attributes.

The treatise does not in the passage mention cognition itself, simply because cognition is not recognized by cognition itself, as a sword cannot cut the sword itself. But according to *Pr. Bh.* cognition is *pramiti* and self is *pramātṛ*[2] (see ch. ii, 2, 1).

(20) The description only refers to the second sort of inference; but the first sort is understood on the analogy of paragraphs 16–17.

"One of the things inherent in one and the same object" (p. 109) is the representative of the affirmative cases, while "a thing contradictory to the other" is the negative case. "Taking place in consequence of the recollection of the connexions between them" has various readings, which were caused by misreading and corruption, so that they can hardly be translated. But the proper reading and meaning can be obtained by comparison with the definition in ch. i (3, 12).

(21) See notes on ch. ii, 2, 2, and the paragraphs 16–19. *Pr. Bh.* states that pleasure and pain result from merit and demerit[3] (cf. ch. i, 3, 13–14).

(22) *Pr. Bh.* says, "sā (icchā) ca-ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogāt sukha-ādy-apekṣāt smṛty-apekṣād vā-utpadyate"[4] and "sa (dveṣa) ca-ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād duḥkha-apekṣāt smṛty-apekṣād vā-utpadyate".[4]

[1] 5, 2, 15.

[2] p. 188. Cf. *Nyāya-bhāṣya*, p. 1.

[3] pp. 259–60.

[4] pp. 261–2, "Desire is produced by conjunction of self with mind, through pleasure, etc., or through remembrance," and "aversion is produced by conjunction of self with mind, through pain or through remembrance".

Imperfect perception as a cause of desire and aversion is peculiar to the treatise. Improper desire and aversion result from want of perfect knowledge and cause transmigration.

(23) *Pr. Bh.* explains that desire and aversion are the causes of effort, remembrance, merit, and demerit, and effort is of two sorts, *jīvana-pūrvaka* and *icchā-dveṣa-pūrvaka*. The former is that which makes breathing out and in of a sleeper to be continual, and is the cause of conjunction of the internal organ with other sense-organs at the moment of awakening; this sort of effort is produced by conjunction of self with mind, aided by merit and demerit, while the latter is the cause of exertion for obtaining agreeable things and abandoning disagreeable things, and it also leads to suppression of the body; it is produced by conjunction of self with mind, aided by desire or by aversion.[1] The instinct to live corresponds to *jīvana*. The treatise in this paragraph is an abridgment of *Pr. Bh.*

(24) See *Pr. Bh.* "vego nimitta-viśeṣa-apekṣāt karmaṇo jāyate niyata-dik-kriyā-prabandha-hetuḥ".[2] *V.S.* says that impetus is an effect of action, and "the first action of an arrow is from impulsion, the next is from the impression (= impetus) caused by that action, and in like manner the next and the next".[3]

(25) *V.S.* states that "activity in merit or demerit has for its antecedents desire and aversion".[4] *Pr. Bh.* says, "merit is produced by conjunction of the man (= self)

[1] pp. 261–3, "jīvana-pūrvakaḥ suptasya prāṇa-apāna-santāna-prerakaḥ prabodha-kāle ca-antaḥkaraṇasya-indriya-antara-prāpti-hetuḥ, asya jīvana-pūrvakasya ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharma-adharma-apekṣād utpattiḥ," and "itaras (i.e. icchā-dveṣa-pūrvakas) tu hita-ahita-prāpti-parihāra-samarthasya vyāpārasya hetuḥ śarīra-vidhārakaś ca sa ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād icchā-apekṣād dveṣa-apekṣād vā-utpadyate".

[2] p. 266, see notes on ch. i, 3, 21 (impression).

[3] 5, 1, 17, "nodanād ādyam iṣoḥ karma tat-karma-kāritāc ca saṁskārād uttaraṁ tathā-uttaram uttarañ ca."

[4] 6, 2, 14, "icchā-dveṣa-pūrvikā dharma-adharma-pravṛttiḥ."

with the internal organ and pure intention . . . , conjunction of self with mind, when aided by all these accessories (detailed above, i.e. the observance of the four periods of life, etc.), followed without a motive for gaining thereby any visible results, and by tranquil disposition, tends to bring about merit," and "its (demerit's) causes are (1) the doing of actions which are prohibited in the scriptures, and which are contrary to the causes of merit, (2) the non-performance of actions enjoined (in the scriptures), and (3) carelessness; demerit is produced by conjunction of self with mind, caused by these (three accessories) and evil intention".[1] Cf. *V.S.* "dṛṣṭa-adṛṣṭa-prayojanānāṁ dṛṣṭa-abhāve prayojanam abhyudayāya",[2] and "duṣṭaṁ hiṁsāyāṁ", and 6, 1, 5–16; 6, 2, 1–9; 10, 2, 8.

The latter part of this paragraph may be paraphrased as follows: "Caused by hearing and reflecting that merit brings about a pure state in the future life, or caused by disregarding the fact that merit brings about a pure state in the future life; and caused by hearing and reflecting that demerit brings about an impure state in the future life, or caused by disregarding the fact that demerit brings about an impure state in the future life."

(26) *V.S.* says that "reminiscence results from a particular conjunction of self with mind, and from impression".[3] Cf. the definition of the cause of reminiscence.

(27) *V.S.* 2, 2, 31, and *Pr. Bh.*, p. 287.

(28) Cf. *Pr. Bh.*, "avarṇa-lakṣaṇo (śabdo) 'pi bherī-daṇḍa-saṁyoga-apekṣād bhery-ākāśa-saṁyogād utpad-

[1] pp. 272–80, "dharmaḥ . . . puruṣa-antaḥkaraṇa-saṁyoga-viśuddha-abhisandhijaḥ . . . dṛṣṭaṁ prayojanam anuddiśya-etaṁ sādhanāni bhāva-prasādaṁ ca-apekṣya-ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād dharma-utpattiḥ," and "tasya (adharmasya) tu sādhanāni śāstre pratiṣiddhāni dharma-sādhana-viparītāni (hiṁsā-anṛta-steyādīni) vihita-akaraṇam pramādaś ca-etāni duṣṭa-abhisandhiṁ ca-apekṣya-ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād adharmasya-utpattiḥ".

[2] 6, 2, 1; 6, 1, 7.

[3] 9, 2, 6.

yate."[1] "In (a region of) ether" or "with (a region of) ether". "Accompanied by impetus, which causes the conjunction of the substances" may be "accompanied by impetus, which is conjunct with substances", but the former reading is better. Cf. the next paragraph.

(29) Cf. *Pr. Bh.*, "veṇu-parva-vibhāgād veṇv-ākāśa-vibhāgāc ca."[1] "In (a region of) ether" or "from (a region of) ether".

(30) Cf. *Pr. Bh.*, "śabḍāc ca saṁyoga-vibhāga-niṣpannād vīcī-santānavac chabda-santāna iti."[1]

6. *Attributes abiding in one Substance, etc.* (pp. 110–11)

Pr. Bh. says that conjunction, disjunction, duality and dual individualities, etc., have more than one substance as their substrata, while each of the other attributes exists in a single substance (*ekaika-dravya-vṛtti*); and further, that colour, taste, smell, touch, viscidity, intrinsic fluidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, mental impression, and sound are the particular attributes of definite substances (*vaiśeṣika-guṇa*), while number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, extrinsic fluidity and impetus are attributes common to more than one substance (*sāmānya-guṇa*).[2]

"Impression" is the cause of reminiscence and "impetus" is the cause of actions; both make one impression, so that "these twenty-one attributes" must be "these twenty attributes".

7. *Attributes pervading and not pervading their Substrata* (p. 111)

Pr. Bh. states that conjunction, disjunction, sound, and the special attributes of self exist in a part of their respective substrata (*pradeśa-vṛttitva*), while all other attributes pervade their respective substrata (*āśraya-vyāptitva*).[3]

[1] p. 288. [2] pp. 95–6. [3] pp. 102–3.

8. *Attributes destroyed by their Effects, etc.* (pp. 111–13)

(1) *V.S.* says "A substance is not destroyed either by its effect or by its cause", and then "ubhayathā guṇāḥ".[1] The *Upaskāra* explains the latter *sūtra* "(attributes) are destroyed by their effects, and are destroyed by their causes";[2] but the *Bhāradvāja-vṛtti-bhāṣya*[3] and the *Candra-kānta-bhāṣya*[4] explain that attributes are sometimes destroyed and sometimes not destroyed by their effects and causes. The *Upaskāra's* explanation is not correct, because the explanation is contradictory to the nature of some attributes. *V.S.* says "rūpāṇāṁ rūpaṁ (sāmānyaṁ kāryaṁ)".[5] "Destroyed" means that two things are in the relation of destroyer and destroyed, though they are in the causal relation, or that they do not exist at the same time, according to the commentators.

(2, 7, 13) *Pr. Bh.* states that sound is momentary and opposed to both its effects and its causes.[6] *V.S.* says "the transiency (of sound), which is an attribute, is a property common also to actions".[7] The quality momentariness, common to both sound and actions, has probably been derived from this *sūtra*.

(3–6, 8–12, 14) *Pr. Bh.* states that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit and demerit, mental impression, and sound are "*akāraṇa-guṇa-pūrvaka*",[8] which Śrīdhara explains "*nitya-guṇatvāt*". But the explanation is not correct, because *Pr. Bh.* asserts that the particular attributes of self and ether, i.e. all from

[1] 1, 1, 12–13.

[2] "kārya-badhyāḥ kāraṇa-badhyāś ca-ity arthaḥ."

[3] p. 12, "kutracid badhati kutracin na badhati."

[4] On 1, 1, 13, "guṇaḥ kvacit kāraṇaṁ badhati kvacin na badhati . . . evaṁ aniyamena kārya-badhyatvaṁ guṇānāṁ sāmānyaṁ."

[5] 1, 1, 28, "A colour is the common effect of colours (*Candra-kānta-bhāṣya*)" or "a colour is the effect of colours" (more than one, *Upaskāra*).

[6] p. 287.

[7] 2, 2, 25, "guṇasya sato 'pavargaḥ karmabhiḥ sādharmyam."

[8] p. 98.

cognition down to sound, are momentary.[1] See *Nyāya-kośa*, pp. 196–7, 2.

(3) *Pr. Bh.* states "(dharmo) 'ntya-sukha-saṁvijñāna-virodhī".[2] "Its effect, i.e. pleasure," relates to *pravṛtti-dharma*, and "perfect cognition" to *nivṛtti-dharma*. Cf. ch. i, 3, 22–3 (merit and demerit).

(4) *Pr. Bh.* says "(adharmo) 'ntya-duḥkha-saṁvijñāna-virodhī".[3]

(5–6) "Impressions" are the causes of reminiscence and do not include the causes of actions. Cf. *Pr. Bh.* "bhāvanā-saṁjñakaḥ . . . smṛti-pratyabhijñāna-hetur bhavati jñāna-mada-duḥkhādi-virodhī".[4]

(8–12) These paragraphs are perspicuous.

(14) This is not clear. The commentators explain that "the substances possessing touch" means bodies. According to other passages pleasure and pain are not the direct causes of effort, but desire and aversion are the effects of pleasure and pain and the direct causes of effort. Effort and pain may be in conjunction with a body and not be destroyed by the cause or the effect, that is, the two attributes can exist at the same time.

(15) The cause of reminiscence is the impression of cognition, and pain is the immediate effect of demerit. They may exist at the same time. *Pr. Bh.* says "atīteṣu sarpa-vyāghra-caurādiṣu smṛti-jaṁ (duḥkhaṁ)".[5] The treatise does not clearly mention this.

(16–17) *Pr. Bh.* states, "vego mūrtimatsu pañcasu dravyeṣu nimitta-viśeṣa-apekṣāt karmaṇo jāyate . . . sparśa-vad-dravya-saṁyoga-viśeṣa-virodhī." Impetus is destroyed by a kind of conjunction, but not by its effect.

[1] p. 25.

[2] p. 272.

[3] p. 280.

[4] p. 266, "What is called mental impression is the cause of remembrance and recognition . . . and is destroyed by knowledge, intoxication, pain, etc."

[5] p. 260, "Pain is produced by the remembrance of snakes, tigers, robbers, etc. (experienced) in former times."

See 5–6. But the cause of reminiscence and its effect, cognition, do not co-exist.

(18–19) *Pr. Bh.* states that priority, posteriority, duality, and dual individuality are *buddhy-apekṣa.*[1]

(20) This has been explained.

(21) Conjunction and disjunction presuppose each other, but they are not in the relation of cause and effect.

(22–25) *V.S.* 1, 1, 12; 1, 1, 18; 1, 1, 27; 1, 1, 28.

(26) This is the characteristic of substances and their attributes.

9. *Attributes inhering in Substances, etc.* (p. 113)

See the definition of attribute. *Pr. Bh.* says that all the attributes are included in attribute-ness, have substances as their substrata, have no attributes in themselves, and are inactive.[2] Inactivity of attributes is stated in *V.S.* 7, 1, 15; 7, 2, 12; 7, 2, 24–5. Inherent cause is one of the characteristics of substances, and non-inherent cause is so of attributes.

But *Pr. Bh.* states that gravity, fluidity, impetus, effort, merit, demerit, conjunction, and disjunction are the causes of actions (*kriyā-hetu*); colour, taste, smell, cool touch, number, extension, single individuality, viscidity, and sound are non-inherent causes; cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, and mental impression are efficient causes; conjunction, disjunction, hot touch, gravity, fluidity, and impetus are both non-inherent and efficient causes; and priority, posteriority, duality and dual individualities, etc., have not the quality of being cause (*akāraṇatva*).[3] These distinctions are not stated in our treatise.

Section 3.—*Action* (pp. 113–16)

1. *Actions inhering in Substances, etc.* (pp. 113–14)

Cf. the definition of action and *Pr. Bh.*, "utkṣepaṇādīnāṁ pañcānām api karmatva-sambandhaḥ, eka-dravyavattvaṁ

[1] p. 99. [2] p. 94. [3] pp. 101–2.

kṣaṇikatvaṁ mūrta-dravya-vṛttitvaṁ aguṇavattvaṁ gurutva-dravatva-prayatna-saṁyoga-jatvaṁ sva-kārya-saṁyoga-virodhitvaṁ saṁyoga-vibhāga-nirapekṣa-kāraṇatvaṁ asamavāyi-kāraṇatvaṁ sva-apara-āśraya-samaveta-kārya-ārambhaka-tvaṁ samāna-jātīya-anārambhakatvaṁ dravya-anārambhaka-tvaṁ ca pratiniyata-jāti-yogitvaṁ, digviśiṣṭa-kārya-ārambhakatvaṁ ca viśeṣaḥ.[1]

"All inhere in substances" is a general statement, while "they have each one substance as their substratum" is a special one. The next four qualities agree with *Pr. Bh.* and *V.S.*

As to "they are productive and products", Kwhēi-ci remarks that "actions are altogether non-eternal, because they are productive and products as well".

That they are non-aggregate is known from their quality of being destroyed by their effects. They are signs of substances, just as attributes are, because they always inhere in substances.

"They have causes of the different classes" means that they also have no causes of the same class. *V.S.* says that "an action cannot be effected by an action", and "action because of its dissimilarity from attribute is not (an effect) of actions".[2]

2. *Actions having Substances as their Substrata* (p. 114)

"All of earth, water, fire, and wind" means the four substances as effects and causes (atoms). The actions contracting and expanding cannot abide in atoms and binary atomic compounds; they reside in ternary atomic compounds, etc.

3. *Actions pervading their Substrata* (p. 114)

The author of the treatise refers to, and almost accepts, some other teachers' opinion. The opinion may be justified

[1] p. 290.

[2] 1, 1, 11, "karma karma-sādhyaṁ na vidyate," and 1, 1, 24, "guṇa-vaidharmyān na karmaṇāṁ karma."

from the nature of atoms, mind, and binary atomic compounds, and from the three sorts of conjunction and disjunction. But the "some" are not yet identified.

Kwhēi-ci says that "actions are all perceptible". But perceptibility of actions is not possible in atoms and binary atomic compounds. Besides, the actions contracting, expanding and going are sometimes imperceptible.

4. *Actions in Body*,[1] *etc.* (pp. 114–16)

(1) This is a general statement, and the following are special.

Actions in body are stated in *V.S.* 5, 1, 1–3, and *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 297–302. "Body" implies the members of a body, and "its organs" is literally "cause and accessories", which is usually the translation of *kāraṇa-* (or *hetu-*) *pratyaya*, but sometimes is that of *karaṇa.* See *Nyāya-kośa*, s.v., pp. 174–5. At any rate the word must in this case mean "organs", and it implies the four sense-organs which "inhere in the body".

The actions in the parts of a body have their inherent causes in the parts, e.g. for the action in the hand the hand is the inherent cause.

(2) "Conjunction with, and effort of, self" is literally "self-conjunction-effort" in Chinese. *V.S.* says, "ātma-saṁyoga-prayatnābhyāṁ haste karma."[2] In Chinese it is also possible to read "the effort connected with self", as the commentators do; but "conjunction with self and effort of self" is the correct rendering. Both conjunction and effort are non-inherent causes.

(3) *V.S.* says that "the first action of an arrow is from impulsion, the next is from impression caused by that action, and in like manner the next and the next".[3] The actions leave their impression, and that impression is the non-inherent cause for the second action and so on in order.

[1] Cf. Cowell, *Sarva-darśana-saṁgraha*, pp. 155–7.
[2] 5, 1, 1. [3] 5, 1, 17.

(4) "Parts" is the hands, etc. Concerning mind *V.S.* says that "the action of mind is explained by that of the hand".[1]

(5) "Conjunction with self and that of effort (of self) with the body" is translated on the analogy of para. 2; but it may be correct to understand thus: "conjunction with the body[2] of effort, which is conjunct with self." In Chinese there is no sign of the dual or plural number.

The paragraphs 2 and 5 have no mention of the ear, because the sensation of sound is passive. Kwhēi-ci explains that "when sound is produced in ether, the sound causes the perceptional function in a body". Cf. *Pr. Bh.*, "evaṁ santānena śrotra-pradeśam āgatasya grahaṇaṁ śrotra-śabdayor gamana-āgamana-abhāvād aprāptasya grahaṇaṁ nāsti."[3]

(7) *V.S.* states that ("action in the hand is by way of conjunction with, and effort of, self") "in like manner, and from conjunction with the hand, is action in the pestle," "in the action produced in a pestle and the like by impact conjunction with the hand is not a cause, being excluded therefrom," "in like manner conjunction with self (is not a cause) in relation to action in the hand," and "the action in the hand is from impact, and from conjunction with pestle".[4]

(8–11) Paragraphs 1–7 describe the conscious actions, while these paragraphs mention the unconscious actions and correspond to *V.S.* 5, 1, 7–13, and *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 308–9.

V.S. says that "in the absence of conjunction falling (*patana*) results from gravity".[5] Gravity is the non-inherent cause, and the body of a sleeper is the inherent cause. There is the impression left by the action falling,

[1] 5, 2, 14. [2] Cf. *Upaskāra* on 5, 1, 1–2. [3] p. 288.

[4] 5, 1, 2–5, "tathā hasta-saṁyogāc ca musale karma," "abhighātaje musalādau karmaṇi vyatirekād akāraṇaṁ hasta-saṁyogaḥ," "tathā-ātma-saṁyogo hasta-karmaṇi," and "abhighātān musala-saṁyogād dhaste karma".

[5] 5, 1, 7, "saṁyoga-abhāve gurutvāt patanaṁ.'

and the impression and gravity are the non-inherent causes for the second action and so forth.

V.S. states that "movement (*calana*) of a sleeper takes place even in the absence of effort".[1] Cf. *Pr. Bh.*, "prāṇa-ākhye tu vāyau karma . . . suptasya tu jīvana-pūrvaka-prayatna-apekṣāt."[2] "Effort" in "conjunction of effort with self" is *jīvana-pūrvaka* in *Pr. Bh.* Consequently "the absence of effort" in *V.S.* is to be understood like "the absence of conscious effort".

(12) From this paragraph the actions in nature are explained. These actions are stated in *V.S.* 5, 1, 14, 5, 2, 13, and in *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 303–7. The explanation is one of the characteristics of the system, and distinguishes it from the Sāṁkhya, the Vedānta, and other systems.

V.S. says that "flowing (*syandana*) results from fluidity".[3] See *Pr. Bh.*, p. 302.

(14, 19) *V.S.* states that "The upward flaming of fire, the sideward blowing of wind, and the first action of atoms and of mind, are caused by destiny (*adṛṣṭa*)"[4]; see *Pr. Bh.*, p. 309. The conjunction of *adṛṣṭa* (i.e. merit and demerit) with self is stated in *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 48–9.

(16) Cf. *V.S.* 4, 2, 1–5 (aṇu-saṁyogas tv-apratiṣiddhaḥ), and *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 48–9, 308–9 (tathā sarga-kāle pratyagreṇa śarīreṇa sambandhārthaṁ karma-adṛṣṭa-kāritaṁ).

(18) *V.S.* states that "the circulation (*abhisarpaṇa*) in trees is caused by destiny"[5] (*Pr. Bh.*, pp. 305–6, 48–9).

(19) Cf. *V.S.*, "the egress and ingress (of mind from and into bodies), conjunction with things eaten and drunk, and conjunctions with other effects—all these things are caused by destiny."[6]

[1] 5, 1, 13, "prayatna-abhāve prasuptasya calanam."

[2] p. 308.

[3] 5, 2, 4, "dravatvāt syandanam."

[4] 5, 2, 13, "agner ūrdhva-jvalanaṁ vāyos tiryak-pavanam aṇūnāṁ manasaś ca-ādyakarma-ādṛṣṭa-kāritam."

[5] 5, 2, 7, "vṛkṣa-abhisarpaṇam ity adṛṣṭa-kāritam."

[6] 5, 2, 17, "apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśita-pīta-samyogaḥ kārya-antara-saṁyogāś ca-ity-adṛṣṭa-kāritāni."

(21) "The actions in the (present) world" is literally "earth-foot-karma", which is in Chinese not at all intelligible. But it seems to be the literal translation of *bhūmi-tala-karma* (or *pṛthivī-tala-karma* ?), which is literally "the actions on the surface of the earth".

"The ripening of the happy and the unhappy effects" is the translation of *hita-ahita-vipāka*. The commentators say: "*Vipāka* means ripening (of effects) different (from their causes), that is, merit brings about pleasure or good, and demerit brings about pain or evil. Thus the cause and the effects are of different classes."

(23) *V.S.* states that "action in earth results from impulsion, impact, and conjunction with the conjunct", "the falling of water in the absence of conjunction results from gravity," "the sun's rays cause the ascent of water through conjunction with wind, through the impress of the impulsion, and conjunction with the conjunct," "particular impulsion results from particular effort," and "the action of fire and that of wind are explained by the action of earth".[1] Cf. *Pr. Bh.*, "tatra nodanaṁ gurutva-dravatva-vega-prayatnān samasta-vyastān apekṣamāṇo yaḥ saṁyoga-viśeṣo nodanam avibhāga-hetor ekasya karmaṇaḥ kāraṇaṁ tasmāc caturṣv-api mahābhūteṣu karma bhavati."[2]

(24) The paragraph refers principally to the last paragraph (23).

Gravity does not exist in fire, and fluidity is not possessed by wind.

Wind and mind are not mentioned in the last paragraph, which is intended to cite the five corporeal substances. But mind has not impulsion and impact (*nodana* and *abhighāta*); accordingly it is omitted in that paragraph.

[1] 5, 2, 1, "nodana-abhighātāt saṁyukta-saṁyogāc ca pṛthivyāṁ karma"; 5, 2, 3, "apāṁ saṁyoga-abhāve gurutvāt patanam"; 5, 2, 5-6, "nāḍyo vāyu-saṁyogād ārohaṇam, nodana-āpīḍanāt saṁyukta-saṁyogāc ca"; 5, 1, 9, "prayatna-viśeṣān nodana-viśeṣaḥ"; and 5, 2, 12, "pṛthivī-karmaṇā tejaḥ-karma vāyu-karma ca vyākhyātam." Cf. 5, 1, 8; 10; 18.

[2] p. 303.

Wind has perhaps particular impulsion and impact (both impulsion and impact are *samyoga-viseṣa*), and is not treated like the other three substances. Accordingly, wind is also omitted in the last paragraph. The commentators explain that this paragraph is the conclusion of the whole subsection 4; but this is not correct.

Section 4.—*Existence* (p. 116)

This hardly needs an explanation.

Kwhēi-ci remarks that "existence and particularity are incorporeal, though the treatise does not mention this", and further, "the five categories other than the first three, i.e. existence, particularity, inherence, non-potentiality, and commonness (naturally except non-existence), and the five substances, ether, time, space, self, and mind are eternal, but they are not productive." But even the category potentiality has no productiveness. Potentiality is abstraction of the productive faculty from productive substances, as action is abstraction and has no action in itself.

The commentators explain the category thus, "existence is that which makes substances, etc., existent, that is, by virtue of the category substances, etc., can exist." But we have to bear in mind that the category existence does not make non-existent things existent. Existence is also an abstraction and the cause of the notion that substances, etc., are existent.

Section 5.—*Particularity* (p. 117)

The description distinctly shows that the category particularity is inherent in ether, time, and space, and in nothing else. The commentators explain that ether, time, and space have neither priority nor posteriority; and, if the category is not inherent in these three substances, there cannot be, with regard to them, the notion that that is ether, time, or space. The author of

the treatise specially mentions the three substances, because it is not easy to know that the category inheres in them. "It exists in ether, space, and time" does not exclude the other six substances, because the treatise distinctly states that the nine substances have each particularity.

Why, then, is self not enumerated in this passage? Probably because the author acknowledges plurality of self in regard to its appearances, and consequently self has priority and posteriority (see ch. ii, 2, 5, and 8 ; ch. ii, 3, 4). Or the author may mean that the three substances are, though possessing neither priority nor posteriority, three distinct entities and not one entity. If the ultimate particulars contain the nine substances as causes, the three substances can never be one. In this connexion the treatise is more consequent than *Pr. Bh.* (cf. p. 137).

Kwhēi-ci remarks, "Particularity is not perceptible, like potentiality and non-potentiality, although the treatise does not distinctly express this." But potentiality and non-potentiality are perceptible or not according as they inhere in different substrata; see ch. ii, 2, 5 (16–18). According to Dharma-pāla the fifth category, universality-particularity, is perceptible, but particularity, being restricted to the ultimate particulars, is imperceptible. The treatise does not enumerate inherence, non-existence, and particularity among the perceptible categories in ch. ii (2, 5, 16–18).

Section 6.—*Inherence* (p. 117)

"The cause of being inherent" is literally "producing-reaching-cause". This is not clear. It may be a translation of *udbhūta-kāraṇa*. But this Sanskṛt is not suitable for the passage. "Producing-reaching" is probably an equivalent of *samaveta*. Any way stress must not be laid upon the meaning of "production", because inherence is not at all productive.

There is no mention of inherence and non-existence among the categories in which inherence inheres, because inherence does not inhere in itself or in non-existence.

Inherence is imperceptible, as Dharma-pāla states. *Pr. Bh.* says, "ata eva-ati-indriyaḥ sattādīnāṁ iva pratyakṣeṣu vṛtty-abhāvāt sva-ātma-gata-saṁvedanā-abhāvāc ca tasmād iha buddhy-anumeyaḥ samavāya iti."[1]

"Inherence has for mark (*liṅga* or *lakṣaṇa*) the recognition (of its existence)" has the same meaning as *Pr. Bh.* Inherence is the cause of *iha-buddhi* and has at the same time *iha-buddhi* as the mark of its existence. The reality of inherence is rejected by the Vedānta and the Mīmāṁsā.[2]

As for the other qualities, see *Pr. Bh.*, pp. 326–8.

Sections 7–8.—*Potentiality and Non-potentiality* (p. 117)

"It is something inherent in the categories, with the exception of universality, potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness, and particularity" shows that the five categories are not productive; the productive categories are the first three categories only. "The cause of the notions" is literally "the mark of the notions". "The mark" was probably suggested by "inherence has the mark" in the last section and took the place of "the cause" during the transmission of the treatise by copying. No category can be the mark of the notion, and the treatise does not usually use "the mark" in such a case. "The mark" in the last section is used because inherence is imperceptible. Cf. Section 5.

Section 9.—*Commonness* (p. 118)

As to "commonness is one" Kwhēi-ci states that "Commonness is manifold, like attributes, actions, particularities, potentialities, non-potentialities, and non-existences"

[1] p. 329.

[2] *Brahma-sūtra*, 2, 2, 13 f.; *Śloka-vārttika*, *Anumāna-pariccheda*, śl. 100 f.; cf. *Prābhākara School*, p. 92.

The treatise means that commonness in substances is one and commonness in another category is another, while Kwhēi-ci means that commonness is manifold, because commonness in substances is different from that in attributes. *Pr. Bh.* says "(sāmānyaḥ) dravyādiṣu vṛtti-niyamāt pratyaya-bhedāc ca parasparataś ca-anyatvaṁ, pratyekaṁ sva-āśrayeṣu lakṣaṇa-aviśeṣād viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa-abhāvāc ca-ekatvaṁ".[1]

Section 10.—*Non-existence* (pp. 118–19)

1. *Non-existences Eternal and Non-eternal* (pp. 118–19)

Eternal "subsequent non-existence" means the non-existence when things have been destroyed and will never be produced, and eternal "reciprocal non-existence" is the non-existence which never gives place to mutual association. Such subsequent non-existence has a beginning, but it has no end. The subsequent non-existence which may have an end is a kind of antecedent non-existence; but this is classified in the treatise under natural non-existence. Reciprocal non-existence is, if it is succeeded by mutual association, also to be classified under natural non-existence; but reciprocal non-existence is eternal and differs from absolute non-existence only in the point of having relativity.

"Universality-particularity, like substance-ness, etc.," evidently shows that the ninth category is called in the original Sanskṛt *sāmānya-viśeṣa*, because "universality-particularity" cannot be two categories, otherwise substance-ness is contained in universality (= existence), and particularity is superfluous.

"Existence does not inhere in universality, etc."

[1] p. 314, "Universalities are different from one another according as they reside in substances, etc., and because the notions of them are different (with regard to each of them); (on the other hand) universality is one in all its substrata (of the same category), inasmuch as there is no particularity of the marks and there does not exist any particular mark therein.

"Etc." implies potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness, and particularity.

Kwhēi-ci remarks that "products and non-products of non-existences will be explained on the analogy of their eternity and non-eternity".

2. *Non-existences Perceptible and Imperceptible* (p. 119)

"Those which exist without being supported by other things" or "those which do not depend upon other things" may be the translation of *aparatantra-vṛtti* (or *aparatantra*), and is explained by some commentators as follows:—

"'Those which exist without being supported by other things' means the categories other than non-existence, e.g. inherence, existence, potentiality, non-potentiality, and commonness. Particularity is not enumerated, although the category is imperceptible, because particularity exists in dependence upon substances." Other commentators say: "But existence, potentiality, non-potentiality, and commonness are perceptible and cannot be classified among the objects of inference, while inherence is imperceptible." Therefore "those" or "that", according to the commentators, "includes inherence only."

The explanations are not correct. The paragraph is distinctly expressed in the plural number ("altogether" is literally "all"), and is the continuation of the last paragraph. It naturally relates to non-existences.

The meaning is that absolute non-existence and eternal reciprocal non-existence are known by inference, i.e. by the second sort of inference; therefore the paragraph is the detailed explanation of the last.

"All the five non-existences are not the objects of perception" in the last paragraph may relate to both the first and the second sort of inference; but the first sort of inference is principally referred to, that is, the non-existences are not the objects of perception; they are

inferred from perceptible objects. And the eternal non-existences are the objects of the second sort of inference.

Section 11.—*Conclusion* (p. 119)

Pr. Bh. states that the common properties of the six categories are *astitva, abhidheyatva, and jñeyatva* (p. 16).

"Knowable" represents *jñeyatva*, while *astitva* and *abhidheyatva* are included in "causes of their recognitions".

The categories which only relate to the first three categories are existence (= universality), potentiality, non-potentiality, commonness, and non-existence.

The category inherence is in relation to the other eight, except non-existence, and particularity only to substances.

The categories attribute and action are in relation to the other nine, while the category substance relates to the ten, including substances.

Substance is known to be the principal, and the other nine categories are the means to the explanation of substances. Consequently, the nine categories, however independent and real, could hardly have a meaning, if they were considered apart from substances. The consequence may lead to the conclusion that the Vaiśeṣika system intends principally to explain things and phenomena in nature as they are. The whole system was a kind of natural philosophy in ancient India.

DASAPADARTHI

CHINESE TEXT

若有性於同等不和合。

云何無常。謂實與實雖未相應當必相應、此於彼無。

若於實所有實德業當必和合、彼於此無。

如是五無、幾是現量境、幾非現量境。

一切非現量境。

亦不依他轉、皆比量境。

此十句義、幾是所知、幾非所知。

一切是所知。

亦卽此詮因。

勝宗十句義論[1]

二十八

[1] B. adds 一卷.

於實德業上各別、除同有能無能俱分異所和合、非一、同詮緣相[1]、是謂有能。

無能亦爾。

俱分、實性遍實句義、所和合、一、無質礙、無細分、無動作、無德、常、非所作。

諸實展轉共卽此與德業異。

德性業性地等性、亦爾。

如是五種無說句義、幾常、幾無常。

未生無、是無常、與實德業生相違故。

已滅無、更互無、畢竟無皆是常、不違實等故。

不會無、有常、有無常。

云何常。如地等實餘德不和合。

若實性等同異及有能無能異、除自所依、於餘所不和合。 二十七

[1] 相 must be 因. See notes on chap. ii, 7–8.

如是有性、爲是所作、爲非所作。

定非所作。

如非所作、常、無德、無動作、無細分、亦爾。

有實德業、除同有能無能俱分異所和合、一、有同詮緣因、別有。

異、於實轉、依一實、遮餘覺因、表此覺因、空方時轉、空等想因、常、非所作、無德、無動作、無細分、除有性有能無能俱分異所和合、非一。

和合、是一、常、非所作、無細分、無質礙、一切實德業同異有能無能俱分生至因、詮[1]緣相。

如是有能、爲是所作、爲非所作。

定非所作。

如非所作、常、無德、無動作、無細分、無質礙、亦爾[2]。

二十六

B. has 同 before 詮緣.

I. 合.

第二等、以液體行爲不和合因緣。

火之上然風之傍扇初者、以法非法我合爲不和合因緣。

第二等如前說。

四大極微微造身因緣初業、以法非法我合爲不和合因緣。

第二等如前說。

如爲造身、爲造樹等變異及在二微等業、亦爾。

意趣向及棄[1]背業初者、以法非法我合爲不和合因緣。

第二等如前說。

地足業表衆生利益不利益異熟初者、以法非法我合爲不和合因緣。

第二等如前說。

在地水火獨打相應業、以合重體液體勤勇勢用爲不和合因緣。

如其所應、有取等業、若在火除重體、若在風除液體、若在意除打擲。

[1] I. 背.

二十四 如是諸業、若在內者、以身及彼因緣身所合鼻味皮眼根幷意、爲和合因緣。

此中、身業初者、以欲爲先、我合勤勇爲不和合因緣。

等二等、亦以行爲不和合因緣。

如身業在意及細分業、亦爾。

鼻味皮眼業初者、以我合勤勇身合爲不和合因緣。

第二等、亦以行爲不和合因緣。

如鼻等業、在杵[1]仗等[1]及在屬身鬘瓔珞塗香等業、亦爾。

睡者身墮落業初者、以重性爲不和合因緣。

第二等、以重體行爲不和合因緣。

睡者入出息業、或睡者、不欲故、初者、以命緣爲先、勤勇我合爲不和合因緣。

第二等、亦以行爲不和合因緣。

如下流水初者、以液體爲不和合因緣。

[1] [1] B. 杵等仗; I. 香等仗.

如是五業、幾有實、幾無實。

一切有實。

如有實、依一實、無質礙、無德、無細分、離合之因、能作所作事、不積集、實之標[1]幟、是[2]躦[3]擲等所待行之因、非同類爲因、亦爾

如是五業、誰依何實。

取業、以一切地水火風意爲所依。

如取業、捨業、行業、亦爾。

屈業、以極舒緩細分安布差別果大長實爲所依。

如屈業、伸業亦爾。

如是五業、幾遍所依、幾不遍所依。

一切遍所依。

有說、依附極微意者遍所依、依附二微等者不遍所依。

二十三

[1] B. 幖. [2] I. 足. [3] B. 攢.

二十二 如二體等數、二別體等別體彼體此體、亦爾。
色味香觸地所有極微和合者與火[1]合、非果因相違。
合離、展轉非果因、而相違。
一實極微色等能造同類二微色[2]等[2]、同類果不相違。
最後有分實色等果、與因色等同類、不相違。
中間所有有分實色等、與同類果因色等、不相違。
一實色等展轉非果因相違。
一切德與實不相違。
如是二十四德、幾有實、幾無實。
一切有實。
如有實、無德、無動作、非和合因緣、是有德實之標[3]幟、無質礙、無細分、
亦爾。

[1] B. and I. 大.　[2] B. and I. 等色.　[3] B. 幖.

最後聲、一切因相違。
最後我德亦爾。
樂苦、欲瞋果相違。
法非法、因相違。
欲瞋、勤勇果相違。
樂苦、因相違。
中間所有聲亦爾。
我德勤勇·苦、有觸實合二、非果因相違。
行、我德行念因與苦、非果因相違。
行念因、果相違。
作因、有觸實合、非果相違。
二性等數與二等覺果、不相違。

二十一

何者依一實。謂一數。
何者依非一實。謂二體等數。
如數、別體亦爾。
如是二十四德、幾遍所依、幾不遍所依。
色味香觸數量別體彼體此體液體潤重體勢用遍所依。
餘不遍所依。
如是二十四德、誰與誰相違。
合離生聲、能造餘聲一切聲、果相違。
法、樂正智果相違。
非法、苦邪智果果相違。
一切智、行果相違。
差別智、一切智行果相違。

勢用以何爲因。⿰犭贊擲生業勢用爲因。

法非法、欲瞋爲先、待聞念遠離法非法能成淨不淨密趣俱我意合爲因。

念因行、待現比智行我意合爲因。

聲有三種。一合生、二離生、三聲生。

合生者、有觸實合勢用俱、有觸實空處合爲因。

離生者、有觸實離勢用俱、有觸實空處離爲因。

聲生者、有觸實合離勢用俱[2]、無障空處聲爲因。

如是二十四德、幾依一實、幾依非一實。

色味香觸量彼體此體覺樂苦欲瞋勤勇法非法行重體液體潤勢用聲、此二十一皆依一實。

合離依二實。

數或依一實或依非一實。

十九

B. 攢.

[2] B. 待; I. 得.

十八

現量有三種。一四和合生、二三和合生、三二和合生。

四和合生現量云何。謂了相。於至色味香觸數量別體合離體彼體此體[1]液體潤勢用、地水火實取等業有性、除聲和合有能無能聲性、於俱分有能無能、所有智、我根意境四和合爲因。

三和合生現量云何。謂於聲及聲和合有能無能聲性有性境、所有智、我根意三和合爲因。

二和合生現量云何。謂於樂苦欲瞋勤勇境及彼有能無能俱分有性境、所有智、我意二和合爲因。

比量。謂所和合一義和合相違智爲先、待彼[2]等相屬念[3]我意、合爲因。

樂苦、待法非法四三二和合[4]爲因。

欲瞋、待樂苦念邪智我意合爲因。

勤勇、待欲瞋我意合爲因、及命緣爲因。不欲故、與入出息等業爲因。

[1] B., I., and C. have 重體 between 此體 and 液體. See notes on chap. ii, 2, 1, and 4.

[2] B. and I. 合.

[3] I. 合.

[4] I. 念.

彼體此體、一時等相屬待遠近覺爲因
智有二種。謂現及比。
現有四種。一猶豫智、二審決智、三邪智、四正智。
猶豫智以何爲因。非一同法現量爲先、待各別異念我意和合
爲因、爲何物智、名猶豫智。
審決智以何爲因。猶豫智爲先、待各別異印、我意和合爲因、定
是此智、名審決智。
邪智以何爲因。非一同法現量爲先、待各別異見我意和合爲
因、暗決斷智、是名邪智。
正智以何爲因。非一同法現量爲先、待各別異現量。我意和合
爲因、無顚倒智、是名正智。
如、現、比亦爾。

十七

[1] B. and I. 等時.

諸質礙及質礙非質礙合、是所作。

如所作非所作、常無常亦如是。

此諸德中、聲觸色味香、各一根所取。數量別體合離彼體此體液[1]體

潤勢用、眼觸所取。

如是諸德誰何爲因。

色味香觸同類爲因者、謂二微果等和合。

火合爲因者、謂地所有諸極微色味香觸、地及火所有液體。

地水所有重體、及水所有液體潤、二微果等和合、同類爲因。

一數一別體二微果等和合、同類爲因。二體等數二別體等別體、

同類不同類爲因。一體別體、彼覺爲因。

大體長體、因多體大體長體、積集差別爲因。微體短體、因二體爲因。

合離隨一業俱業合離爲因。

十六

[1] C. has 重體 between 此體 and 液體. See notes on chap. ii, 2, 4.

法非法行(重體)、唯非現境。

此諸德中、幾是所作、幾非所作。

覺樂苦欲瞋勤勇法非法行離彼體此體聲、唯是所作。

餘或所作、或非所作。

色味香觸、若地所有皆是所作。

色味觸液體潤、極微和合者、非所作。二微果等和合者、是所作。

重體亦爾。[2]

如水所有、火所有色觸、風所有觸、亦爾。

地火所有液體、一切是所作。

一數[3]一別體、隨所作非所作實和合、成所作非所作。二體等

數二等別體、一切是所作。

大體微體短體長體、一切是所作。圓體一切非所作。

十五

[1] See notes on chap. ii, 2, 1.

[2] B., I., and C. have 如非所作是所作、常無常亦如是、 See notes on chap. ii, 2, 2.

[3] B. and I. 二 instead of 一.

十四 我由幾德說名有德。謂由十四。何者十四。一數、二量、三別體、四合、五離、六覺、七樂、八苦、九欲、十瞋、十一勤勇、十二法、十三非法、十四行。

意由幾德說名有德。謂由八。何者八。一數、二量、三別體、四合、五離、六彼體、七此體、八行。

如是色等二十四德、幾是現境、幾非現境。色香味觸或現境、或非現境。云何現境。謂若依附大非一實、是名現境。云何非現境。謂若依附極微及二極微果名非現境。聲一切是現境。如色味香觸、數量別體合離彼體此體液體潤[1]勢用亦爾。覺樂苦欲瞋勤勇、是我現境。

[1] B., I., and C. have 重體 between 潤 and 勢用. See notes on chap. ii, 2, 1.

何者十四。一色、二味、三觸、四數、五量、六別體、七合、八離、九彼體、十此體、十一重體、十二液體、十三潤、十四行。

火由幾德說名有德。謂由十一。

何者十一。一色、二觸、三數、四量、五別體、六合、七離、八彼體、九此體、十液體、十一行。

風由幾德說名有德。謂由九。

何者九。一數、二量、三別體、四合、五離、六彼體、七此體、八觸、九行。

空由幾德說名有德。謂由六。

何者六。一數、二量、三別體、四合、五離、六聲。

時由幾德說名有德。謂由五。

何者五。一數、二量、三別體、四合、五離。

如時、方亦爾。

十三

十二

如有色無色、有可見無可見、有對眼無對眼、亦爾。

如是九實、五常。四分別。

謂此四中、非所造者常、所造者無常。

如常無常、無[1]實有實、無細分有細分、因不相違非因不相違、有邊異非有邊異、圓不圓[1]、亦爾。

如是九實、五根、四非根。

何者爲五。謂地水火風空是根。

如是五根、鼻根卽地、味根卽水、眼根卽火、皮根卽風、耳根卽空。

如是九實、地由幾德說名有德。謂由十四。

何者十四。一色、二味、三香、四觸、五數、六量、七別體、八合、九離、十彼體、十一此體、十二重體、十三液體、十四行。

水由幾德說名有德。謂由十四。

[1] B. and I. 有實無實、有細分無細分、因不相違非因不相違、非邊有異邊有異、不圓圓、C. 無實有實、無細分有細分、因不相違非因不相違、非邊有異邊有異、圓不圓、 See notes on chap. ii, 1, 5. (I. = the text in the library of the India Office, and C. = the texts of the Commentaries Nos. 9 and 10.)

如是九實、幾有動作、幾無動作。

五有動作、謂地水火風意。 四無動作、謂此餘實。

如有動作無動作、有質礙無質礙、有勢用無勢用、有彼此體無彼此體、應知亦爾。

如是九實、幾有德、幾無德。

一切皆有德無無德實。

如一切皆有德、和合因緣、有實性、有異、與果不相違、有待因、亦爾。

如是九實、幾有觸、幾無觸。

四有觸、謂地水火風。 五無觸、謂餘實。

如有觸無觸、能造實實德業因共不共、亦爾。

如是九實、幾有色、幾無色。

三有色、謂地水火。 六無色、謂餘實。

十一

德性者、謂一切德和合、於一切德德詮緣因、於實業不轉、一切根所取、是名德性。

業性者、謂一切業和合、於一切業業詮緣因、於實德不轉、眼觸所取、是名業性。

地性等亦如是。

無說句義云何。謂五種無名無說句義。

何者爲五。一未生無、二已滅無、三更互無、四不會無、五畢竟無。是謂五無。

未生無者、謂實德業因緣不會、猶未得生名未生無。

已滅無者、謂實德業或因勢盡或違緣生、雖生而壞名已滅無。

更互無者、謂諸實等彼此互無名更互無。

不會無者、謂有性實等隨於是處無合無和合名不會無。

畢竟無者、謂無因故三時不生、畢竟不起名畢竟無。

八

智因、是謂有性。

異句義云何。謂常於實轉、依一實、是遮彼覺因及表此覺因名異句義。

和合句義云何。謂令實等不離相屬、此詮智因、又性是一、名和合句義。

有能句義云何 謂實德業和合、共或非一造各自果決定所須。如是名爲有能句義。

無能句義云何。謂實德業和合、共或非一不造餘果決定所須。如是名爲無能句義。

俱分句義云何。謂實性德性業性、及彼一義和合地性色性取性等。如是名爲俱分句義。

實性者、謂一切實和合、於一切實實詮緣因、於德業不轉、眼觸所取、是名實性。

能還者、謂離染緣正智喜因、我和合、一實與果相違、是名能還。
非法云何。謂不可愛身等苦邪智因、我和合、一實與果相違、是名非法。
聲云何。謂唯耳所取一依名聲。

業句義云何。謂五種業名業句義。
何者爲五。一取業、二捨業、三屈業、四伸[1]業、五行業。
取業云何。謂上下方分虛空等處極微等合離因、依一實名取業。
捨業云何。謂上下方分虛空等處極微等離合因、依一實名捨業。
屈業云何。謂於大長實依附一實、近處有合遠近處離合因、是名屈業。
伸[1]業云何。謂於大長實依附一實、近處有合[2]遠近處合離因、是名伸[1]業。
行業云何。謂一切質礙實和合、依一實、合離因、名行業。

同句義云何。謂有性。
何者爲有性。謂與一切實德業句義和合、一切根所取、於實德業有詮

七

[1] B. 申. [2] B. 離.

欲云何。謂一實我和合、希求色等名欲。
瞋云何。謂一實我和合、損害色等名瞋。
勤勇云何。謂一實我和合、待欲瞋我意合所生策勵、是名勤勇。
重體云何。謂地水實和合、一實墜墮之因、是名重體。
液體云何。謂地水火實和合、一實流注之因、是名液體。
潤云何。謂水實和合、一實地等攝因名潤。
行云何。此有二種。一念因、二作因。
念因者、謂我和合、一實現比智行所生數習差別、是名念因。
作因者、謂攢[1]擲等生業所生、依附一實、有質礙實所有勢用、是名作因。行謂勢用。
法云何。此有二種。一能轉、二能還。
能轉者、謂可愛身等樂因、我和合、一實與果相違、是名能轉。

[1] B. 攅.

彼體云何。謂屬一時等遠覺所待一實所生、彼詮緣因、是名彼體。

此體云何。謂屬一時等近覺所待一實所生、此詮緣因、是名此體。

覺云何。謂悟一切境。

此有二種。一現量、二比量。

現量者、於至實色等根等和合時、有了相生、是名現量。

比量者、此有二種。一見同故比、二不見同故比。

見同故比者、謂見相故、待相所相相屬念故、我意合故、於不見所相境有智生、是名見同故比。

不見同故比者、謂見因果相屬一義和合相違故、待彼相屬念故、我意合故、於彼畢竟不現見境所有智生、是名不見同故比。

樂云何。謂一實我德、適悅自性名樂。

苦云何。謂一實我德、逼惱自性名苦。

極微者、謂極微所有、和合、一實極微詮緣因、是名極微。
四

極大者、謂空時方我實和合、一實極大詮緣因、亦名遍行等、是名極大。

別體云何。謂一切實和合、一非一實別詮緣因、一別體等、是名別體。

合云何。謂二不至至時名合。

此有三種。一隨一業生、二俱業生、三合生。

隨一業生者、謂從有動作無動作而生。

俱業生者、謂從二種有動作生。

合生者、謂無動作多實生時與空等合。

離云何。謂從二至不至名離。

此有三種。一隨一業生、二俱業生、三離生。

此中、隨一業生、及俱業生、如前合說。

離生者、謂已造果實由餘因離、待果實壞與空等離。

味云何。謂唯舌所取一依名味。

香云何。謂唯鼻所取一依名香。

觸云何。謂唯皮所取一依名觸。

數云何。謂一切實和合、一非一實等詮緣因、一體等名數。

量云何。謂微體、大體、短體、長體、圓體等名量。

微體者、謂以二微果爲和合因緣、二體所生一實微詮緣因、是名微[1]體。

大[2]體者、謂因多體大[2]體、積集差別所生三微果等和合、一實大詮緣因、是名大體、

短體者、謂以二微果爲和合因緣、二體所生一實短詮緣因、是名短體。

長體者、謂因多體長體、積集差別所生三微果等和合、一實長詮緣因、是名長體。

圓體者、有二種。一極微、二極大。

三

[1] B. 短.　[2] B. 長.

二

風云何。謂唯有觸、是爲風。
空云何。謂唯有聲、是爲空。
時云何。謂是彼此俱不俱遲速詮緣因、是爲時。
方云何。謂是東南西北等詮緣因、是爲方。
我云何。謂是覺樂苦欲瞋勤勇行法非法等和合因緣起智爲相、是爲我。
意云何。謂是覺樂苦欲瞋勤勇法非法行不和合因緣起智爲相、是爲意。
德句義云何。謂二十四德名德句義。
何者爲二十四德。一色、二味、三香、四觸、五數、六量、七別體、八合、九離、十彼體、十一此體、十二覺、十三樂、十四苦、十五欲、十六瞋、十七勤勇、十八重體、十九液體、二十潤、二十一行、二十二法、二十三非法、二十四聲。如是爲二十四德。
色云何。謂唯眼所取一依名色。

勝宗十句義論[1]

勝者慧月造

唐[2]三藏法師玄奘奉詔譯

有十句義。一者實、二者德、三者業、四者同、五者異、六者和合、七者有[3]能、八者無能、九者俱分、十者無說。

實句義云何。謂九種實名實句義。何者爲九。一地、二水、三火、四風、五空、六時、七方、八我、九意。是爲九實。

地云何。謂有色味香觸、是爲地。

水云何。謂有色味觸及液潤、是爲水。

火云何。謂有色觸、是爲火。

[1] B. adds 一卷. (B. = the text in the Bodleian Library.)

[2] B. omits 唐.

[3] B. omits 有. See notes on chap. i, 8–9.

印度 勝者慧月 著
支那 玄奘三藏 譯
日本 宇井伯壽 譯

勝宗十句義論 全

大正六年六月
一千九百十七年
英國亞細亞協會發行

INDEX

[Proper Names, Subjects, and Sanskṛt Technical Terms, with Chinese Equivalents.]

The Table of Contents may also be consulted.

Stephen Austin and Sons, Ltd., Printers, Hertford.